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BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE EVIDENCE IN THE AGE OF
DAUBERT: REFLECTIONS OF A SKEPTIC
Mark S. Brodin
I. Introduction
"Both fields, those of Mental health and Law,... speak two different
languages [and] have different customs and casts of thought... Diag
noses do not convey legal truth. Legal 'truth' and scientific 'truth'
may have nothing to do with each other."1
From its earliest use in American courts, when one Dr. Brown offered
his "scientific" opinion in a Salem witch trial,2 expert testimony has
posed fundamental issues for our system of adjudication. At its most
basic the quandary is: How can we utilize specialists to educate a lay
jury about matters beyond their ken without at the same time intruding
upon the jurors' central role as ultimate factfinder?
In recent years courts and commentators have focused considerable
attention on one dimension of this problem—assuring some degree of
"reliability" regarding the principles and methodologies underlying the
expert's testimony before it is heard by the jury. For much of the
twentieth century courts followed the Frye decision,3 which delegated
this assessment to the practitioners in the particular field under a
"general acceptance" standard.4 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,
* Professor, Boston College Law School. B.A.,J.D., Columbia University. This project received
generous financial support from the Darald and Juliet Libby and Dr. Thomas Carney Funds. The author
wishes to acknowledge the very insightful suggestions made on earlier drafts by Michael Avery, Robert M.
Bloom, and John Garvey, and the invaluable research assistance of Meredith Ainbinder, Deshala Dixon,
Jonah Goldman, Ryan Littrell, and Danielle Porcelli.
1. Lawrence Loeb, Forensic Testimony: WhatJudges Want, 24 PACE L. REV. 211,211-12 (2003).
2. AndreA.Moenssensetal., Scientific Evidence in Civiland CriminalCases 6 (1995)
(citing A Trial of Witches at Bury St. Edmonds, 6 HOWELL'S STATE TRIALS 687, 697 (1665)); John V.
Jansonius & Andrew M. Gould, Expert Witnesses in Employment Litigation: The Role of Reliability in Assessing
Admissibility, 50 BAYLOR L. REV. 267, 270 (1998). "The accused were found guilty and hanged. No issue
seems to have been raised in that case concerning the validity of the process for determining whether one
was a witch." Reed v. State, 391 A.2d 364, 370 n.7 (Md. 1978). See generally Jane Campbell Moriarty,
Wonders ofthe Invisible World: Prosecutorial Syndrome andProfile Evidence in the Salem Witchcraft Trials, 26 VT. L.
Rev. 43 (2001).
3. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
4. Under Frye the "court itself did not have to comprehend the science involved . . . [it] only had
to assure itself that among the people involved in the field, the technique was acceptable as reliable." 4
Jack B. Weinstein & Margaret A. Berger, Weinstein's Federal Evidence § 702.05[1] (2d ed.
1997).
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Inc.5 and itsprogeny—as well asrevised FederalRule ofEvidence (FRE)
702—now assign the trial judge the enhanced role of "gatekeeper,"
screening expert testimony based on certain reliability criteria.
Evidence routinely admitted under the pre-Daubert regime—from foren
sic to epidemiological to economic—is now subject to close scrutiny and
exclusion even before a jury is impaneled.6 In the age-old contest
betweenjudge andjury, the balance has shifted dramatically toward the
former.7
Dauberfs measure ofreliability clearly reflects a traditional conception
of science, envisioning a model driven by experimentation, replication,
and validation.8 In the context of the "hard" sciences concerning
physical phenomena, scientific facts (like the force of gravity) can be
validated in these ways.9 But applying this model to thisArticle's sub
ject, the social or "soft" sciences, is far more problematic.
The social sciences most often find their way into the courtroom as a
tool to accountforor predicthuman behavior.10 The evidence usually
consists of general assertions about classes of persons, such as rape
victims, and is offered "to provide a social and psychological context in
which the trier can understand and evaluate claims about the ultimate
fact."11 Experttestimony concerning child sexual abuseaccommodation
[GJiven the impact of the stare decisis doctrine, once a court, relying on Frye, had ruled that
a doctrine or principle had attained general acceptance, it was all to easy for subsequent
courts simply to follow suit. Before long, a body of case law could develop stating that a
methodology had achieved general acceptance without there ever having been a contested,
detailed examination of the underpinnings of that methodology.
United States v. Horn, 185 F. Supp. 2d 530, 554 (D. Md. 2002).
5. 509 U.S. 579(1993).
6. See, e.g., Henry F. Fradella et al., The Impact o/Daubert onForensic Science, 31 PEPP. L. REV. 323
(2004).
7. It has been suggested that Daubert reflected "a fundamental alteration of the relationships
between judges, juries, lawyers, and experts." Daniel W. Shuman & Bruce D. Sales, The Impact o/Daubert
andits Progeny on the Admissibility ofBehavioral andSocial Science Evidence, 5 PSYCHOL., PUB. POL'Y & L. 3, 4
(1999). In perhaps its most dramatic form, the new regime permits the trial judge to exclude a proponent's
expert witnessesbefore trial, and then grant summaryjudgment against it. See, e.g., Claar v. Burlington N.
R.R. Co., 29 F.3d 499 (9th Cir. 1994).
8. For a compelling argument that this conception of science is "unduly cramped," see David
Crump, The Trouble with Daubert-Kumho: Reconsidering the Supreme Court's Philosophy ofScience, 68 Mo. L.
Rev. 1 (2003).
9. See Dean Hashimoto, Science asMythology inConstitutionalLaw, 760R.L.REV. 111,112n.7 (1997).
10. For a good overview of the various forms of this evidence, see the recent symposium Syndromes,
Frameworks, andExpert Testimony: What Jurists Need toKnow, 24 PACE L. REV. 187 (2003).
11. Neil J. Vidmar & Regina A. Schuller,Juries andExpert Evidence: Social Framework Testimony, 52
LAW&CONTEMP.PROBS. 133, 135(1989); see also Laurens Walker &John Monahan, Social Frameworks:
ANew Use ofSocial Science inLaw, 73 VA.L. REV. 559 (1987). One writer has conceptualized the role of
social science injudicial proceedings as "assistedsensemaking." Melvin M. Mark, Social Science Evidence in
the Courtroom: Daubert and Beyond," 5 PYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y &L. 175 (1999). "[T]he social scienceshave
been developed to assistand extend natural human abilitiesto observe, understand, and makejudgments
about social behavior, organizations, and the like." Id.
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syndrome (CSAAS), battered woman syndrome, learned helplessness,
and rape trauma syndrome is offered by prosecutors to explain conduct
of the alleged victim that might appear inconsistent with abuse. For
example an expert may testify to the reasons behind a victim's delay in
reporting the events, recantation, or remaining in a relationship with the
abuser. Battered woman syndrome evidence may also be offered by the
defense for the purpose of establishing that the defendant believed she
was in imminent danger, even though the objective circumstances posed
no apparent immediate threat justifying self-defense (as where the
abuser is killed in his sleep).12 "Future dangerousness" testimony is
offered duringthe penaltyphaseofcapitalcases13 and in proceedings to
commit sexual aggressors.14
Derived not from experimentation but observation, there is serious
question as to whether much of this behavioral evidence can meet the
Daubert definition of reliable science.15 Nonetheless, this evidence con
tinues to be admittedroutinely at trial,16 often withlittle critical analysis
by the court and sometimes even after the evidence has been discredited
in its own field.17 Indeed, researchers tracking Daubert have concluded
12. See, e.g., MASS. GEN.LAWS, ch 233, § 23F (2004); CAL. EVID. CODE§ 1107 (West 1995 & Supp.
2005).
13. See Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880 (1983).
14. Seegenerally 3 DAVID L. FAIGMANETAL., MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE § 36-1-36.26 (1999).
15. Science has been defined as "knowledge or a systemofknowledge covering general truths or the
operation of general laws especially as obtained and tested through scientific method." MERRIAM-WEB
STERONLINE DICTIONARY, a/http://www.m-w.com/cgi-bin/dictionary?book=Dictionary&va=science
(last visited Mar. 23, 2005). An eminent social scientist described science as "essentially a method of
controlled observation and verification for the purpose of reducing human errors of observation, judgment,
or logic. Science begins with observation and ends by testing its assumptions against experience." Kenneth
B. Clark, The Desegregation Cases: Criticism ofthe Social Scientist's Role, 5 VlLL.L. REV. 224, 233 (1959).
16. &*z>z/raPartII.B-C..
17. Munchausen syndrome by proxy, for example, which purports to identify parents (mosdy
mothers) who feign or create illness in their children, "continues to carry weight in the judicial system"
although it has been shown to be fundamentally flawed. Margaret Talbot, TheBadMother, NEWYORKER,
Aug. 9, 2004, at 62, 69. A forensic psychologist reports that in courtrooms "they're treating [this profile]
as probative when [it]s not." Id. Butcf Adoption of Keefe, 733 N.E.2d 1075, 1080 (Mass.App. Ct. 2000)
(Munchausen syndrome inadmissible as profile evidence).
Even some long-time staples of psychology like the Rorschach inkblot personality test are being
re-evaluated and rejected in the field. See William M. Grove & R. Christopher Barden, Protecting the Integrity
ofthe Legal System: The Admissibility of Testimonyfrom Mental Health Experts Under Daubert/Kumho Analyses, 5
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 224, 226-29 (1999); Frederick Crews, Out, Damned Blot!, N.Y. REV. BOOKS,
July 15, 2004, at 22 (reviewing James M. Wood et al., WHAT'S WRONG WITH THE RORSCHACH?:
Science Confronts the Controversial Inkblot Test (2003)); Drake Bennett, Against Types,
BOSTONSUNDAY GLOBE, Sept. 12, 2004, at D1. Although some psychologists assert the Rorschach is no
more valid than "tea-leaf reading and tarot cards," it continues to be relied upon during expert testimony
in child custody disputes, sex offender evaluations, civil suits,juvenile delinquency cases, and other proceed
ings. "The Rorschach is routinely relied upon in the forensic realm." Id.
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that it has not resulted in significant changes in the admissibility of
behavioral and social science evidence.18
This Article submits, however, that the recent focus on reliability has
distracted us from far more basic evidentiary problems with the admis
sion of behavioral science, particularly of the syndrome variety. These
concerns include:
• Whether the behavioral expert's testimony is "helpful" to the trier-
of-fact in the sense required by FRE 702. Does the jury need assis
tance on the matters addressed by the testimony? And, if so, does
the evidence approach the level of certainty and precision neces
sary to render it of assistance in resolving the case?
• Whether the expert testimony is truly relevant to the disputed
issues in the particular case (what Daubert called "fit") and, if so,
whether its probative value is nonetheless outweighed by the dis
tinct risk that the jury will be confused, distracted, overwhelmed,
or unfairly prejudiced by the evidence (the familiar balancing test
of FRE 403)?
• Whether the expert testimony constitutes impermissible vouching
for the credibility of the complaining witness?
• Finally, whether the costsofthe expert testimony to the parties and
the judicial system outweigh the benefits, and if so, what alter
natives exist?
Exploration of these issues suggests a fundamental rethinking of the
widespread admission of behavioral science evidence, a phenomenon
that threatens the integrity of the factfinding process. Part II of this
Article examines the Daubert standard and its application to behavioral
science. Part III measures behavioral science testimony against the
foundational requirements for expert evidence. Part IV presents a cost-
benefit analysis of the admission of this evidence. Finally, Part V con
cludes that although social scientistshave made significant contributions
to society, as suppliers of courtroom evidence they often stand on shaky
ground.
For a scathing indictment of the entire realm of psychological testimony, see MARGARETA.
Hagen, Whores of the Court: The Fraud of Psychiatric Testimony and the Rape of
AmericanJustice (1997).
18. Shuman & Sales, supra note 7, at 5. "[BJehavioral and social science evidence that was admitted
before Daubert has been admitted afterDaubert." Id. ProfessorSlobogin comes to the same conclusion, and
even detects some increase in admission rates. See Christopher Slobogin, Doubts About Daubert* Psychiatric
Anecdata as a Case Study, 57 WASH. & LEEL. REV. 919, 940 (2000). Part of the explanation may be the
"grandfathering in" ofevidence previously ruled admissible, as discussed below.
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II. The Reliability of Behavioral Science Evidence
A. The Daubert Standard
"It is true that open debate is an essential part of both legal and
scientific analyses. Yet there are important differences between the
quest for truth in the courtroom and the quest for truth in the labora
tory. Scientific conclusions are subjectto perpetual revision. Law,on
the other hand, must resolve disputes finally and quickly. The
scientific project is advanced by broad and wide-ranging considera
tion of a multitude of hypotheses, for those that are incorrect will
eventually be shown to be so, and that in itself is an advance. Con
jectures that are probably wrong are of little use, however, in the
projectofreachinga quick, final, and bindinglegaljudgment—often
ofgreatconsequence—about a particularsetofevents in thepast. We
recognize that, in practice,a gatekeeping rolefor thejudge, no matter
how flexible, inevitably on occasion will prevent the jury from
learning of authentic insights and innovations. That, nevertheless, is
the balance that is struck by Rules of Evidence designed not for the
exhaustive searchforcosmic understandingbut for the particularized
resolution of legaldisputes."19
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. provided the vehicle by
which the United States Supreme Court reworked the doctrinal struc
ture for weighing admissibility of scientific20 proof. The decision was
writtenagainst the backdropofdissatisfaction withthe ubiquitous Frye21
standard, whichpinned admissibility on whether the methodology was
"generally accepted"asreliable in theparticularscientific community.22
19. Daubert v. MerrellDow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 596-97(1993).
20. A standard treatise observes:
In truth, much of the proof that is presented as "scientific" evidence involves very littie
science. Over the years, the term has cometo be generically appliedto a broad spectrum
of expert opinion testimony that spans the sciences, the arts and all kinds of skilled
professions. Evenwithina profession that restson scientific underpinnings, in the sensethat
the discipline has definiterulesand fixedconceptsthat governits workings, the testimony
offered by its specialists is frequendy couched in terms of opinions, conclusions, and
evaluations which, themselves, are not scientifically measurable.
MOENSSENS ETAL., supra note 2, at 1. Thus a fingerprint expertwhocomparesa latent crimesceneprint
to the defendant'sisengagednot so much in scienceas in the skill and art ofsuch comparison. See United
States v. Llera Plaza, 188 F. Supp. 2d 549 (E.D. Pa. 2002).
21. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
22. See generally PaulC. Giannelli, The Admissibility ofNovel Scientific Evidence: Fryev. United States,
AHalfCentury Later, 80 COLUM L.REV. 1197(1980). Much ofcoursedepended upon identification of the
relevantscientific community. Astrology maybegenerally acceptedamongthe communityofastrologers,
but that would not make it reliable science. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts cautioned
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Frye produced results that were both o^rinclusive, admitting dubious
evidence merelybecausepractitioners in the field rallied to its support,
and underinclusive, excluding reliable evidence merely because a con
sensus had notyetemerged accepting itsvalidity. Daubert was portrayed
in the popular media as the "junk science" case after the phrase from
Peter Huber's 1991 book Galileo's Revenge.23
The Dauberts alleged that their children's birth defects were caused
by the mother's ingestion of Bendectin, an antinausea drug. Merrell
Dow moved for summary judgment relying upon the affidavit of an
epidemiologist who had reviewed the 30 published studies concerning
Bendectin, none of which connected the drug to birth malformations.
Plaintiffs countered witheightexpertswho connected the causation dots
by reference to test tube and animal studies, pharmacological compari
sons of Bendectin and substances known to cause birth defects, and a
"re-analysis" of the previously published epidemiological studies. The
district court, affirmed by the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit, discountedplaintiffs' expertsbecause their methodologies
were not "generally accepted" within the medical and scientific com
munities, and consequently granted summary judgment for Merrell
Dow.
Vacating and remanding,Justice Blackmun's opinion rejected Fryeh
outward-looking and singular focus on "general acceptance" and con
cludedthat FRE 70224 imposed upon trialjudges themselves the taskof
independentlyassessing the reliability of scientific proof. "P]n order to
qualify as 'scientific knowledge' [within the meaning of FRE 702], an
inference or assertion must be derived by the scientific method. Pro
posed testimony must be supported by appropriate validation—i.e.,
'good grounds,' based on whatis known."25
General acceptance within the scientific community becomes only
one of severalfactors for the judge to consider under Daubert. In codify
ing the new standard in FRE 702, the Advisory Committee observed:
that ajudge[ ] ... must not define the "relevant scientificcommunity" sonarrowly that the
expert's opinion will inevitably be considered generally accepted. If the community is
defined to include only those experts who subscribe to the same beliefsas the testifying
expert, the opinion will always be admissible. A relevant scientificcommunity must be
' defined broadly enough to include a sufficiently broad sample of scientists so that the
possibility of disagreement exists.
Canavan's Case, 733 N.E.2d 1042, 1050 n.6 (Mass. 2000).
23. See D. Michael Risinger,Defining the "Task atHand": Non-Science Forensic ScienceAfter Kumho Tire
Co. v. Carmichael, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 767, 768 (2000).
24. "If scientific,technical, or other specializedknowledgewillassistthe trier of fact to understand
the evidence or to determine a fact in issue,a witnessqualified as an expert by knowledge, skill,experience,
training, or education, may testifythereto in the form ofan opinion or otherwise...." FED. R. EVID. 702.
25. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm. Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 590 (1993).
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Daubert set forth a non-exclusive checklist for trial courts to use in
assessing the reliability of scientific expert testimony. The specific
factors explicated by the Daubert Court are: (1) whether the expert's
technique or theory can be or has been tested—that is, whether the
expert's theory can be challenged in some objective sense, or whether
it is instead simply a subjective, conclusory approach that cannot
reasonably be assessed for reliability; (2) whether the technique or
theory has been subject to peer review and publication; (3) the known
or potential rate of error of the technique or theory when applied; (4)
the existence and maintenance of standards and controls; and (5)
whether the technique or theory has been generally accepted in the
scientific community.26
As David Faigman has described the new concept of evidentiary
reliability,
The key to being a good scientist is, of course, to be self-critical.
Thus, Karl Popper and the Court in Daubert used the notion of falsifi
cation to describe the process of hypothesis testing. The underlying
point is that only when hypotheses survive myriad attempts to falsify
them do we gain enough confidence to believe them. Hence, if we
believe that cross-racial identifications are less reliable than same-race
identifications, research should rigorously test this hypothesis by
subjecting it to tests that would falsify it. The logic of the null hypo
thesis is that we should not accept our pet hypothesis—the alternative
hypothesis—until wehave no choice based on our rules ofdecision.27
Other factors to weigh include whether the testimony grows naturally
and direcdy out ofresearch conducted independent of the litigation, or
was prepared expressly for purposes of testifying; whether the expert
has unjustifiably extrapolated from an accepted premise to an unfound
ed conclusion; whether the expert has adequately accounted for alter
native explanations; whether the expert is being as careful in court as
he or she would be in his or her regular professional work; and whether
the field of expertise claimed by the expert is known to reach reliable
results.28
Daubert makes clear that the trial judge's task of screening expert
evidence for reliability is not limited to novel scientific techniques (such
as the systolic blood pressure lie detector device in Frye).29 Nor, with
26. FED.R. EVID. 702 advisory committee's note (amend, effective Dec. 1, 2002).
27. David Faigman, The Law's Scientific Revolution: Reflections andRuminations ofthe Law's Use ofExperts
in Year Seven ofthe Revolution, 57 WASH. & LEEL. REV. 661, 673 (2000) (citations omitted).
28. FED.R. EVID. 702 advisory committee's note (amend, effective Dec. 1, 2000).
29. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592 n. 11.
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Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael™ isit limited to scientific proof; it applies
to allexpert testimony. In Kumho Tire, Carlson, a mechanical engineer
and tire failure expert, opined that the right rear tire on the plaintiffs'
minivan blew out because of a latent manufacturing or design defect.
His conclusion was founded upon visual inspection of the tire and his
exclusionof other possiblecausesbased on his observations and experi
ences over the years (what a physician would refer to as a differential
diagnosis). Certiorari was granted on the question of whether Daubert
applied to such expert testimony that did not derive from "scientific"
principles, and the Court answered in the affirmative. While thus ex
panding the judge's gatekeeping role to all expert testimony,31 Justice
Breyer's opinion cautioned that the standard for measuring reliability
must remain flexible and that "DauberH list of specific factors neither
necessarily nor exclusively applies to all experts or in every case."32
The premise ofDaubert and Kumho Tire is that experts, unlike ordinary
witnesses,are permitted wide latitude to offeropinions, even absent first
hand acquaintance with the events in question, because they bring rele
vant knowledge that will assist the trier-of-fact to resolve facts in dispute.
"Knowledge," Daubert notes, means "more than subjective belief or
unsupported speculation" and suggests instead a "body of known facts
or . . . ideas inferred from such facts or accepted as truths on good
grounds."33 It is the trialjudge's task, before the testimony isheard by
the jury, to assure that the expert opinion is derived from reliable
sources and that the witness is employing "the same level ofintellectual
rigor" he would use outside the courtroom.34 Where earlier decisions
placed great faith in the ability of lay jurors to assess the validity of
experttestimony astestedbycross examination andcontraryevidence,35
the judge may now preempt their role.
Yet the laundry list of reliability factors set out in Daubert and Kumho
Tire provides little concrete guidance to trial judges.36 How much is
30. 526 U.S. 137(1999).
31. In so doing, the Court answeredwhat has been referred to as the "boundary" question, namely
what evidence is subject to special scrutiny. See D.H. Kaye, Choice and Boundary Problems in Logerquist,
Hummert, and Kumho Tire, 33 ARIZ. St. L.J. 41 (2001).
32. Kumho Tire,526 U.S at 141.
33. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590 (citation omitted).
34. Kumho Tire, 526 U.S at 152.
35. See, e.g., Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 901 (1983) ("We are unconvinced . . . that the
adversaryprocesscannot be trusted to sortout the reliablefrom the unreliableevidenceand opinion about
future dangerousness, particularlywhen the convictedfelonhas the opportunity to present hisown sideof
the case."); id. at 901 n.7 ("Petitioner's entire argument, as well as that ofJustice Blackmun's dissent, is
founded on the premise that a jury will not be able to separate the wheat from the chaff.").
36. See DanielA. Krauss& Bruce D. Sales, The Problem of"Helpfulness" inApplying Daubert toExpert
Testimony: Child Custody Determinations inFamily LawasanExemplar, 5 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y& L. 78, 90-94
(1999).
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each factor to be weighed? What constitutes an acceptable error rate?
Can general acceptance of a methodology trump negative answers on
the other factors? That "gatekeeping" is no small burden is reflected in
the remarks of ChiefJudge Kozinski in his opinion on the remand of
Daubert (again excluding plaintiffs' experts):
Federal judges ruling on the admissibility ofexpert scientifictestimony
face a far more complex and daunting task in a post-Daubert world
than before. The judge's task under Frye is relativelysimple: to deter
mine whether the method employed by the experts is generally
accepted in the scientificcommunity. Under Daubert, we must engage
in a difficult, two-part analysis. First, we must determine nothing less
than whether the experts' testimony reflects "scientific knowledge,"
whether their findings are "derived by the scientific method," and
whether their work product amounts to "good science." Second, we
must ensure that the proposed expert testimony is "relevant to the task
at hand," i.e., that it logically advances a material aspect of the pro
posing party's case. The Supreme Court referred to this second prong
of the analysis as the "fit" requirement.
The first prong of Daubert puts federal judges in an uncom
fortable position. The question of admissibility only arises if it is first
established that the individuals whose testimony isbeing proffered are
experts in a particular scientificfield; here, for example, the Supreme
Court waxed eloquent on the impressive qualifications of plaintiffs'
experts. Yet something doesn't become "scientific knowledge" just
because it's uttered by a scientist; nor can an expert's self-serving
assertion that his conclusions were "derived by the scientific method"
be deemed conclusive, else the Supreme Court's opinion could have
ended with footnote two. As we read the Supreme Court's teaching
in Daubert, therefore, though we are largely untrained in science and
certainly no match for any of the witnesses whose testimony we are
reviewing, it is our responsibility to determine whether those experts'
proposed testimony amounts to "scientific knowledge," constitutes
"good science," and was "derived by the scientific method."
The task before us is more daunting still when the dispute con
cerns matters at the very cutting edge ofscientific research, where fact
meets theory and certainty dissolves into probability. As the record
in this case illustrates, scientists often have vigorous and sincere dis
agreements as to what research methodology is proper, what should
be accepted as sufficient proof for the existence of a "fact," and
whether information derived by a particular method can tell us any
thing useful about the subject under study.
Our responsibility, then, unless we badly misread the Supreme
Court's opinion, is to resolve disputes among respected, well-
credentialed scientists about matters squarely within their expertise,
in areas where there is no scientific consensus as to what is and what
is not "good science," and occasionally to reject such expert testimony
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because it was not "derived by the scientificmethod." Mindful of our
position in the hierarchy of the federal judiciary, we take a deep
breath and proceed with this headytask.37
As it has been applied by courts, the multi-factor approach has both
closed the door to some evidence previously admitted under Frye, and
opened the door to some evidence previously excluded.38 This has led
one scholar to refer to Daubert and Kumho Tire's "schizoid" character,39
and a federal judge to wonder at its "competing vectors" of more
rigorous scrutiny and more open admissibility.40
B. Application 0/Daubert to Behavioral Science Evidence
"Psychiatrists, psychologists, and social workers who base their testi
mony ... on behavioral science information are often, at best,
engaging in informed speculation, not reporting data obtained
through rigorous scientific methods."41
"It is meticulous standards that bring respect and credence to
scientific testimony. When a social psychologist is called to serve as
a 'friend of the court', he should be able to assume our belief that his
bestfriend, his premier loyalty, isalways the objective truth."42
Daubert, it has been observed, "represents a potential revolution in
American expert evidence law in that it offers as guidelines rigorous
criteria for ascertaining whether testimony claimed to be scientific is in
factscientific."43 Kumho Tire extends the range to evidence derived from
experience and observation, thus answering in the affirmative any
question about whether the Daubert opinion applies to the social
37. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm. Inc., 43 F.3d 1311, 1315-16 (9th Cir. 1995).
38. Seegenerally PAULC. GIANNELLI& EDWARDj. IMWINKELRIED, SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE §1-7-1-8
(3ded. 1999).
39. Risinger, supra note 23, at 768.
40. Id. (citing United States v. Hines, 55 F. Supp. 2d 62, 66 (D. Mass. 1999)).
41. Christopher Slobogin, TheAdmissibility of Behavioral Science Information in Criminal Trials: From
Primitivism toDaubert to Voice, 5 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y& L. 100, 101 (1999).
42. Edmond Cahn, Jurisprudence, 30 N.Y.U. L. REV. 150, 167 (1955).
43. James T. Richardson et al., The Problems ofApplying Daubert toPsychological Syndrome Evidence, 79
JUDICATURE 10, 16 (1995). A RAND Institute for CivilJustice study concludes that Daubert has had the
effectof narrowing the window of admissibility of expert testimony. See Katerina M. Eftimoff,RANDStudy:
The DecadeAfter Daubert Proves Tough on Expert Witnesses, ABA LlTIG. NEWSONLINE,July 2002, at 2; see also
Jennifer L. Reichert, Less Expert Testimony Since Daubert, Study Says, TRIAL, Apr. 2001, at 82. Butcf Paul R.
Rice & Neals-Erik William Delker, Federal Rules of Evidence Advisory Committee: A Short History of Too Little
Consequence, 191 F.R.D. 678, 703 (2000) (concluding that "[i]n fact, since the Daubert decision, admissibility
decisions of scientific evidence have not been significantly different from pre-Daubert decisions under Frye").
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sciences.44 What was not answered isthe all-important follow-up: How
does a court determine whether an expert opinion grounded in the
social sciences rests on a valid methodology?45 As the Seventh Circuit
has acknowledged, in understatement, "[sjocial sciences in general, and
psychological evidence in particular, have posed both analytical and
practical difficulties for courts attempting to apply FRE 702 and
Daubert."46
While Kumho Tire emphasizes the need to be flexible regarding appli
cation ofthe Daubert factors to testimony based on experience and obser
vation, it nonetheless insists on some showing of validation beyond the
witness's own assurance. Can the wide variety ofsocial science evidence
that has customarily been admitted at trial meet what the Supreme
Court has referred to as the new "exacting standards of reliability"?47
Or has the admissibility bar been raised above it?48
44. It is now clear that in the federal courts the Daubert framework is applicable to social science
experts. See MARGARET A. BERGER, FEDERALJUDICIAL CENTER, REFERENCE MANUAL ONSCIENTIFIC
EVIDENCE: EVIDENTIARYFRAMEWORK32(1994); Tyus v. Urban Search Mgmt., 102 F.3d 256, 263 (7th
Gir. 1997).
45. Distinguishing between knowledge derived from controlled experimentation and that derived
from experience, one court offered a helpful analogy:
The distinction between scientific and nonscientific expert testimony is a critical one.
By way of illustration, if one wanted to explain to a jury how a bumblebee is able to fly, an
aeronautical engineer might be a helpful witness. Since flight principles have some
universality, the expert could apply general principles to the case of the bumblebee.
Conceivably, even if he had never seen a bumblebee, he still would be qualified to testify,
as long as he was familiar with its component parts.
On the other hand, if one wanted to prove that bumblebees always take off into the
wind, a beekeeper with no scientific training at all would be an acceptable expert witness if
a proper foundation were laid for his conclusions. The foundation would not relate to his
formal training, but to his firsthand observations. In other words, the beekeeper does not
know any more about flight principles than the jurors, but he has seen a lot more
bumblebees than they have.
Berry v. City of Detroit, 25 F.3d 1342, 1349-50 (6th Cir. 1994).
46. United States v. Hall, 93 F.3d 1337, 1342 (7th Cir. 1996) (citations omitted).
47. Weisgram v. Marley Co., 528 U.S. 440,455 (2000). Not everyone agrees that the new standards
are all that rigorous. Some have raised questions about whetherjudges, untrained in scientific matters, will
be able to independendy assessreliability. See, e.g., Rice & Delker, supra note 43, at 703. Others argue that
Dauberts emphasis on peer review publications ignores the reality that the sources of funding for research
often itself compromises objectivity, .fejean Hellwege, Undisclosed Industry Tus ofScientific Authors Undercut
Credibility, TRIAL,July 2001, at 16 (citing Sheldon Krimsky & L. S. Rothenberg, Conflict ofInterest inScience
andMedicalJournals: EhicalPractices andAuthorDisclosures, 7 SCI.ENGINEERING ETHICS 205 (2001)); Susan
Okie, A Standfor Scientific Independence: MedicalJournals AimtoCurtail DrugCompanies' Influence, WASH.POST,
Aug. 5, 2001, at Al.
48. Writing before Daubert in the context of a statistical study suggesting racial disparity in Georgia's
death-sentencing process, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals cautioned with regard to the "soft"
sciences:
The broad objectives for social science research are to better understand mankind and its
institutions in order to more effectively plan, predict, modify and enhance society's and the
individual's circumstances. Social science as a nonexact science is always mindful that its
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1. Social Science in the Courtroom—The Beginnings
It is instructive to consider the most famous example ofsocial science
evidence—Dr. Kenneth Clark's doll studies in Brown v. Board of
Education,^ documenting theinjurious effect ofsegregated schools on the
self-esteem ofblack children. The eminent sociologist testified that he
had presented black and white dolls to 16 black children attending a
segregated elementary school and inquired which doll they liked the
best—which was the "nice" doll, which looks "bad," and which "looks
like you."50 Ten children preferredthe white dolland eleven identified
the black doll as "bad." Dr. Clark testified that these were consistent
with previous results he obtained involving hundreds of black school
children that revealed negative stereotypes held by them as well as
lasting psychological injuries.
The Court's landmark decision relied on Kenneth Clark's work to
conclude that Plessy v. Ferguson51 was flat wrong in its assertion that
"enforced separation ofthe two races [did not] stamp[s] the colored race
with a badge of inferiority:"52
Segregation of white and colored children in public schools has a
detrimental effect upon the colored children. The impact is greater
research is dealing with highly complex behavioral patterns and institutions that exist in a
highly technical society. At best, this research "models" and "reflects" society and provides
society with trends and information for broad-based generalizations. ... To utilize
conclusions from such research to explain the specific intent of a specific behavioral
situation goes beyond the legitimate uses for such research. . . .
The judiciary is aware of the potential limitations inherent in such research: 1) the
imprecise nature of the discipline; 2) the potential inaccuracies in presented data; 3) the
potential bias of the researcher; 4) the inherent problems with the methodology; 5) the
specialized training needed to assess and utilize the data competently; and 6) the
debatability of the appropriateness for courts to use empirical evidence in decisionmaking.
McCleskey v. Kemp, 753 F.2d 877 (11th Cir. 1985),affd 481 U.S. 279 (1987). Writing after Daubert and
Kumho Tire, Professor Slobogin observed that "much behavioral science does not fare well under this
standard." Slobogin, supra note 18, at 919.
49. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). It should be noted that Brown represents the use of social science evidence
on legislative facts (general propositions going to questions of policy) as compared to adjudicative facts
particular to the case. See KENNETH C. DAVIS, ADMINSTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 15:3 (2d ed. 1980);
Hashimoto, supra note 9; FED.R. EVID. 201 advisory committee's note; McCleskey, 753 F.2d at 888. This
Article will focus on the latter use.
50. These psychological studies are referenced in the famous footnote 11 of the Brown decision. See
Brown, 347 U.S. at 494 n. 11. For excerpts of the transcript of the testimony and further discussion of the
doll tests, see GordonJ. Beggs,Novel Expert Evidence inFederal CivilRights litigation, 45 AM. U. L. REV. 1,9-16
(1995); Cahn, supra note 42, at 161-63; JOHNMONAHAN &LAURENS WALKER, SOCIAL SCIENCE INLAW:
Cases and Materials 185-205 (5th ed. 2002).
51. 163 U.S. 537(1896).
52. Id. at 551. "If this be so," the Plessy Court continued, "it is not by reason of anything found in
the act [requiring segregation], but solelybecause the colored race chooses to put that construction upon
it." Id.
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when it has the sanction of the law; for the policy of separating the
races is usually interpreted as denoting the inferiority of the Negro
group. A sense ofinferiority affects the motivation ofa childto learn.
Segregation with the sanction of law, therefore, has a tendency to
[retard] the educational and mental development of Negro children
and to deprive them of some of the benefits they would receive in a
racial Py] integrated school system.
Whatever may have been the extent ofpsychological knowledge
at the time of Plessy v. Ferguson, this finding is amply supported by
modern authority. Any languagein Plessy v. Ferguson contrary to this
finding is rejected.53
Dr. Clark asserted that his doll tests were "generally accepted as
indications ofthe child's sensitivity to race asa problem,"54 and neither
his methodology nor conclusions were seriously challenged by defense
counsel at trial.55 Yet several attorneys for the plaintiffs (including
William Coleman, former clerk toJustice Felix Frankfurter) reportedly
had considerable doubt about the tests' validity.56 Moreover, the results
of the doll tests in northern schools also indicated a marked preference
for the white dolls, seemingly undercutting any causal connection to a
formally segregated environment.57
The scientific validityofDr. Clark's methodologywassubsequendy
subjected to scathing criticism.58 Doubters questioned theadequacy of
the sample tested and whether the group was a representative cross-
section, and noted the absence of both control tests on white children
and precise standards for interpretation ofresponses.59 Dr. Clark him-
53. Brown, 347 U.S. at 494 (citations omitted). Interestingly the Court did not cite to Dr. Clark's
testimony at trial, but rathertoan earlier paper. See RICHARD KLUGER, SlMPLEjUSTICE: THE HISTORY
ofBrown v.Board ofEducationand BlackAmerica's Strugglefor Equality 315-21 (1976). The
school board defendants in the Virginia case offered their ownexpertpsychologist and psychiatrist who
conceded that racialsegregation harmedblackschool children's personalities. Cahn, supra note42,at 160
(citing Trial Transcript).
54. Cahn, supra note 42, at 161 n.25.
55. Id. at 165. "The doll test was not analyzed in suitable detail by any of the cross-examiners,
probably because they, too, realized thatsegregation does degrade andinjure Negro school children." Id.
Rather, the attackon cross-examination wasan "old order" attempt to disparage Clarkhimself, including
hisparentage, place ofbirth,skin color, andNorthern orientation. Id.; see also MONAHAN &WALKER, supra
note50,at 193 ("Confronted witha determined and obviously quick-witted witness withexpertise in the
areathatFigg knew relatively little about, thedefense attorney didnotforce theissue." (citation omitted)).
56. KLUGER, supra note 53, at 321.
57. See Beggs, supra note50,at 13; see also MONAHAN &WALKER, supra note50,at 189-92.
58. See Beggs, supra note50,at 14-15; Cahn, supra note42,at 163-65; ERNEST VAN DEN HAAG
&RALPH ROSS, THE FABRIC OF SOCIETY 165-66 (1957). The critiqueofthe social science evidence, and
the Court'sreliance uponit, persists to the present. See WHAT BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION SHOULD
Have Said: The Nation's Top Legal Experts Rewrite America's Landmark Civil Rights
DECISION (JackM. Balkin ed., 2001).
59. Edgar Cahnalso suggested that some ofClark's interpretations seemed predetermined. "For
example, ifNegro children say a brown doll islike themselves, he infers that segregation hasmade them
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selflater conceded that his studies could not isolate the effects ofsegre
gated schools and thus did not provide evidentiary proof that school
segregation alone damaged the personalities of black children.60 In
short, it ishighlyunlikely that the legendarydoll studies wouldmeet the
standards set byDaubert?1 Having said this, the Court's long overdue
abandonment ofPlessy v. Ferguson standsfirmly on it's ownconstitutional
footing even ifDr. Clark's evidence (which was, from a doctrinal point
of view, arguably irrelevant) is discounted.62
conscious ofrace; yet if theysaya white dollis likethemselves, he infers that segregation hasforced them
to evade reality." Cahn, supra note 42, at 163.
60. KennethB.Clark,The Desegregation Cases: Criticism ofthe SocialScientist's Role, 5 VlLL. L.REV. 224,
231 (1959).
61. In Wessman v. Gittens, 160F.3d790(1 stCir. 1998), forexample, testimony offered bytheBoston
School Department tojustify itsrace-conscious assignment policy was discounted because thesociologist,
opiningthat teachershad lowexpectations forminoritystudents,"conceded that the data he usedwasnot
ofthequality necessary tosatisfy themethodological rigors required byhis disciple." Id. at 805. Among
the"shortcomings" notedregarding Dr.Trent'stestimonywas thatthe"climate survey" ofteacherattitudes
and the multiple regression analysis connecting low expectations with racial achievement gap were
performed in the Kansas Cityschool system, not Boston. Id. at 804. Unlikethe Court in Brown, the First
Circuit was unwilling toextrapolate results from one locality toanother. Id. Norwas thecourt impressed
with the witness' reliance on anecdotal evidence. Id. at 805-06.
62. The "modern authority" referenced in footnote 11 served as a counter to the outrageous
assertion in Plessy that the stigmaof segregation wasonly in the minds of blackcitizens. Brownv. Bd. of
Educ, 347 U.S. 483,494(1954). But, astheCourtruled inBrown, legally segregated schools were inherently
unconstitutional, id. at 495, without regard to the actual effect on black (orfor that matterwhite) school
children. See id. The "cruelty" of segregation was so "obvious and evident" that "theJustices of the
Supreme Court could see it andactonit even after reading thelabored attempts byplaintiffs' experts to
demonstrateit 'scientifically'." Cahn, supra note 42, at 159.
ChiefJustice Earl Warren himself isreported to have expressed surprise at theattention paid
totheCourt's social science footnote, stating "Itwas only anote, after all," andstressing thatitwas "merely
supportive" andnotthe"substance" ofthedecision. KLUGER, supra note53,at 706. Similarly, E.Barrett
Prettyman,Jr., law clerk toJustice RobertJackson at the time of Brown, has remarked:
It'ssointeresting, this Footnote 11 thatbecame thehuge markofcontroversy intheopinion
he has referred to here,whichcitesKen Clark'sstudies and the other social studies, wasa
throwaway. Weneverpaid anyattention to it. The ChiefI thinkjust toldJerry Gunther
or one of his law clerks to add something, add a footnote to his sentence here. Whatever
mayhave been the extent ofpsychological knowledge at the time ofPlessy thisfinding is
amply supported by modem authority. That is the finding that segregation of colored
children hasa detrimental affect uponthem. Buthereally didn'tneedanything tocite. He
was justthrowing in something tokindof,youknow, bolster it up. It was nobigdealat all.
And none of the restof us paid the slightest bit of attention to it. We should note that that
was very badjudgment on our part because Ken Clarkalonewas a matterofgreatcon
troversy, andthese studies apparently in thesociological world were contested, shall wesay.
Andsowewere allstunned when thatbecame thefocal pointofthelaydissent, thisFoot
note 11, that none of us had paid any attention to at all.
Symposium, Brown v.Board ofEducation: An Exercise in Advocacy, 52MERCER L.REV. 581, 602. In sum,
the Court's references to social psychology seem merely to have beena "convenient face-saver." Cahn,
supra note 42, at 168; see also Hashimoto, supra note 9, at 138-43.
Edmund Cahn aptly observed, "I would not have the constitutional rights of Negroes—or other
Americans—rest on any suchflimsy foundationassomeof the scientific demonstrationsin theserecords."
Cahn,supra note42,at 157-58. He lamented the prospect ofhaving
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2. Syndrome Evidence
The legal philosopher Edmond Cahn perceptively predicted that
Brown would invite social scientists into court as expert witnesses with
increasing frequency.63 Decades later Judge Teague of the Texas
Criminal Court of Appeals observed the pervasive nature of one form
of behavioral evidence.
Today, wehave the following labels: "The Battered WifeSyndrome";
"The Battered Woman Syndrome;" "The Battered Child Syn
drome;" "The Battered Husband Syndrome"; "The Battered Parent
Syndrome;" "The Familial Child Sexual Abuse Syndrome"; "The
Rape Trauma Syndrome"; "The Battle Fatigue Syndrome;" "The
Viet Nam Post-Traumatic StressSyndrome"; "The Policeman's Syn
drome"; "The Post-Concussive Syndrome"; "The Whiplash Syn
drome;" "The Low-Back Syndrome;" "The Lover's Syndrome;"
"The Love Fear Syndrome"; "The Organic Delusional Syndrome;"
"The Chronic Brain Syndrome"; and "The Holocaust Syndrome."
Tomorrow, there willprobably be additions to the list, such as "The
Appellate CourtJudge Syndrome."64
Another commentator has apdy coined the phrase "forensic abuse
syndrome."65
our fundamental rights rise, fall, or change along with the latest fashions of psychological
literature. Today the socialpsychologists—at leastthe leadersof the discipline—are liberal
and egalitarianin basic approach. Suppose,a generation hence, some of their successors
were to revert to the ethnic mysticismof the very recent past; suppose they were to present
us with a collection of racist notions and label them "science." What then would be the
state of our constitutional rights?
Id at 167. More recently, Professor Kathleen Sullivan observed on the 50th anniversary of Brown that
relianceon the socialscience "leavesopen the possibility that separateeducationmight be permissible in
someother time,place,or setofsocialcircumstances, ifevidence fromsocial science coulddemonstratethat
it had different psychological effects, suchas empowering minoritystudents or improving their academic
performance." KathleenSullivan, What Happened to Brown?, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Sept. 23, 2004,at 48.
Evidence of this kind is now available. See Black Children's Self-esteem: ANewLook, BOSTON SUNDAY GLOBE,
April 2, 2000, at Al7.
63. Cahn, supra note42,at 166.Cahn predictedthat "[a]sthecourts'exclusionary rulesofevidence
tend to relax more and more the [social] scientists will appear more frequently to testifyas expert wit
nesses." Id; see also Clark, supra note 15(advocatinggreater integration ofsocialsciencein thejudicial pro
cess).
64. Werner v. State, 711 S.W.2d 639,649 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986)(TeagueJ., dissenting)(citations
omitted). Mr. Werner shot and killed another motorist following a minor traffic accident. The son of
Holocaustsurvivors, he offeredin support of his self-defense claimtestimonyfrom a psychiatrist asserting
that survivorsand their familieshad a heightened senseof fear whenever they were threatened in any way;
thus what might appear to an outsideras an egregious overreactionduring a conversation betweentwo
driverswasto Werner a reasonableresponseto perceiveddanger. The trial court excludedthe testimony.
For more on the proliferation of syndromeevidence, seeSlobogin, supra note 41, at 103-04.
65. Ian Freckelton, When Plight Makes Right—The Forensic Abuse Syndrome, 18 CRIM. LJ. 29 (1994).
To thisalreadylonglistweshouldadd PostTraumaticSlavery Disorder, ParentalAlienation Syndrome,
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Syndrome evidence continues to be widely admitted,66 yet it does not
come close to satisfying either Daubert or Kumho Tire standards.67 The
concept ofpsychological syndromes wasoriginallydevelopedbypracti
tioners for therapeutic and not truth-detection, purposes.68 Mental
health professionals are trained to assist patients, not judge their credi
bility. "While it may be entirely proper for a clinician to accept a
patient report of sex abuse at face value and proceed to render treat
ment on that basis,for forensic purposes, such an assumption is," as one
court observed, "utterlyinappropriate."69 It isfar fromself-evident that
Compassion Fatigue, SecondaryTraumaticStress (STS), and Vicarious Traumatization(VT). See Marcella
Bombardieri, Theory links Slavery, Stress Disorder, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 12,2002,at Bl; Alayne Katz,Junk
Science v. Novel Scientific Evidence: ParentalAlienation Syndrome, Getting it Wrong in Custody Cases, 24 PACE L. REV.
239(2003); AndrewP. Levin&ScottGreisberg, Vicarious Trauma inAttorneys, 24 PACE L.REV. 245 (2003).
66. See GlANNELLI &IMWINKELRIED, supra note 38, at 427; DAVID L. FAIGMAN ETAL., SCIENCE
IN THE LAW: SOCIAL BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE ISSUES §§ 4-1.0,5-1.0,6-1.0,7-1.0(2002); Moriarty, supra
note 2, at 92-98; Fradella et al., supra note 6, at 403; BERGER, supra note 44, at 87-88 (collecting cases
admitting syndrome evidence).
Thisisnot tosuggest thatallcourtsareinaccord. Somenotabledecisions rejecting theevidence
asunreliable includeGier v. Educational Service Unit No. 16,845 F.Supp. 1342, 1353 (D.Neb. 1994), State v.
Cressey, 628 A.2d 696,699 (N.H. 1993) ("Generally speaking, the psychological evaluation of a child
suspected ofbeingsexually abusedis,at best,an inexactscience . . . [and]doesnot presentthe verifiable
results and logical conclusions that workto ensurethe reliability requiredin the solemnmatter ofa criminal
trial."),Newkirk v. Commonwealth, 937 S.W.2d 690 (Ky. 1996), and State v. Saldana, 324 N.W.2d 227, 230
(Minn. 1982).
It mustbe noted that profileevidence offered by the prosecutionregardingthe defendant (unlike
syndromeevidenceregardingthe victim) is generallynot admissible, as it is viewedas unreliableand runs
afoul ofthecharacter evidence prohibition against painting thedefendant asa particular "criminal-type."
See, e.g,Commonwealth v.Day,569N.E.2d397,399(Mass. 1991) (reversing conviction because evidence
of"child batteringprofile" hadbeenadmitted against defendant); People v.Robbie, 112 Cal.Rptr.2d479
(Ct. App. 2001) (rapist profile); see also State v. Vue, 606N.W.2d 719, 723 (Minn. Ct. App. 2000) ("By
asserting that Hmongmentendtoabuse theirwives, theexperttestimony directly implied to thejury that
becausedefendantwasHmong, he wasmore likely to have assaultedhiswife. It is self-evident that this is
highly prejudicial. It isimpermissible tolink adefendant's ethnicity tothelikelihood ofhisguilt.); cf. Dang
Vang v. VangXiong X. Toyed, 944 F.2d 476 (9th Cir. 1991) (expert permitted to testify regarding
submissiveness of Hmong, women to explain failure complain of rape by government employee). See
generally MONAHAN & WALKER, supra note 50, at 455-65; PAUL J. LlACOS ET AL., HANDBOOK OF
MASSACHUSETTS EVIDENCE § 7.8.5, at 437-38 (7thed. 1999). Testimony offered by the defendant that
he didnot fitthe sexoffender profile hasalso beenexcluded. See Statev. Parkinson, 909P.2d647(Idaho
1996).
Afew jurisdictions allow testimony as to whether the defendant is the typeofpersonality who
wouldcommit the criminalact. Seecases collected in Slobogin, supra note 41, at 103.
67. See Richardson et al., supra note 43.
68. Id. at 13. The originator ofChildSexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome (CSAAS) hassince
described it as "clinical observation" whichhas become "elevated as gospel." See Steward v. State,652
N.E.2d 490,492-93 (Ind. 1995) (citations omitted). "Thesyndrome was notintended asadiagnostic device
anddoes notdetect sexual abuse. Rather, thesyndrome was designed forpurposes oftreating childvictims
and offering them . . . assistance . . . ." Id. (citations omitted); see also Lisa R. Askowitz & Michael H.
Graham, The Reliability ofExpert Psychological Testimony in Child SexualAbuse Prosecutions, 15CARDOZO L. REV.
2027,2039-40(1994).
69. Newkirk, 937 S.W.2d at 694.
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methodologies useful inchoosing a course ofpsychotherapy arereliable
enough "toprovide a sound basis forinvestigative conclusions and con
fident legal decision-making."70 Indeed theAmerican Psychiatric Asso
ciation's own Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders
(DSM) warns against using these categories for forensic purposes.71
A dissenting Michigan SupremeCourtJustice argued that the courts
have it backward:
The [child sexual abuse accommodation] syndrome's sole function
was to start with a known child victim of sexual abuse, and then to
explain the child's behavioral reactions to the abuse. The syndrome
cannot be used in reverse, which would be to start with the behavioral
reactions identified bythe syndrome, checkoffthe onesthat the child
exhibits, and conclude that, on the basisofthe checklist, the childwas
sexually abused.72
The very definition of a "syndrome" itself raises questions about
reliability:
A syndrome is a cluster ofsymptoms that appear together regularly
enough tobeconsidered associated. Unlike diseases, syndromes have
70. Gier, 845 F.Supp. at 1353; see also Spencer v. General Elec. Co.,688F. Supp. 1072, 1075-76
(E.D. Va. 1988) ("Evidence ofPTSD [Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder] occasioned byrape ... isnota
scientifically reliable means ofproving thata rape occurred. PTSD issimply adiagnostic category created
by psychiatrists; it is a human construct, anartificial classification ofcertain behavioral patterns. RTS
[Rape Trauma Syndrome] was developed by rape counselors as atherapeutic tool tohelp identify, predict,
andtreat emotional problems experienced bythecounselor's clients orpatients. It was notdeveloped or
devised asa tool forferreting outthetruthin cases where it ishotly disputed whether therape occurred.);
Statev. Chauvin, 846So.2d 697, 707 (La. 2003) ("[T]he psychiatric procedures used in developing the
diagnosis ofPTSD are designed for therapeutic purposes and are not reliable as fact-finding tools to
determine whethersexual abusehasin factoccurred."); Statev. Cressey, 628A.2d696, 702(N.H. 1993)
("The child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome was notintended tobeadiagnostic device capable of
detecting whether a child has been sexually abused. Rather, itproceeds from the premise that achild has
been sexually abused and seeks to explain the resulting behaviors and actions of the child." (citation
omitted)); Stewardv.State, 652 N.E.2d 490,493 (Ind. 1995) (child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome
helps toexplain reactions—such as recantingordelayed reporting—ofchildren assumed to have experienced
abuse); Newkirk, 937 S.W.2d at 692 ("Neither [CSAAS] syndrome northe symptoms that comprise the
syndrome have recognized reliability in diagnosing child sexual abuse as a scientific entity." (quoting
Hellstrom v. Commonwealth, 825 S.W.2d 612, 614 (Ky. 1992)).
71. DSM-IV xxxii-xxxiii (4th ed.TextRevision 2000) ("When theDSM-IV categories, criteria, and
textual descriptions are employed in making legal judgments, there are significant risks thatdiagnostic
information will be misused or misunderstood.")
72. People v.Peterson, 537 N.W.2d 857, 873 (Mich. 1995) (Cavanagh, J., dissenting). Thesyn
drome identifies five behavioral reactions commonly observed in victims: (1) secrecy, (2) helplessness, (3)
entrapment and accommodation, (4) delayed, conflicted, and unconvincing disclosure, and (5) retraction.
These responses are equally consistent with other experiences, including poverty orpsychological abuse.
Id. at 872-73. "Because children's responses to sexual abuse vary widely, and because many of the
characteristics identified by CSAAS, or by similar victim behavior groupings, may result from causes
unrelated toabuse, diagnostic use ofsyndrome evidence incourtrooms poses serious accuracy problems."
Steward, 652 N.E.2d at 493.
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no specified temporal course, norisa pathological naturenecessarily
clear. Therefore, syndromes vary in the certainty with which they
allow inferences about etiology.73
Although sometimes confused withoneanother,syndromes mustbedis
tinguished from Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), a generally
recognized anxiety disorder (with more precise contours) that has been
listed in the DSM since 1980.74 Syndromes are not recognized in the
DSM.75
Characterized by one court as "vague psychological profiles and
symptoms, and unquantifiable evaluation results,"76 there has been sub
stantial criticism ofthe endeavorto compile a checklist that couldserve
as an accurate indicator ofwhether abuse occurred:
There are nosymptoms or behaviors thatoccur in every case ofchild
abuse, norarethere symptoms orbehaviors thatarefound exclusively
in child abuse cases Thesymptoms ... arefarfrom establishing
a clearprofile bywhich an abused child can be accurately identified.
Many of the symptoms considered to be indicators of sexual abuse,
such asnightmares, forgetfulness, andovereating, could justaseasily
be the result ofsome other problem, or simply may be appearing in
the natural course of the children's development.77
When the checklist includes behavioral reactions thatmay becaused by
traumatic events unrelated tosexual abuse, it isnota reliable diagnostic
tool.78 Indeed, testimony from syndrome "experts" often identifies such
73. Richardson etal., supra note 43, at 11 n.3. Seegenerally David McCord, Syndromes, Profiles and Other
Mental Exotica: ANew Approach to theAdmissibility ofNontraditional Psychobgical Evidence in Criminal Cases, 66OR.
L. REV. 19 (1987). Even some courts that admit expert testimony in this area reject theuse ofthe term
"syndrome" because ofitsmisleading nature. See, e.g, Peterson, 537N.W.2d at 863.
74. Seegenerally Missy Thornton, State v.Chauvin: Determining the Admissibility ofPost-Traumatic Stress
Syndrome Diagnosis as Substantive Evidence ofSexualAbuse, 78 TUL. L. REV. 1743 (2004).
75. Donna A. Gaffhey, PTSD, RTS, and ChildAbuse Accommodation Syndrome: Therapeutic Tools or Fact-
FindingAids, 24 PACEL. Rev. 271,284(2003).
76. Statev. Cressey, 628A.2d696, 700(N.H. 1993).
77. Id. at 700; see also Peterson, 537 N.W.2d at 871 (Cavanagh, J., dissenting) ("the behavioral
'symptoms'ofchildsexualabuseare too variedand too unreliableto be usedasaccurate detectorsofsexual
abuse."). "Research findings related to Child Abuse Accommodation Syndrome arelimited anddonot
support sexual abuse syndrome oraCSAAS. These syndromes are[exploratory] and meet neither^ nor
Daubert:' Gaffhey, supra note 75, at284 (citations and internal quotations omitted); see also McCord, supra
note 73, at 41 ("Researchers have been unsuccessful in theirattempts to find common reactions that
children have tosexual abuse. Infact, research has indicated that children react inincredibly diverse ways
tosexual abuse."); Brett Trowbridge, TheAdmissibility ofExpert Testimony in Washington on Post Traumatic Stress
Disorder and Related Trauma Syndromes: Avoiding the Battle ofthe Experts By Restoring the Use ofObjective Psychological
Testimony in the Courtroom, 27SEATTLE U.L.REV. 453 (2003).
78. Peterson, 537 N.W.2d at872 (Cavanagh,J., dissenting); see also Commonwealth v.Dunkle, 602
A.2d 830, 832 (Pa. 1992) ("The difficulty with identifying a set ofbehaviors exhibited by abused children
is that abused children react inamyriad ofways that may not only be dissimilar from other sexually abused
children, butmay bethe very same behaviors aschildren exhibit who arenotabused.").
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commonplace symptoms as poor self-esteem, family problems, associa
tion with an older peer group, depression, withdrawal, leaving home
without permission, and problems with school behavior and perfor
mance.79
In order to establish the clinical reliability of a syndrome identifica
tion, it would have to be shown first that its particular symptoms are
distinguishable fromthoseassociated withother syndromesor disorders,
and second, that different clinicians would agree on a diagnosis for the
same patient.80 Social scientists have demonstrated neither.81 Instead,
we have what one forensic psychiatrist concedes is "some fuzziness in
the diagnosis."82 One might ask whether syndrome testimony is just
"another opportunity for socialscientists to 'cloak an investigationcon
cerned with the soft-data of attitudes and feelings in the mande of
exactitude conveyed by medical and physical science"'83 (as has been
suggested in the context of the "psychological autopsy" used to deter
mine whether a suspicious death was a suicide).
Although the literature is somewhat more persuasive in identifying
common characteristics among victims ofrape84 andbattering85 thanof
79. See, e.g., Stewardv. State, 652 N.E.2d 490, 492 (Ind. 1995); Dunkle, 602 A.2d at 833.
80. See Patricia Frazier & Eugene Borgida,Juror Common Understanding and the Admissibility ofRape
Trauma Evidence in Court, 12 LAW &HUM.BEHAV. 101,117(1988); Askowitz & Graham, supra note 68, at
2029. Asonecourtput it in regardto standardfieldsobrietytesting(SFST), "[R]eliability meansthe ability
of a test to be duplicated, producingthe sameor substantially sameresults when successively performed
under the same conditions. Thus, for the SFSTs, if reliable, it would be expected that different officers,
viewing the same suspect performing the SFSTs, would reachthe same conclusion regarding the level of
the suspect's impairment or intoxication. Alternatively, the sameofficer re-testing the samesuspect with
the same BAC as when first tested would reach the same conclusion." United States v. Horn, 185 F. Supp.
2d 530, 539 (D. Md. 2002).
81. In the caseof CAAS,for example, "it is difficult to determine whether delayeddisclosure is a
direct resultof the abusivesituation, a completelydifferentstressful event, or the child's age and natural
development." Askowitz & Graham, supra note 68, at 2040.
82. MichaelWelner, Hidden Diagnosis and Misleading Testimony: How Courts Get Shortchanged, 24 PACE
L. REV. 193, 204 (2003)(referring to battered women syndrome).
83. David Ormerod, Psychological Autopsies: Legal Applications and Admissibility, 5 iNT'Lj. EVID. &
PROOF 1,2 (2001) (quotingJames Selkin, PsychologicalAutopsy: Scientific Psychohistory or Clinical Institution?, 49
AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 74, 74 (1994)); see also State v. Guthrie, 627 N.W.2d 401 (S.D. 2001)(suicidologist's
testimony on risk factors for suicide wasproperlyadmitted, but not hisconclusion that based on profile
victim did not commit suicide).
84. See David McCord, The Admissibility ofExpert Testimony Regarding Rape Trauma Syndrome inRape
Prosecutions, 26 B.C. L. REV. 1143, 1199-1202(1985); Robert R. Lawrence, Checking the Allure ofIncreased
Conviction Rates: The Admissibility ofExpert Testimony ofRape Trauma Syndrome inCriminal Proceedings, 70 VA. L.
Rev. 1657, 1667-80(1984).
85. United States Deparment of Justice, The Validity and Use of Evidence
Concerning Batteringand its Effects in CriminalTrials (1996) [hereinafter USDOJ Report] ,
available athttp://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/ocpa/94Guides/Trials/Valid/. Although thisreportconcludes that
"[e]xperttestimony on battering and itseffects can be based on and supported by an extensive bodyof
scientific and clinicalknowledge on the dynamics of domestic violence and traumatic stress reactions," it
nonetheless rejects the simplistic notion of a "battered woman syndrome." Id. at ix, vii. "A singular
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childsexual abuse,serious questions ofevidentiaryreliability persist. As
Professor Jane Moriarty has put it, syndrome evidence essentially
"requires a belief in the meaningful relationship between the criminal
activity (the cause) and the observable behaviors or symptoms in the
victims (the effect)."86 But the "empirical pillars" of that belief rest, in
the words ofone standard treatise, "on less than sound foundations."87
To the extent that the conclusions are based on anecdotal evidence, the
reliability problems are self-evident—such broad generalizationsabout
social phenomena, withoutempirical confirmation, have been rejected
when asserted by social scientists in court in other contexts.88
As noted above, a keyfactor in the Daubert formulation is the ability
to verifyor disprove a theory: "Scientific methodologytoday is based
on generating hypothesesand testingthem to seeif they can be falsified;
indeed, this methodologyiswhat distinguishes science from other fields
ofhuman inquiry."89 Behavioral science constructs such aspsycholo-
construct, suchasthe term 'battered woman syndrome' is not adequate to encompass the scientific and
clinical knowledge about battering and its effects that is germane to criminal cases involving battered
women. The term'battered womansyndrome' portrays astereotypic image ofbattered womenashelpless,
passive, orpsychologically impaired, andbattering relationships asmatching asingle pattern, which might
not apply in individual cases." Id. at vii-viii.
86. Moriarty, supra note 2, at 45.
87. FAIGMAN ETAL., supra note66, §4-1.0, at 172 (referring to battered womansyndrome). "No
courtor commentatorhasdefendedthe methodologyusedto develop [battered woman]syndromeor has
suggested that adequate research methodswereemployedin it development. Unfortunately, courts have
almost uniformly failed to examine in any detail whatsoever the empirical support, or lackthereof, for
batteredwoman syndrome [B] alteredwoman syndromeremains littiemore than an unsubstantiated
hypothesis that... hasyettobetested adequately orhasfailed tobecorroborated whenadequately tested."
Id. §4-1.5, at203-04; see also David L. Faigman &AmyJ. Wright, The Battered Woman Syndrome in the Age of
Science, 39 ARIZ.L. REV. 67 (1997).
Regarding the reliability of the research methods underlying battered woman syndrome, the
following candid remarks of its originator, Dr. LenoreWalker, arecause forconcern:
Lawyers, in cross-examination, said "She isbiased because shestarts witha premise thata
woman who say's she'sbattered is a batteredwoman. She shouldstart with a premise of
neutrality." First of all, that is not appropriate using the scientific method. But, it is also
important to know that you can't be neutralwhen dealingwith somebody who has been
abused and still collect reliable andvaliddata. The psychology of an abuse victim tellsus
that one of the most significant damages that happens,at leastto a woman but I think for
men as well, is that victims lose the capacity to understand neutrality and objectivity.
Because of theneedto protect oneself from further abuse, the abuse victim learns tojudge
that you are either "with" her or you are considered "against" her. If you are not
observably "with" her, then sheneedsto protectherselffrom you, and she'llusewhatever
methodsthat shehasdeveloped to copewithrepeated danger andrepeated abuse to make
sure you have less ofa chance to cause her harm.
Now,what I havedescribed is not bias to the psychologist. I wouldbe biasing the
informationI gatherif I did not recognize the wayabatteredwoman reacts to an interview.
LenoreE. A. Walker,Psychology and Law Symposium: Women and the Law, 20 PEPP. L. Rev. 1170, 1171-72
(1993).
88. See, e.g., Wessman v. Gittens, 160 F.3d 790, 806-07 (1st Cir. 1998) (discussed atsupra note61).
89. 509 U.S. 579, 593 (1993) (citationomitted).
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gical syndromes obviously do not lend themselves to testing upon
patients and control groups.90 Unlike at least some of the predictions
and assumptions of economists,91 syndrome theory cannot usually be
validated in retrospect.92 Even the recognition of a condition such as
PTSD (Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder) in the DSM givesno assurance
of scientific reliability in the Daubert sense of empirical validation.93
A second Daubert factor, computation ofthe known or potential error
rate, including calculation offalsepositives and negatives, isequally pro
blematic whenappliedto syndrome and other social science evidence.94
The question posed by Kumho Tire—how often the expert's methodology
producedan erroneous result95—is usually unanswerable in thiscontext.
Even if the two other factors enumerated in Daubert—existence of a
peer review literature and general acceptance among people in the
field—were satisfied with regard to certain types ofsyndrome evidence,
neither assures evidentiary reliability under the new standard. Where
a discipline itself lacks reliability, as in the case of astrology, general
acceptance amongpractitioners carries little weight.96
The Court emphasized that "the test of reliability is 'flexible,'5' and
Dauberfs list of specificfactors neither necessarily nor exclusivelyapplies
to all experts or in every case. "Rather, the law grants a district court
the same broad latitude when it decides how to determine reliability as
it enjoys in respect to its ultimate reliability determination."97 Yetsyn
drome evidence has not been shown to be reliable under any meaning
ful scientific or legal standard.
90. See generally Richardson et al., supra note 43; seealso Gier v. Educ. Serv. Unit No. 16, 845
F. Supp. 1342, 1348 (D. Neb. 1994); State v. Foret, 628 So. 2d 1116, 1125 (La. 1993); Askowitz &
Graham, supra note 68, at 2040 (1994) (scientistscannot "recreate or control [sexual abuse] for scientific
experiment").
91. See, e.g, Saia v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 47 F. Supp. 2d 141, 148 (D. Ma. 1999) ("Many of the
predictions or assumptions of economists in damages testimony can be validated in retrospect, if not
otherwise. For instance, predicted rates of inflation, predicted salaryescalations,averagelifeexpectancies,
average work lifeexpectancies, average interest rates, can all be looked at years down the line to determine
if we were correct in allowing expert estimates of economic loss .... No such retrospective validation is
possible . . . [with] hedonic damages. Speculative assumptions remain speculation." (citation omitted)).
92. Similarly, empirical research on the theory of "repressed memory," the notion that memories
of abuse or trauma may be suppressed and later can be revived during therapy or hypnosis, has not
progressed to the point where the concept realisticallycan be tested. See Richardson et al., supra note 43,
at 13-14; elizabeth loftus, the myth of repressed memory: false memories and
Allegations of Sexual Abuse (1994).
93. Richardson et al., supra note 43, at 14. "Many mental disorder categories contained in the DSM
also lack reliability, such that two psychiatrists or psychologists can diagnose the same client as suffering
from two different disorders." Id.
94. Id. at 14-15.
95. Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 151 (1999).
96. Id.
97. Id. at 141-42.
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Syndrome evidence must be distinguished from other forms of psy
chological testimony in which the subject's state of mind is directly in
issue. Qualified psychiatrists routinely testify on the issue of a criminal
defendant's insanity or diminished mental state. Their opinions are
based upon psychiatric examination of the*subject and reflect years of
scientific investigation of the major psychotic disorders, the clinical
course of which have been charted with some precision and generally
accepted in the fields.98
In pondering the admissibility ofsyndrome testimony it is instructive
to look at another form of behavioral "science" that, although of even
more dubious reliability, is regularly admitted in the trial of capital
cases." Texas executed Thomas Barefoot for the murder of a police
officer after two psychiatrists told the jury that he would commit further
acts of violence and represented a continuing threat to society. One
psychiatrist testified that there was a "one hundred percent and abso
lute" chance that Barefoot would commit future acts of criminal vio
lence.100 Neitherwitness had examined (orrequested to examine) Bare
foot; each merely responded to hypothetical questions about the
defendant posed by the prosecutor.
In its amicus brief in Barefoot v. Estelle,m the American Psychiatric
Association roundly debunked the accuracy ofsuch predictions, assert
ing that" [t]he unreliability ofpsychiatric predictions oflong-term future
dangerousness is by now an established fact within the profession."102
Studies acknowledged by the Court indicated that these predictions
werewrongtwoout ofthree times.103 The best thatJustice White could
98. See generally FAIGMAN ETAL.,supra note 66, § 1-2.0-1-2.1.3, at 22-26; McCord, supra note 73,
at 35-38 (1987). Professor Slobogin advocates admission of such evidence as a matter of necessity, there
being no better method for exploring criminal responsibility. See Slobogin, supra note 18, at 922-23.
Similarly, in civil casespsychologicalexperts testifyas to the emotional distresssufferedby the
plaintiff. See, e.g.,Jansonius & Gould, supra note 2, at 287-90.
99. Seegenerally Erica Beecher-Monas&Edgar Garcia-Rill, Danger atthe Edge ofChaos: Predicting Violent
Behavior ina tf^-Daubert World, 24 CARDOZO L. REV. 1845 (2003); Eugenia T. LaFontaine, A Dangerous
Preoccupation with Future Danger: Why Expert Predictions ofFuture Dangerousness in Capital Cases are Unconstitutional,
44 B.C. L. REV. 207 (2002).
100. Barefootv. Estelle,463 U.S. 880,919 (1982)(BlackmunJ., dissenting)(emphasisomitted). One
of the witnesses,James Grigson, was dubbed "Dr. Death" because of his testimony for the prosecution in
over 100 death-penalty cases. In every one, he had diagnosed the defendant as an untreatable antisocial
personality bound to commit further violence; and the jury invariably agreed. ALAN STONE, LAW,
Psychiatryand Morality 107 (1984)(quoted in D.H. Kaye, Science in Evidence 276 (1997)). The
Barefoot jury deliberated for one hour before returning with answers requiring a death sentence. 463 U.S.
at 919. In 1995 Dr. Grigson was expelled from both the American Psychiatric Association and the Texas
Societyof PsychiatricPhysiciansbecauseof his unprofessionaland unethical testimony in death cases. See
Flores v.Johnson, 210 F.3d 456, 467 (5th Cir. 2000) (Garza, C.J., concurring).
101. 463 U.S. 880(1982).
102. Id. at 920 (BlackmunJ., dissenting).
103. Id. at 901 n.7, 920-21. See generally Grant H. Morris, Defining Dangerousness: Risking a Dangerous
Definition, 10J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 61, 85 (1999).
2005] BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE EVIDENCE 889
come up with to support the holding that admission of the evidence did
not violate Barefoot's constitutional rightswas that" [n]either petitioner
nor the Association suggests that psychiatrists are always wrong with
respect to future dangerousness, only most ofthe time? and thus the Court
was "not persuaded that such testimony is almost entirely unreliable"104
Justice Blackmun derided this "remarkable observation."105
Even after Daubert, "future dangerousness" evidence continues to be
admitted in capital cases,106 civil commitments,107 and proceedings to
commit "sexually dangerous persons."108 Psychiatrists routinely testify
in Texas courts—without even the benefit of an examination of the
defendant or his psychological records—that in their unequivocal
"expert opinion," the convicted murderer poses a future danger.109 Yet
nothing in the years since Barefoot v. Estelle has even remotely established
the reliability of this evidence,110 which "virtually compel[s]" juries to
choose the death penalty.111
Ironically, the form of social science evidence which is most solidly
based in "hard" empirical science has met with the most resistance in
104. Id. at 899-901 (emphasis added). For a recent critique of the decision, see Thomas Regnier,
Barefoot in Quicksand' The Future of "Future Dangerous" Predictions in Death Penalty Sentencing in the World of
Daubert and Kumho, 37 AKRON L. REV.469 (2004). See generallyJohn Monahan, Violence Risk Assessment:
Scientific Validity and Evidentiary Admissibility, 57 WASH. & LEEL. REV. 901 (2000).
The Barefoot Court did distinguishthe narrow constitutional question before it from what it saw
as the separate matter of reliability under evidence doctrine. 463 U.S. at 899 n.6; see also Kaye, supra note
31. Moreover, the decision may reflect the pragmatic reality that where the jury is required by statute to
determine dangerousness, expert testimony no matter how unreliable may be all that is available to assist
them. See People v. Murtishaw, 631 P.2d 446, 469 (Cal. 1981).
105. Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 928 (Blackmun,J., dissenting). For Blackmun, Brennan, and Marshall this
was simply too much to swallow. "In a capital case, the specious testimony of a psychiatrist, colored in the
eyesof an impressionable jury by the inevitable untouchability of a medical specialist'swords, equates with
death itself." Id. at 916 (Blackmun,J., dissenting).
106. Seegenerally FAIGMAN ETAL.,supra note 66, § 2-1.1, 3-1.1, at 77, 114; Regnier, supra note 104,
at 501-02.
107. Seegenerally Alexander Scherr, Daubert &Danger: The "Fit"ofExpertPredictions inCivil Commitments,
55 HASTINGS L.J. 1 (2003).
108. Seegenerally Robert F. Schopp et al., Expert Testimony and ProfessionalJudgment: PsychologicalExpertise
andCommitment as a Sexual Predator After Hendricks, 5 PSYCHOL. PUB.POL'Y& L.J. 120 (1999).
109. See Flores v.Johnson, 210 F.3d 456, 458 (5th Cir. 2000) (Garza, C.J., concurring) (affirming
denial of habeas relief on other grounds). The "expert," Dr. Griffith, "is frequendy the state's star witness,"
testifying (at that time) in 97 capital murder trials. Id. at 462.
110. Judge Garza wrote in Flores, "[s]uch testimony lacking objective scientific testing or personal exa
mination defies scientific rigor and cannot be described as expert testimony. It is simply subjective testi
mony without any scientific validity by one who holds a medical degree." Id. at 458. Citing Daubert and
Kumho Tire, Judge Garza observed, "The inadequacy of the science underlying Dr. Griffith's testimony
become[s] strikingly apparent when considered relative to scientific evidence generally admissible at trial."
Id. at 464. Indeed "it appears that the use of psychiatric evidence to predict a murderer's 'future
dangerousness' failsall fiveDaubert factors." Id.; see also FAIGMAN ETAL.,supra note 66, § 2-1.1, at 78 ("This
area of the law thus presents a paradox in which judges seemingly take the most lenient approach toward
scientific evidence involving some of the most controversial science to enter the courtroom.").
111. Flores, 210 F.3d at 458.
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the courts. Expert testimony concerning the limitations and weaknesses
of eyewitness identification112 is firmly rooted in experimental founda
tion, derived from decades of psychological research on human percep
tionand memory aswell asan impressive peer review literature.113 Like
syndrome evidence, this testimony purports to educate the factfinder
about reasons a witness at trial should be believed or disbelieved. The
expert is prepared to testify about the factors that adversely affect
accuracy (for example, stress, "weapon focus," and confusion of post-
event information) and to contradict assumptions likely to be shared by
jurors, such as the equation of the witness's level of certainty with the
accuracy of the identification.114
Despite itsclearly"scientific"(inthe Daubertsense)foundations, expert
testimony on eyewitness identification isveryoften excluded at trial.115
Courts rejecting it typically conclude it is unnecessary because an
unassisted jury is perfectly capable of weighing the weaknesses of
eyewitness testimony after cross-examination by defense counsel,116 a
112. By far the most common error found by researchers studying exonerations after wrongful
convictions is faulty eyewitness identification testimony. See EDWARD CONNORS ET AL., NATIONAL
Institute ofJustice, Convicted byJuries, Exonerated by Science: Case Studies in the Use
of DNA Evidence to Establish Innocence After Trial (1996); Barry Sheck et al., Actual
Innocence (2000).
113. See GlANNELLI & IMWINKELRIED, supra note 38, § 9.2, at 428-30; EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY:
PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES (Gary Wells et al. eds., 1984); Vidmar & Schuller, supra note 11, at 160-
66. For recent decisions making the case for reliability, see Newsome v. McCabe, 319 F.3d 301, 305-07
(7th Cir. 2003) and United States v. Hines, 55 F. Supp. 2d 62, 71 (D. Mass. 1999).
114. See, e.g, United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224 (3d Cir. 1985); see also Vidmar & Schuller,
supra note 11, at 161-62.
115. Seegenerally GlANNELLI &IMWINKELRIED, supra note 38, § 9.2(C), at 434-39; FAIGMAN ETAL.,
supra note 66, § 8-1.1, at 370 n.3. See also United States v. Hall, 165 F.3d 1095, 1107 (7th Cir. 1999) (such
evidence is strongly disfavored); United States v. Smith, 156 F.3d 1046, 1052-53 (10th Cir. 1998) ("Until
fairly recently, most, if not all, courts excluded expert psychological testimony on the validity of eyewitness
identification. But, there has been a trend in recent years to allow such testimony under circumstances
described as 'narrow.'") (citation omitted); Commonwealth v. Francis, 453 N.E.2d 1204 (Mass. 1983)
(collecting state and federal cases). There has been somewhat more judicial receptivity to this evidence in
recent years. See FAIGMAN ETAL.,supra note 66, § 8-1.1, at 369.
The research into eyewitness identification has had its impact outside the judicial forum, most
notably in the promulgation of reform guidelines by the U.S. Dept. ofJustice (adopted in NewJersey and
otherjurisdictions). See NATIONAL INSTITUTE OFJUSTICE,EYEWITNESS EVIDENCE: A GUIDEFORLAW
Enforcement (1999).
116. See FAIGMAN ETAL.,supra note 66, §8-1.3.1, at 375 (casescollected); State v. Coley, 32 S.W.3d
831 (Tenn. 2000); Francis, 453 N.E.2d 1204. Butcf United States v. Smithers, 212 F.3d 306, 316 (6th Cir.
2000) ("Today, there is no question that many aspects of perception and memory are not within the
common experience of most jurors, and in fact, many factors that affect memory are counter-intuitive.");
Hines, 55 F. Supp. 2d at 72 ("While jurors may well be confident that they can draw the appropriate
inferences about eyewitness identification directly from their life experiences, their confidence may be
misplaced, especially where cross-racial identification is concerned.").
2005] BEHA MORAL SCIENCE EVIDENCE 891
conclusion belied by the empirical data,117 or that it invades the exclu
sive province of thejury to assess the credibility ofwitnesses.118
In any event, the frequent exclusion ofexpert testimony on eyewitness
identification despite its scientific reliability, contrasting sharply with the
widespread admission of evidence of such dubious reliability as "future
dangerousness" and the various syndromes discussed above, strongly
suggests that factors other than reliability are playing the determinative
role. These will be explored in the next section.
C Judicial RationalesforAdmission ofBehavioral Science Evidence
"If courts allow the admission of long-relied upon but ultimately
unproven analysis, they may unwittingly perpetuate and legitimate
junk science."119
Despite heightened reliability standards, courts persist in admitting
behavioral science evidence.120 In explaining thisparadox, it has been
suggestedthat media attention and public sentiment surrounding certain
kinds of cases, particularly those involving abuse of children and
women, have influenced courts in this regard.121 Researchers in the
117. See Brian L. Cutler et al.,Juror Decision Making in Eyewitness Identification Cases, 12 LAW & HUM.
BEHAV. 41 (1988) (concluding that laypersons are not knowledgeable or critical about the variables that
influenceeyewitnessmemory such as stressfulness of the confrontation, time delay, and levelof confidence
of the witness); see also Newsome v. McCabe, 319 F.3d 301, 305-07 (7th Cir. 2003).
118. See, e.g., United States v. Lumpkin, 192 F.3d 280, 289 (2d Cir. 1999) ("By testifying that
confidence bears little or no relationship to accuracy in identifications, Dr. Lieppe would effectively have
inserted his own view of the officers' credibility for that of the jurors, thereby usurping their role. Indeed,
by our estimation, the added aura of reliability that necessarilysurrounds expert testimony would have
placed the officers' credibility here in jeopardy. As a result, we find Dr. Lieppe's proposed testimony
intrudes too much on the traditional province of the jury to assesswitness credibility."); United States v.
Hall, 165 F.3d 1095, 1107 (7th Cir. 1999) ("the credibility of eyewitness testimony is generally not an
appropriate subject matter for expert testimony because it influences a critical function of the
jury—determining the credibility of witnesses."). Butcf.Hines, 55 F. Supp. 2d at 72 ("All that the expert
does is provide the jury with more information with which the jury can then make a more informed
decision.").
119. United States v. Lewis, 220 F. Supp. 2d 548, 554 (S.D. W. Va. 2002).
120. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
121. Richardson et al., supra note 43, at 11. Referring to battered woman syndrome, Faigman et al.
observe: "The reasons for this positive reception lie more in the policies and values implicit and explicit
in the law, rather than the quality or force of the science. In particular, courts have been justly outraged
at the rate ofdomestic violence, and the very poor record of the legal systemin responding to this violence."
FAIGMAN ETAL., supra note 66, § 4-1.0, at 172; see also Slobogin, supra note 41, at 117-18 (arguing that
continued admission ofbattered woman syndrome evidence, despite its suspect reliability,may be necessary
to "avoid damage to the political viability of the [criminal justice] system.").
As one forensic psychiatrist put it recently, "[i]f they make a play out of a case, that is a clear
indication of how much political pressure can be attached." Welner, supra note 82, at 197 (footnote
omitted). Certainly the notorious child care center abuse casesof the 1980sand the accompanying public
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fields may have failed to critically test their hypotheses for fear of being
labeledpolitically incorrect.122 Also playing a part is the reluctance123
or inability124 of trialjudges to conduct the critical analysis envisioned
in Daubert and Kumho Tire, a problem anticipated by Chief Justice
Rehnquist.125 And in cases like Barefoot v. Estelle™ the courts seem
willing to skirt the reliability question in order to permit statutory
schemes like Texas's death penalty, premised on future dangerousness,
to operate.
It is also important to note the prevalence of "grandfathering in"
evidence previously admitted in the jurisdiction under less stringent
standards. As one court put it (apparently without seeing the irony),
"[t]he fact that handwriting comparison analysis has achieved wide
spread and lasting acceptance in the expert community gives us the
assurance of reliability that Daubert requires."127 This circular reason
hysteria played a role in encouraging courts to admit evidence of questionable validity from children and
"experts." See Askowitz & Graham, supra note 68, at 2028-29.
In an apparent example of the power of media attention, U.S. District Judge Lewis Pollak
reconsidered and vacated an order excluding fingerprint identification evidence as unreliable only two
months after he issuedit, after an avalanche of national coverage. See United States v. Llera Plaza, 179 F.
Supp. 2d 492 (E.D.Pa. 2002), vacated by 188 F. Supp. 549 (E.D.Pa. 2002).
122. David Faigman has observed that "[i]n our time, the rape trauma syndrome, the battered
woman syndrome, repressed memories, post-traumatic stress disorder, and child abuse accommodation
syndrome all represent accession to holy writ." Faigman, supra note 27, at 674.
More direct and transparent political pressure on and within Congress produced the
controversialamendments that appear asFRE 413,414, and 415, which suspend in sexualassaultand child
molestationcasesthe usualprohibition against"bad act" evidenceand perhaps eventhe trialjudge's power
under FRE 403 to excludesuch proof when unfairlyprejudicial. See generallyJoseph A. Aluise,Evidence of
Prior Sexual Misconduct inSexual Assault and Child Molestation Proceedings: DidCongress ErrinPassing Federal Rules
413, 414, and415?, 14J. L. & POL. 153 (1998).
123. In large part because of their sympathy towards battered women who kill their abusers, "courts
have almost uniformly failed to examine in any detail whatsoever the empirical support, or lack thereof,
for the battered women syndrome." FAIGMAN ETAL., supra note 66, § 4-1.5, at 203-04.
124. Richardson et al., supra note 43, at 15; Margaret Kovera, The Effects ofPeer Review and Evidence
Quality on Judge Evaluations ofPsychological Science: AreJudges Effective Gatekeepers?, 85J. APPL. PSYCHOL. 574
(2000)(concludinguntrained judges had difficultyrating the validityofscientificstudies);Margaret Kovera
et al.,Assessment ofthe Commonsense Psychology Underlying Daubert, 8 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 180(2002).
125. "I defer to no one in my confidence in federal judges; but I am at a loss to know what is meant
when it issaid that the scientific statusofa theory depends on its Talsifiability,' and I suspectsome of them
willbe, too." Daubert v.MerrellDowPharm., Inc., 509U.S. 579,600 (1993) (Rehnquist,C.J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part).
126. 463 U.S. 880 (1983) (discussed at supra notes 100-05 and accompanying text).
127. United Statesv. Crisp, 324 F.3d 261, 271 (4thCir. 2003). Another federaljudge admitted the
testimonyof a pediatrician who had examined the allegedvictim and was prepared to testify that her
behaviorwasconsistent withabuse: "Well,I'm not goingto holda Daubert hearing. I've had thistestimony
beforein trials,and it's not newand novel " United Statesv. Velarde, 214 F.3d 1204, 1208(10th Cir.
2000) (omission in original). In an influential opinion, Massachusetts SupremeJudicial Court Justice
Greaney opined that "in the absence of specific, concrete evidence suggesting unreliability, Lanigan
[adoptingDaubert analysis] shouldnot be used to revisit areas wherewe have validatedexpert testimony
based on properly conducted personal observations and clinical testing applying generally accepted
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ing,128 which directly contradicts the entire thrust ofDaubert and Kumho
Tire, nonetheless has supported the admission of much evidence which
could not survive contemporary scrutiny.
Several otherjudicial rationales have been invoked to avoid meaning
ful reliability testing ofsocial science evidence.129 Some states continue
to followFrye and admit such evidence under the more lenient "general
acceptance" standard.130 Others have concluded that experttestimony
concerning syndromes isnot novel scienceand thus need not be specially
scrutinized.131 Still other decisions except from screening expert
testimony that isbased onobservation and experience.132 Finally, some
courts have held that where the social science evidence is not offered as
direct proofof what happened, but only as an explanation of a victim's
behavior, a reliability showing is not necessary.133
The Supreme Court ofArizona reliedupon severalofthese rationales
inaninfluential opinion regarding testimony on"repressed memory."134
Plaintiff Kim Logerquist called a clinical psychiatrist to support her
belated claim that she was sexually abused by her pediatrician as a child,
scientific techniques." Canavan's Case, 733 N.E.2d 1042, 1053 (2000) (Greaney,J., concurring); see also
Commonwealth v. Frangipane, 744 N.E.2d 25, 33 (Mass. 2001).
128. Ashas been welldocumented with regard to fingerprint identification, courts initially admitted
the evidencewithout any meaningfulconsideration of reliabilityand then, having beenjudicially accepted,
it was welcomed by other courts. See SIMON A. COLE, SUSPECT IDENTITIES: A HISTORY OFFINGER
PRINTING AND CRIMINAL IDENTIFICATION (2001); Robert Epstein, Fingerprints Meet Daubert- The Myth
ofFingerprint 'Science" is Revealed, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 605, 615-17 (2002)
A more enlightened view suggests "a court faced with the present task of deciding the
admissibility of scientific evidence must exercisecare to considerwhether new developmentsor evidence
requirea reevaluation of the conclusions previously reachedby courtsthat did not havethe benefitofthe
more recent information. In short, neither science and technology may rest on past accomplishments—nor
may the courts." Untied Statesv. Horn, 185F. Supp. 2d 530, 536 n.15(D.Md. 2002); see also CHARLES
A. Wright & Victor A. Gold, 29 Federal Practice and Procedures § 6266, at 277 (1997)
("Dauber?s focus upon multiplecriteriafor scientific validitycompelslowercourtsto abandon longexisting
per se rulesof admissibility or inadmissibility grounded upon the Frye standard.").
129. For an inventory of the various state's approaches, see Steward v. State, 652 N.E.2d 490, 495-98
(Ind. 1995).
130. See, e.g, Nixon v. United States, 728 A.2d 582, 588-89 (D.C. 1999)(methodology in diagnosis
of battered women based on work of Dr. Lenore Walker is generally accepted in community of mental
health experts); State v. Alberico, 861 P.2d 192, 208 (N.M. 1993) ("PTSD is generally accepted by
psychologists and psychiatrists as a valid technique for evaluating patients with mental disorders. The
existenceof DSM III-R and its general acceptance in psychologyindicate that PTSD has been exposed to
objective scientific scrutiny and empirical verification.").
131. See, e.g., State v. Vumback, 791 A.2d 569, 578-80 (Conn. App. Ct. 2002),affdon other grounds,
819 A.2d 250 (Conn. 2003); Logerquist v. McVey, 1 P.3d 113, 118 (Ariz. 2000).
132. See, e.g., Canavan's Case, 733N.E.2d at 1053(2000) (GreaneyJ. concurring); Logerquist, 1P.3d
at 120.
133. See, e.g, People v. Beckley,456 N.W.2d 391, 404 (Mich. 1990).
134. Logerquist, 1 P.3d at 115. For a critique of the court's reasoning,see Kaye, supra note 31 and
Tomika Stevens,TheAdmissibility ofExpert Testimony on RepressedMemories ofChildhoodSexualAbuse inLogerquist
v. McVey: Reliability Takes a Backseat to Relevancy, 46 VlLL. L. REV. 385 (2001).
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but had developedamnesiaand onlyrecoveredthe memoriesyearslater
as an adult.135 The witness had conducted studies on the effect of
trauma on memory and was conversant with the extensive literature in
the field of repressed memory.136 In moving to exclude the testimony,
the defendant doctor presented a researchpsychologistwho testifiedthat
there were "serious flaws" in many of the studies relied upon by
plaintiffs expert.137 The trial judgeexcluded Logerquist's expert on the
grounds that his evidence did not meet the Frye general acceptance test,
pointing to the cautionary note in the DSM-IV, relied upon by the
expert, that "[tjhere is currently no method for establishing with
certainty the accuracy of such retrieved memories in the absence of
corroborative evidence."138
Reversing, the Supreme Court of Arizona exempted observational
and experience-based expert testimony from reliability screening.
Rejecting the "judge-as-gatekeeper" model, the court opted instead to
leave it to the jury to weigh the expert's testimony.139 Rejecting both
Daubert and Kumho Tire, Logerquist asserts that the we need only be
concerned about reliabilitywhere the testimony isbased on a "scientific"
principle, process, theory, or formula, and only then when it is also
"novel "m In those limited situations we distrust the jury's ability to
evaluate the evidencebecause they are out of their element and may be
unduly impressed with "the infallibility" of the science. But no similar
obstacles prevent thejury fromassessing an expertwhoisrelyingmerely
on observations and experience. Overriding its professed "skepticism"
about the plaintiffs repressed memory claims, the Arizona Supreme
Court choseto relyon the adversarysystem, particularlycross-examina
tion, to expose the flaws in the psychiatric expert's testimony.141
Logerquist relied on an earlier decision holding that a dog handler's
opinion on the ability of his trackingdog to identify human scent long
after it was laid down was admissible without pre-screening under
Frye:142
135. Logerquist, 1 P.3d at 115.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 117.
139. Id. at 119.
140. Id. at 119, 121. Quoting decisions in other jurisdictions, the court noted that "testimony
concerninggeneralcharacteristics ofchildsexual abusevictims isnot 'new,novelor experimental scientific
evidence' and therefore doesnot requirethe additional screening providedby Frye." Id. at 121 (citations
omitted).
141. Id at 134.
142. Id. at 119-20.
2005] BEHA VIORAL SCIENCE EVIDENCE 895
The evidencehere was not bottomed on any scientific theory. In fact,
it appears thatnoone knows exactly how or why some dogs areable
to track or scent, or the degree to which they are able to do so. No
attempt was made to impress the jury with the infallibility of some
general scientific technique or theory. Rather, this evidence was
offered on the basis that it is common knowledge that some dogs,
when properly trained andhandled, candiscriminate between human
odors. Preston's testimony waspremisedupon this simple idea and
was notoffered asa productoftheapplication ofsome accepted scien
tific process, principle, technique ordevice. Itwas offered asPreston's
opinion ofthemeaning ofhis dog's reaction; thatopinion was based
upon Preston's training ofand experience with the dog. The weight
of the evidence did not hinge upon the validity or accuracy of some
scientific principle; rather, it hinged on Preston's credibility, the
accuracy ofhispastobservation ofthe dog's performance, the extent
of the training he had given the dog, and the reliability of his
interpretations of the dog's reactions. It was not the theories of
Newton,Einsteinor Freud which gavethe evidence weight; ifso, the
Frye test should have been applied. It was, rather, Preston's
knowledge, experience and integrity which would give the evidence
weight and it was Preston who was available for cross-examination.
His credentials, his experience, his motives and his integrity were
effectively probedand tested. Determination ofthese issues does not
depend on science; it is the exclusive province ofthe jury.143
Scholar Michael Saks has described this reasoning as follows:
"Because [such testimony] flunks Daubert, it isnot science. Because it is
not science, it need not pass the Daubert test. [T]heweakest fields, with
the most tenuous commitment to real science, recategorize themselves
as nonsciences to remain expert witnesses in a post-Daubert world."144
AndtheLogerquist courtseemed oddly unperturbed byits own admission
that the witness presenting the dog-scent evidence turned out to be a
"charlatan" who had been permitted to give false testimony in several
criminal cases before he was exposed.145 Was that not the natural
consequence ofexempting such testimony from reliability screening?
Logerquist also relied on another Arizona precedent that rejected a
DNA expert's opinion based on probability and statistics because they
were not found to be generally accepted by scientists in the field, but
permitted him to testify to his own "personal opinion" that the two
samples matched. Because no scientific principle was invoked in the
143. Id. at 120 (quoting State v. Roscoe, 700P.2d 1312, 1319-20 (Ariz. 1984)).
144. Michael J. Saks, The Aftermath of Daubert An Evolving Jurisprudence ofExpert Evidence," 40
JURIMETRICS 229, 237 (2000).
145. Logerquist, 1 P.3d at 120.
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latter testimony, no reliability showing was required.146 Yet asJustice
McGregor noted in his dissent in Logerquist, it is hard to see how the
truth-finding function of the trial is served bypermitting an expert to
expound an opinion, notshown to bebased onreliable science, simply
because he expresses it as his "personal" opinion.147
Kumho Tirem rejects the notion that expert testimony based upon
observation should beimmunized from judicial scrutiny. TheSupreme
Judicial CourtofMassachusetts explained its ruling to the same effect:
There isno logical reason why conclusions based on personal obser
vations or clinical experience should not be subject to [reliability]
analysis. That a person qualifies as an expert does not endow his
testimony with magic qualities. Observation informed byexperience
is butone scientific technique thatis noless susceptible to [reliability]
analysis thanothertypes ofscientific methodology. Thegatekeeping
function ... is the same regardless ofthe nature ofthe methodology
used: to determine whether the process or theory underlying a
scientific expert's opinion lacks reliability [such] that [the] opinion
should not reach the trieroffact. Of course, even though personal
observations arenotexcepted from [reliability] analysis, inmany cases
personal observation will be a reliable methodology to justify an
expert's conclusion. If the proponent can show that the method of
personal observation is either generally accepted by the relevant
scientific community or otherwise reliable to support a scientific
conclusion relevant to thecase, such experttestimony isadmissible.149
A final rationale courts have articulated for admitting social science
evidence without reliability screening concerns the role played bythe
evidence at trial. "i^?-ing," theargument goes, is necessary only when
the evidence is "likely to have an enormous effect in resolving com
pletely a matter in controversy."150 When the expert gives testimony
that "only helps a trier to interpret the evidence ... it will be received
on a lesser showing of scientific certainty."151 Since testimony from
146. Statev. Hummert,933P.2d 1187, 1192-93 (Ariz. 1997).
147. Logerquist, 1 P.3d at 142.
148. See supra notes30-34and accompanying text.
149. Canavan's Case, 733 N.E.2d 1042,1050 (Mass. 2000) (citations omitted) (personal observations
and clinical experience ofaphysician regarding patient's "multiple chemical sensitivity"). Inaconcurring
opinion, Justice Greaney sought to distinguish "the so-called 'soft' sciences, such as psychology and
sociology, which arehighly dependent oninformation derived from such sources aspersonal observations,
clinical assessments, and statistical data. It is here, more than anywhere else, that anappellate court will
defer toa trial judge's exercise ofdiscretion, once the judge makes a decision as to the reliability ofthe
process or theory underlying theproffered opinions andtherelevance oftheopinion toa matter in issue."
Id. at 1053.
150. Logerquist, 1 P.3d at 121.
151. Id. at 121; see also People v. Peterson, 537 N.W.2d 857, 864 (Mich. 1995) ("as long asthe
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behavioral experts regarding the various victim syndromes is "not
offered asdirect proofthat sexual abuse occurred but asan explanation
of behavior that would help the jury understand the evidence and
determine whether the charge was true," the protection against misuse
lies in cross-examination and not exclusion.152 Whether reliability
screening should turn on this distinction, which may have more signifi
canceto the legal professional than the layjuror, isopen to serious ques
tion.153
Even if these various rationales for admitting social science evidence
withoutscrutiny werepersuasive, it is submitted that the evidence runs
afoul of the threshold requirementsfor admission of expert testimony,
as set out in the next section.
III. Threshold Foundational Issues Regarding
Behavioral Science Evidence
As a witness permitted to expound opinions in court,154 the expert
holds greatpotential sway overfactfinder. The trial judge has always
served as a gatekeeper to assure that the expertis "qualified" byvirtue
of "knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education"; that the
subject matterto be addressed concerns "scientific, technical, or other
specialized knowledge"; andthat thetestimony will "will assist thetrier
of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue."155 It
isalso ofcourse thejudge's responsibility to determine that the expert's
evidence is relevant156 and that its probative value is not substantially
outweighed "by the dangerofunfair prejudice, confusion ofthe issues,
or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of
time, or needless presentation ofcumulative evidence."157
purpose ofthe[syndrome] evidence ismerely tooffer anexplanation for certain behavior, theDavis/Frye
test is inapplicable"); Frenzel v. State, 849 P.2d 741 (Wyo.1993) (although CSAAS is not generally
accepted, testimony based onthesyndrome may beadmitted toexplain thebehavior ofanalleged victim
such asdelayed reporting); Wilson v.Philips, 86Cal. Rptr. 2d204, 206 (Ct. App. 1999) (refusal toapply
Frye orDaubert toscreen expert's opinion thatplaintiffs' behavior was "consistent with otherindividuals who
had repressed their memories ofchildhoodsexual abuse").
152. Logerquist, 1 P.3d at 121.
153. Indeed, in ruling admissible testimony about the "typical" behavior ofsexabuse victims, the
New Mexico Supreme Court blurred thedistinction byexplaining: "Ifa complainant suffers from PTSD
symptoms, it indicates thatshe might have been sexually abused. Thus, testimony regarding a complainant's
PTSD symptoms has the tendency to show that she might have been sexually abused." State v.Alberico, 861 P.2d192,
209 (N.M. 1993)(emphasisadded).
154. Lay witnesses areofcourse allowed some limited opportunity to state an opinion. See FED. R.
EVID. 701.
155. Fed. R. Evid. 702.
156. Fed.R. Evid. 401.
157. Fed. R. Evid. 403.
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A survey offederal district judges recently conducted by the Federal
Judicial Center determined that the reasons most often cited for exclu
sion of expert testimony have to do with these basic foundational
requirements foradmission, and not concerns about reliability.158 The
most frequent ground for exclusion was that the evidence is not relevant
(47%), followed closely bythe conclusion that the proffered testimony
would not assist the trier of fact (40%).159 Twenty-one percent of the
exclusions were based on FRE403 concerns that theprejudicial nature
ofthe testimony outweighed its probative value.160 Reliability concerns
accounted for approximately 20 percent of the exclusions.161
As explained in the following sections, behavioral science evidence
does not fare well measured against these threshold requirements for
admission.162
A "Helpfulness" and "Fit"
"[T]he separate fields ofbehavioral science and criminal justice are
different enough intheirfoundations andgoals thatwhatmay becon
sidered helpful information in one may not be so valued in the
other."163
A prime consideration with regard to the admissibility of expert
testimony is, as Wigmore put it, whether "[o]n This subject canajury
receive from This person appreciable help?"164 While the traditional
formulation required the subject matter tobebeyond theken ofaverage
juror,the federal standard of"helpfulness" is more lenient.165 Although
thematter is one notwholly outside thejury'sknowledge, an expert may
still be permitted to testify if it will "assist" in resolving the disputed
issues. Moreover, as one court explained in a case involving testimony
158. Molly TreadwayJohnson et al., FederalJudicial Center: Expert Testimony in





162. Forthecontrary conclusion see Walker &Monahan, supra note 11, and Robert P. Mosteller,
Legal Doctrines Governing the Admissibility ofExpert Testimony Concerning Social Framework Evidence, 52 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 85 (1989).
163. Statev. Cressey, 628A.2d696, 699 (N.H. 1993).
164. John Henry Wigmore, Evidence§ 1923, at 21 (1940). As Prof. Ronald Allen has putit,
"Does the expert infact possess knowledge useful tothis trial that is being brought tobear upon itinaway
thatincreases theprobability ofaccurate outcomes?" RonaldJ. Allen, Expertise and the Supreme Court' What
is the Problem?, 34 SETON HALL. L. REV. 1,8 (2003).
165. Seegenerally Krauss &Sales, supra note36; Mosteller, supra note 162, at 96-97.
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regarding a defendant's susceptibility to making a false confession,
"[e]ven though the jury may have had beliefs about the subject, the
question is whether those beliefs were correct. Properly conducted
social science research often shows that commonly held beliefs are in
~_-,~ — 55166
error.
On the other hand, if the jury is in as good a position to resolve the
disputed issues as the expert, the testimony should not be admitted.167
When the layjuror would be able to make a commonsense determina
tion of the issue without the aid of an expert, the testimony is super
fluous.168 Indeed, too pessimistic a view of the jury's capabilities leads
to substitution ofprofessional "expertise" for community wisdom.169
Courts have allowed expert testimony concerning the "typical"
conduct of abuse victims on the assumption that jurors need assistance
in understanding why a battered woman does not leave the abusive
relationship, or a rape victim fails to report the crime, or a child
represses the memory of the traumatic sexual encounter. State v.
Lindsay170 is a representative example:
The trialjudgehasdiscretion to allow suchexperttestimony where it
may assist the jury in deciding a contested issue, including issues
pertaining to accuracy or credibility of a witness' recollection or
testimony. The trialjudgemayexercise this discretion where thereis
a reasonable basis to believe that the jury will benefit from the
assistance of expert testimony that explains recognized principles of
social or behavioral science which the jury may apply to determine
issues in the case. Testimony of this type is not to be permitted in
every case, but only in those where the facts needed to make the ulti
mate judgment may not be within the common knowledge of the
ordinary juror.
... [T]he courtofappeals correctly concluded that the trial court
did not abuse its discretion in permitting . . . testimony on general
patterns of behavior. We cannot assume that the average juror is
166. United States v. Hall, 93 F.3d 1337, 1345 (7th Cir. 1996); see also Tyus v. Urban Search
Management, 102 F.3d 256, 263 (7th Cir. 1997) ("Social scientists inparticular may beable toshow that
commonly accepted explanations forbehavior are,when studied moreclosely, inaccurate. These results
sometimes fly in the face ofconventional wisdom. The courtbelow erredinsofar asit assumed that only
evidence completely inaccessible to thejury could come in under Rule 702. ... [A] trial court is not
compelled toexclude expert testimonyjustbecause thetestimony may, toa greater orlesser degree, cover
matters that arewithin the average juror's comprehension." (citations omitted)); UnitedStates, v. Hines,
55F. Supp. 2d 62,64 (D. Mass. 1999) ("[E]ven if the inferences may be drawn bythe layjuror,expert
testimony may beadmissible asan 'aid' in thatenterprise. Forexample, thesubject looks like onethejury
understands from every daylife, but in fact, the inferences thejury maydraware erroneous.").
167. State v. Saldana, 324 N.W.2d 227, 229 (Minn. 1982).
168. See FED.R. EVID. 702 advisory committee's note.
169. See Mark, supra note 11, at 179.
170. 720 R2d 73 (Ariz. 1986).
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familiar with the behavioral characteristics ofvictims ofchild molest
ing. Knowledge of such characteristics may well aid the jury in
weighing the testimony of the alleged child victim. Children who
have been the victims of sexual abuse or molestation may exhibit
behavioral patterns (e.g. recantation, conflicting versions of events,
confusion or inarticulate descriptions) which jurors mightattribute to
inaccuracy or prevarication, but which may be merely the result of
immaturity, psychological stress, societal pressures or similarfactors
as well as of their interaction.171
Mostjurisdictionsallowtestimonybased on child abuse accommoda
tion syndrome to explain the child's apparendy self-impeaching con-
171. Id. at 74-75 (citations omitted). Similarly, the SupremeJudicial Court of Massachusetts has
ruled thattestimony onthegeneral behavioral characteristics ofsexually abused children may beadmitted
because the behavioral and emotional characteristics of these victims is beyond the jury's common
knowledge:
While jurorsmaybe capable ofpersonalizing the emotions ofvictims ofphysical assault
generally, and of assessing witness credibility accordingly, tensions unique to the trauma
experienced byachild sexually abused bya family member haveremained largely unknown
tothepublic. As theexpert's testimony demonstrates theroutine indicia ofwitness reliability
—consistency, willingness to aid the prosecution, straightforward rendition of the fact—
may, forgood reason, belacking. As a result jurorsmayimpose standards ofnormalcy on
childvictim/witnesses whoconsistently respond in distinctly abnormalfashion.
Commonwealth v.Dockham, 542 N.E.2d 591, 598 (Mass. 1989); see also Mindombe v.United States, 795
A.2d 39, 46(D.C. 2002) ("We believe there isa difference, however, between anadult witness narrating
hisor her story of abuse and a young childrecounting and expressing hisor her recollection of abuse.
There arespecial cognitive issues thatrelate tochildren who arevictims ofsexual abuse thatusually arenot
at issue when thewitness isan adult."); State v. Cressey, 628 A.2d 696, 702-03 (N.H. 1993) (Several
common behaviors, such as child's delayeddisclosure of abuse, recantation, and inconsistentstatements
"maybepuzzling orappear counterintuitive tolay observers" andmay present adefendant anopportunity
to"superficially attack thetestimony ofachild victim witness during cross-examination ortoargue against
thechild's credibility in closing statements before thejury. Therefore, expert testimony explaining the
peculiar behaviors commonly found insexually abused children [without offering anopinion astowhether
a certain child has been sexually abused] may aidajuryinaccurately evaluating thecredibility ofa child
victim witness."); People v.Peterson, 537 N.W.2d 857, 859 (Mich. 1995) ("an expert may testify in the
prosecution's case in chief regarding typical and relevant symptoms of child sexual abuse for the sole
purpose of explaining a victim's specific behavior that might be incorrectly construed by the jury as
inconsistent with that ofan actual abuse victim"); Commonwealth v. Richardson, 667N.E.2d 257, 260
(Mass. 1996) (police officer qualified as expert to testify that it was highly unusual for child victim to
remember dates, times, and sequences).
In an involuntary servitude prosecution, the First Circuit made the same assumption ofjuror
ignorance in ruling that a "victimnologist" was properly allowed to testify as an expert to refute the
principal defense—that thevictim had manyopportunities to escape:
Based on her general research and her personal interactionwith hundreds of victims of
sexual abuse, Burgess testified that Gedara'sbehavioral response to the non-sexual abuse
administered by the Alzankis was consistent with the behavior ofabuse victims generally. It seems
to us that expert testimonyon this subject—which the defense wasfreeto contradict—was
"reasonably likely" toassist thejuryinunderstanding andassessing theevidence, in thatthe
matterat issue was highly material, somewhat technical, andbeyond therealm ofacquired
knowledge normallypossessed by layjurors.
UnitedStates v. Alzanki, 54 F.3d994, 1006(1st Cir. 1995).
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duct, such asdelayed reporting or recantation.ln Testimony concerning
both battered woman and rape trauma syndrome is admitted on the
same rationale—to "dispel common myths and misunderstandings
about domestic violence that may interfere with the factfinders' ability
to consider issues in the case."173
Buthowvalid isthis nearly universal, but untested,174 assumption that
the jurors need assistance because they are not sophisticated enough to
recognize that victims sometimes recant, give conflicting versions of the
172. Askowitz & Graham, supra note 68, at 2040.
173. USDOJREPORT, supra note85, at xii; see, e.g., People v. Brown, 94 P.3d 574,580 (Cal. 2004);
Nixon v. United States, 728 A.2d 582, 590 (D.C 1999)("Actionssometimesspeaklouder than words, and
a layjuror might well wonder whether Ms.Boyd's actions (andinaction) at the timeof the alleged abuse
wereconsistentwith the narrativewhichsheprovidedin the courtroomlongafterthe eventsoccurred. Dr.
Dutton's testimony wasdesigned to apprise thejurors ofcertainrepeatedpatternsofbehavioron the part
ofmanybatteredwomen. Withthat information, thejurorswerein a betterposition to determine whether
thesepatterns of behavior mightexplain anyperceived discrepancy between Ms.Boyd's words and her
deeds. This court and other courts have held that testimony of the type provided by Dr. Dutton may assist
the jury in understanding the evidence and is 'beyond the ken' of the average layjuror."); State v.
Grecinger, 569N.W.2d 189, 195 (Minn. 1997) ("expert testimony on battered woman syndrome would
help to explain a phenomenon [staying with the batterer, recantation, inconsistent stories, delayed
prosecution] notwithin theunderstanding ofanordinary layperson."); State v.Jensen, 252, 432 N.W.2d
913, 918(Wis. 1988) ("Because a complainant's behavior frequently maynot conform to commonly held
expectations ofhowa victim reacts to sexual assault, courts admit expert opinion testimony tohelpjuries
avoid making decisions based onmisconceptions ofvictim behavior."); Prattv.Wood, 620N.Y.S.2d 551,
553(App. Div. 1994) (child custody case) ("(T| t hascome toberecognized thatexpert testimony inthefield
of domestic violence is admissible sincethe psychological and behavioralcharacteristics typically shared
byvictims ofabuse in a familial setting are not generally known by the average person.").
For the admission of similar evidence in civil actions alleging sex harassment, see Donna
Shestowsky, Where isthe Common Knowledge? Empirical SupportforRequiring Expert Testimony in Sexual Harassment
Trials, 51 STAN. L. REV. 357, 380-83 (1999).
174. "[C]ourtsdolittlemorethancitetherecurring fearthatjuriesholdthese 'common myths' about
battered women. They do not citeany research indicating that suchmyths are commonly held,nor do
theyexpress chagrin that suchresearch does notexist." FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note66,§4-1.1.3, at 181.
One notable exceptionisPeople v. Taylor, 552 N.E.2d 131 (N.Y. 1990):
[R]apeisa crime that ispermeated bymisconceptions. Society andlawarefinally realizing
that it is an act of violence and not a sexual act. . . . The stigma and other difficulties
associated with a woman reporting a rape and pressing charges probably deter most
attempts to fabricate an incident; rape remains a grossly under-reported crime. Studies
haveshownthat one of the mostpopular misconceptions about rape is that the victimby
behaving in a certainwaybroughtit on herself. Forthat reason, studies havedemonstrated
thatjurorswill under certaincircumstances blamethe victim for the attackand will refuse
to convict the man accused. Studies have also shown that jurors will infer consent where
the victimhas engagedin certain typesof behavior prior to the incident. . . .
Because culturalmythsstill affect common understandingofrapeandrapevictims and
because experts have beenstudying theeffects ofrapeuponitsvictims onlysince the 1970's,
we believe that patterns of response among rape victims are not within the ordinary
understanding of the layjuror. For that reason, we conclude that introduction of expert
testimony describing rape trauma syndrome mayundercertain circumstances assist a lay
jury in deciding issuesin a rape trial.
Id. at 136 (citations omitted).
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event, fail to report prompdy, or forget details?175 Serious questions
must be raised about the willingness of courts to take for granted that
jurors, left unaided, will misinterpret such behavior.176 Should we not
take into account the increasing sophistication of lay people regarding
abuse and itsvictimsdue to constant newsaccounts, movies,TV shows,
and other information sources?177 Is there any real doubt that the
general public is more knowledgeable today about sexual harassment
than theywerewhenAnitaHill'scredibilitywas challenged—during the
widely-publicized 1991 Senate confirmation hearing of now-Justice
Clarence Thomas—because she did not report her allegations and
continued to work for him?178
175. Bywayofexample istheunannotated assertion inNewkirkv. Commonwealth, 937 S.W.2d690(Ky.
1996):
When ajury of layadults, hearing the horrible details in a typical childsexual abuse case,
is confronted with a childvictimrecanting hisor her previous allegations of sexual abuse,
it is understandable that they would tend to applyan adult standard to the childvictim's
behavior in an effort to understand what motivates the victim to recant his or her
allegations.
Id. at 698-99 (Willett, J., dissenting).
Occasionally courts point to the fact thata party isseeking to exploit a perceived misconception to
support the proposition that jurors must have that misconception. In ruling that the juvenile defendant,
convicted of shooting and killing his mother, should have been permitted to offer the testimony on
"batteredchild syndrome," the Supreme Court of Ohio reasoned:
Absent corroborating evidence, a trier of fact is likely to believe thatthe abuse allegations
are fabricated in response to the charges leviedagainst the child-defendant. The existence
and prevalence of such misconceptions are evident in the transcript of this trial. The
prosecution repeatedly stressed that Brian couldhaveleft the houseagain, that he could
have gone to his father orgrandparents, thathe was not in actual imminent danger at the
timeofthekilling, andimplying thathemusthavecreated theallegations of abuse after the
fact because, otherwise, more peoplewouldhaveknown aboutit.
Statev. Nemeth, 694 N.E.2d 1332, 1337 (Ohio 1998).
176. Edgar Cahn complained manyyears ago ofsocial scientists' "flabby attempt[s] to demonstrate
an assertion thaton its face would seem entirely plausible to the laymind."Cahn, supra note 42, at 166
n.31.
177. AsJustice HerbertWilkins has observed, the"line between common experience andknowledge
andmatters known onlyto experts varies with time andcircumstances. At anyone time, the transition
from onetypeofknowledge totheother isoften gradual andcannot bedefined precisely." Commonwealth
v. Francis, 453 N.E.2d 1204, 1209 (Mass. 1983). It was suggested in 1994 that"many of themyths and
misconceptions that gave rise totheneed for expert testimony more than adecade ago have today largely
beendispelled orhavedisappeared altogether, perhaps,... inlarge part duetomediaattention." Askowitz
& Graham, supra note 68, at 2095.
Defense counsel in one domestic violence case argued unsuccessfully that battered woman
syndrome was "common knowledge... theaverage laymen inthereal world have [been] inundate [d] with
a person getting beat up,a person ... not being able to leave, theyread about [it] every day, theyhear
about and theyknow about it." Nixon v.United States, 728 A.2d582,589 n.15 (D.C 1999). Some courts
have recognized, butdiscounted thelearning curve. See, e.g., id. at 591 ("a great deal ofinformation about
battered women isreported by themedia andhas found itswayintothepublic domain.").
178. For discussion of the confirmation proceedings from the perspective of evidence doctrine, see
Stephan Landsman, Who Needs Evidence Rules, Anyway?, 25LOY. L.A. L.REV. 635 (1992).
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Professor Mosteller's observations in 1989 are even more valid today:
It ishardly obvious that jurors would have great difficultyunderstand
ing why, for example, a child would retract a valid allegation of sexual
abuse in the face of the prospect that 'daddy' would otherwise be
jailed. It is equally unclear [whyjurors would have trouble] under
standing the fact that an adult femalewho claimed to have been raped
by an acquaintance did not flee upon the first opportunity or delayed
reporting the cnme.
What litde empirical data has been developed presents at best a mixed
picture ofjury knowledge versus ignorance on these matters.180 Even
some enthusiasts for syndrome evidence concede there is serious
question as to whether such testimony tells the jurors anything they do
not alreadyknow,181 or, as some courtshaveput it, "explodes common
179. Mosteller, supra note 162, at 125.
180. There is some empiricalevidence from the 1980ssuggesting that potentialjurors (particularly
males) held erroneous beliefsregarding abusedwomen. See Vidmar & Schuller,supra note 11,at 151-54.
Yet the researchers concluded:
[SJeveral studieson beliefsabout the social and psychological contexts in which battered
women exist suggest that the average juror may have an understandingon some issues that
variesfrom conclusionsof expertswho have studied the phenomenon. However, it appears
that jurors may be better informed than critics have suggested. Thus, while there are
groundsforconcludingthatjurorsmight be helpedby experttestimonyon batteredwoman
syndrome, the data are not overwhelming.
Id. at 152 (citations omitted). While there were statistically significant differences between the views of
expertsand laypersons regarding rape,the latterwerewellinformedon matterssuchasthe prevalence of
acquaintance rape and the fact that victimsoften do not reportrapes. Id at 156. Laypersons wereless
informedregarding the behavioral changesfollowing arapeandweremore inclinedto be suspicious about
delays in reporting. Id. at 157.
Basedon acomparisonofresponses on a sexual assault questionnaire betweenexpertsandlaypersons,
two researchers in the late 1980sdocumented some significantgapsbetween "common knowledge" and
expertknowledge regarding the effects of rapeaswellasthe prevalence of certain false myths amongthe
laypersons. They concluded (albeit with several caveats) that experttestimonyon rapetrauma"couldbe
helpfulin educating jurorsaboutrapeandrapevictimbehavior." See Frazier &Borgida, supra note 80, at
115. The authorsconceded, however, that the averagescoreoflaypersons(58% ascompared to the expert
score of 84%)stillindicatedconsiderable "common understanding" on the subject. Id at 116.
Forotherempirical studies (also reaching conflictingconclusions) of the abilityof the average juror
to fairly appraise a complainant'sversionof events in rape and child abusecases, seeMosteller,supra note
162, at 116-26; Askowitz & Graham, supra note 68 at 2094-95.
There is more empirical basis for concluding that jurors need assistance in understanding the
limitations of eyewitness identification testimony. See Steven Penrod & Brian Cutler, Eyewitness Expert
Testimony andJury Decisionmaking, 52 LAW &CONTEMP. PROBS. 45 (1989); John C Brigham & Robert K.
Bothwell, The Ability ofProspective Jurors to Estimate the Accuracy ofEyewitness Identifications, 1 LAW& HUM.
BEHAV. 19(1983).
181. McCord,supra note 73,at31. McCordcitesonestudy findinga potentialjury pool"surprisingly
well-informed about the topic of child sexualabuse." David McCord, Expert Psychobgical Testimony about
Child Complainants in Sexual Abuse Prosecutions: A Foray in to the Admissibility ofNovel Psychological Evidence, 11J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1, 35 (1986). For more on the question of "helpfulness" of social science
testimony, seethe discussion of the employment discrimination cases infra PartIV.
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myths" heldbyjurors.182 Yetcourts rarely recognize that these maybe
matters of common knowledge.183
Jurors in a bank robbery case do not need a criminologist to inform
them that persons like the defendant, who are in substantial debt to
bookmakers or loan sharks, may commit robbery to pay their debts—
this isclearly in the realmof"commonknowledge."184 Nor does ajury
need an expert to tell them that crime victims sometimes recant their
testimony or feign forgetfulness on the witness stand. We leave it to
them to "sort out the truth" after direct and cross-examination. The
jury determines whether the witnesses changed their testimony out of
fear or an honest reappraisal of the facts.185 The rules of evidence are
designed to facilitate this decisionby permitting counsel to makejurors
182. United States v. Shay, 57 F.3d 126, 133 (1stCir. 1995)(citation omitted).
183. An exceptioncan be found in Commonwealth v. Oliveira 728 N.E.2d 320 (Mass. 2000):
The defendantcomplainsthat theprosecutorimproperlycommentedon a subjectreserved
for expert testimony: "There's a varietyof reasons why,social and economicreasons why
women stay with men who abuse them and abuse their children." However, the judge
observed: "It is a matter of common knowledge that men and women remain bound in
abusive relationships." Thus, in the context of this case, the argument was grounded in
common sense, not expertise.
Id. at 323; see also State v. Vue, 606 N.W.2d 719, 723 (Minn. Ct. App. 2000):
Bothsidesaddressed[thevictim's] delayin bringingthe allegations. The prosecutoroffered
the testimonyof a park policeman to bolster M.V.'s story by 'explaining' why a Hmong
immigrantwho had been raped by her husband would be reluctant to go to the police.
There islittlein this recordsuggesting cultural testimonywasnecessary. The complainant
was a grown woman; she was bilingual and educated; and she had been in the United
Statesfor manyyears. A layjury wouldnot havehad troubleunderstanding or believing
her testimonysimplybecauseshe was Hmong. It is patronizing to suggest otherwise.
184. Asthe SeventhCircuithasobserved, "Because the fields ofpsychology and psychiatrydealwith
human behaviorand mentaldisorders, it maybe moredifficult at timesto distinguish between testimony
that reflects genuine expertise—a reliable bodyofgenuine specialized knowledge—and something that is
nothingmore than fancyphrasesforcommonsense." United Statesv. Hall, 93 F.3d 1337,1343(7thCir.
1996).
Courtshave allowed expertsto testify on more esoteric matters,suchas that gun ownersoften
conceal their firearmsin the engine compartment of their car to avoid detection, see United Statesv. Webb,
115 F.3d 711 (9th Cir. 1997),and that street gangs usually impose a code of silence on members. See
United Statesv. Hankey, 203 F.3d 1160(9thCir. 2000). Butexperts have been deemedunnecessary to
educate NewYorkjurors "in today's climate, flushwith daily newsof the latest drug bust, ... as to such
elementary issues as the function of a scaleor index card in a drug deal," United States v. Castillo, 924
F.2d 1227, 1232(2dCir. 1991), or the sharingof proceedsfrom illegalkickback schemes. United States
v. Long, 917 F.2d 691, 702 (2d Cir. 1990).
185. See, e.g., Shelley Murphy,Recanted TestimoniesNot Unusual, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept.27,2002, at B1.
In the assault trial reported, several witnesses for the prosecution recanted their prior grand jury
identifications ofdefendant at trial. Theprosecutor argued inclosing: "What'sdifferent isthis—The grand
jury is a secretproceeding. The difference is [defendant] wasnot seated5 feet awayfrom the witness at
trial. / suggestyou don't need a road map tofigure out what's going on here." Kathleen Burge,Prosecutor's Cite Fear
Factor, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 3,2002,at B4(emphasis added). AsCalifornia SupremeCourtJusticeBrown
has observed: "Recantation ishardlyuniqueto domestic [violence] situations; and the majority fails to
identify whatmisconceptions layjurorsmayharborin these circumstances that require experttestimony
to correct." People v. Brown, 94 P.3d 574,587 (Cal. 2004) (Brown,J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
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aware of the witness's prior statement, confront the witness with the
inconsistencies, and explore the discrepancies on cross-examination.i86
And, jurors certainly need no expert to educate them that people
sometimes lie to protect family or friends.187
Structurally it is unclear how trial judges are to make the call that
jurors do or do not need expert guidance concerning the conduct of an
abuse victim. Is it a determination to be made on a case-by-case basis
or with a per se rule? Should jurors be asked on voir dire what they
believe about abuse victims? Should the analysis vary based on
geographic region? In holding that the prosecution may present experts
to explain the "common postincident behavior of children who are
victims of sexual abuse," the Supreme Court of Michigan gave the
following "guidance" to trial judges:
This expert testimony, however, may be introduced only if the facts
as they develop would raise a question in the minds of the jury
regarding the specific behavior. The behavior must be of such a
nature that it may potentially be perceived as that which would be
inconsistent with a victim of child sexual abuse, i.e., delay in
reporting, recantation, accommodating the abuser or secrecy. The
court must determine whether the particular characteristic is one that
in fact calls for an expert explanation. MRE 702. The expert is then
only allowed to testify regarding the behavior at issue and may not
testify regarding CSAAS characteristics that are not at issue.188
The court went on to create what appears to be a presumption in favor
of admissibility by adding: "It is a logical argument that the jurors
would have made an improper inference upon learning [during direct
examination] that the victim failed to report the sexual assault for five
or six years."189
A few courts departing from the herd have refused to simply assume
the ignorance ofjurors regarding these matters. The Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania has concluded that it is
[commonly] understood [bylaypeople] whysexuallyabused children
do not always come forward immediately after the abuse: They are
afraid or embarrassed; they are convinced by the abuser not to tell
anyone; they attempt to tell someone who does not want to listen; or
they do not even know enough to tell someone what has happened.
186. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 613, 801(d)(1); see also Brown, 94 P.3d at 587 (Brown,J., dissenting).
187. &*Statev.MacDonald,718A.2d 195,198(Me. 1998)(excludingproffered testimony on "adult
children of alcoholics syndrome").
188. People v. Peterson, 537 N.W.2d 857, 868 n.12 (Mich. 1995).
189. Id. at 871.
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. . . [Such conduct is] easilyunderstood by lay people and [does] not
require expert analysis.190
A second equally dubious assumption underlies the admission of be
havioral science evidence, namely that the factfinders can receive
meaningful assistance from it. In order to be helpful to a jury deliberat
ing whether this complaining witness was in fact abused by this defen
dant, an expert would have to bring to bear knowledge sufficiendy
definitive to be readily applicable to the particular case. The Court
addressed this concern in Kumho Tire:
[T]he specific issue before the [district] court was not the
reasonableness ingeneral of a tire expert's use of a visual and tactile
inspection to determine whether overdeflection had caused the tire's
tread to separate from its steel-belted carcass. Rather, it was the
reasonableness of using such an approach, along with Carlson's
particular method of analyzing the data thereby obtained, to draw a
conclusion regarding the particular matter to which the expert testimony was
directly relevant. That matter concerned the likelihood that a defect in
the tire at issue caused its tread to separate from its carcass. . . . The
relevant issue was whether the expert could reliably determine the
cause of this tire's separation.191
Daubert similarly emphasizes, as did Wigmore long ago, the need to
assure that the testimony "is sufficiendytied to the facts of the case that
it willaid the jury in resolvinga factual dispute," what the Court refers
to as "fit."192
But as the Minnesota Supreme Court observed twentyyears ago,
[Syndrome evidence is] not the type of scientific test that accurately
and reliably determines whether a rape has occurred. The char
acteristic symptoms may follow any psychologically traumatic event.
American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of
Mental Disorders 236 (3d ed. 1980). At best, the syndrome describes
only symptoms that occur with some frequency, but makes no
pretense ofdescribing every singlecase. Thejury must not decide this
190. Commonwealthv. Dunkle, 602 A.2d 830, 836-37 (Pa. 1992) (reversing conviction because
expert waspermitted to testifyabout the behavior patterns of sexuallyabused children); see also State v.
Saldana, 324N.W.2d 227,230-31 (Minn. 1982) (rape traumasyndrome expert's testimony concerning
complainant's story wasimproperlyadmitted because the subjectmatter was not beyond the ken of the
jury).
191. KumhoTireCo.,Ltd.v.Carmichael, 526U.S. 137,153-54(1999). "[T]hequestion before the
trial court wasspecific, not general. The trial court had to decide whether this particularexpert had
sufficient specialized knowledge to assist thejurors in decidingthe particular issues in the case." Id. at 156
(citationsand internal quotes omitted).
192. 509 U.S. 579, 591 (1993). "Rule 702's 'helpfulness' standard requires a valid scientific
connection to the pertinent inquiry as a precondition to admissibility." Id. at 591-92.
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case on the basis of how most people react to rape or on whether
Fuller's reactions were the typical reactions ofa person who has been
a victim of rape. Rather, the jury must decide what happened in this
case, and whether the elements ofthe alleged crime have been proved
beyond a reasonable doubt.193
The court concluded that the "scientific evaluation ofrape trauma syn
drome has not reached a level of reliability that surpasses the quality of
common sense evaluation presentinjury deliberations."194 Indeed,the
non-specificnature of their "symptoms" led the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court to conclude that syndrome evidence did not even meet the
minimal threshold for relevance.195
Syndrome theory lacksthe precision necessary to truly assistthe trier-
of-fact in determining what happened on the occasion in question, as
illustrated by the following examples of courtroom testimony:
DEFENSE ATTORNEY: You've testified regarding the number of
actions that you believe illustrate post-traumatic stressdisorder. And
one of those that you emphasized I recall was, that it is not
inconsistent with that disorder to try to act normally?
WITNESS (Psychologist): That's correct. Rape trauma victims will
often try to appear normal so that other people's suspicions won't be
aroused and they won't have to bear the shame and humiliation.
DEFENSE ATTORNEY: It would also be consistent for them to act
upset, wouldn't it?
WITNESS: It could be. If they...
DEFENSE ATTORNEY: Sure.
WITNESS: I think I described the expressed versus the controlled
way of reacting in the acute phase of rape trauma syndrome. So yes,
both of those are consistent.
DEFENSE ATTORNEY: Both would be consistent?
WITNESS: Right. Not in the same person. But, both modes of
behaving would be consistent.
DEFENSE ATTORNEY: And it would be consistent with that
disorder to activelypursue conversations and meetingswith the other
person?
WITNESS: Could you clarify, do you mean with the assailant?
DEFENSE ATTORNEY: With the accused assailant, yes.
WITNESS: Yes.
193. State v. Saldana, 324 N.W.2d 227, 229-30 (Minn. 1982) (citations omitted).
194. &z/to<z,324N.W.2dat230; see also Statev. Ballard, 855 S.W.2d 557, 563 (Tenn. 1993) ("The
symptoms of the syndrome are not likea fingerprint in that it can clearlyidentify the perpetratorof a
crime.") (citations omitted).
195. Dunkk, 602 A.2d at 834.
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DEFENSE ATTORNEY: And it would also be consistent to avoid
that person?
WITNESS: Yes, it would.
DEFENSE ATTORNEY: And it would be consistent to mask the
symptoms, and go to a party? Yes?
WITNESS: Let me explain that. It's more consistent with rape
trauma syndrome, where in the case of an acquaintance rape, to mask
those symptoms, to pretend as if the relationship hasn't changed, as
if there hadn't been the trauma of the sexual assault. Certainly, that's
much more often the case with a sexual assault that's with an
acquaintance. With a stranger, of course, there isn't the opportunity
for that.196
WITNESS (Director/ caseworker of group residential treatment
facility) (Asked whether, based on his experience, kids who have
experienced sexual abuse exhibit certain traits or characteristics or
behavior patterns): Yes. Anything for medical reasons, from bladder
infections to abnormal medical problems, and more of the
characteristics, the girlscan be anything from promiscuous, they can
be very timid, they can come in with extremely low esteem. Almost
exclusively, that is going to be a major characteristic. Some of the
different cues can range in areas from being really over timid to
differentkind of touchesand approaches,where youwouldapproach
them in different directions or from different manners or methods.
You mightevenput your hand on their shoulder and that might freak
them out or something. There is a lot of different areas where just
working with them it becomes really quite evident. You can see that
behaviordemonstrated quite plainly.197
Q. And why would a child delay reporting of sexual abuse?
A. Well, there's a multitude of reasons and it depends on several
variables, depending on the relationship between the child and the
perpetrator, the relationship between them, the living arrangements
between them. There's a lot of contingencies.198
The state proceeded with the direct examination of Mr. Bosman, as
follows:
Q: In your opinion, basedon your experience, and based upon your
training, are the kinds of acting out behavior that the teachers
196. Videotape: Schallockv. Heinz (Court TV 1995)(asex harassment civilaction tried in Arizona
state court in 1995).
197. Stewardv. State, 652 N.E.2d 490, 492 (Ind. 1995).
198. People v. Peterson, 537 N.W.2d 857, 862 n.5 (Mich. 1995).
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described to you that they were seeing in L consistent with children
who were victims of sexual abuse?
A: Yes.
Q: The answer is yes?
A: Yes. One of the, we call them in the workshops that I have
attended, in the seminars that I have attended we call them red flags,
they are indicators.
Q: Of a problem?
A: Of a problem. Dealing with sexuality, because it's an abnormal
thing for a 11 or 12-year old student.
Q: Is it also your experience, or you also know, you also have an
opinion, I guess I should ask you, based on your experience and
training that some children who are victims of sexual abuse do not tell
anyone about it for a long period of time?
A: Correct.
On cross-examination, witness Bosman further testified:
Q. So those things led you to conclude that she may have been—
A. (Interposing) Not conclude, suspicion and belief.
Q. Those are red flags?
A. Yes. And particularly the time that we were talking about
protective behavior in the classroom.
Q. Were you in the classroom?
A. Yes, I was.
Q. And let me ask you a couple of questions. You indicated that
children who had been victims of sexual abuse commonly or
frequently exhibit the types of characteristics that you were aware of
in L, is that right?
A: In not [sic] all cases. Frequently in cases you will see that type of
person, withdrawn behavior, you will see oppressive behavior, you
will see preoccupation with what you would call sexual type.
Q: You also had occasion to see that in children who have not been
sexually abused, however, is that true?
A: Correct.
Q: It is also true that the awareness of a child or the curiosities of a
child about sexual matters does not indicate necessarily that she was
a victim of sexual abuse?
A. I suppose that would be true.
Q. One more question. There are other avenues for children to
become aware of sex than by the parents?
A. Absolutely.
Q. Among those would be experimentation with other children, is
that true?
A. Yes."199
199. State v.Jensen, 432 N.W.2d 913, 916-17 (Wis. 1988).
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Dr. Ornelas then testified that L. had a "normal" physical exam,
which was, she opined, "consistent with what [L.] said happened."
Dr. Ornelas testified that a normal exam is "the most common
physical findings for a child who has been sexually abused." This is
so, Dr. Ornelas opined, because "the type of contact that most
commonly occurs between adults and children that's sexual is oral
kinds of contact, touching, and what's called labial coitus."
Dr. Ornelas also testified that "L.'s behavior of withdrawing from
her family, staying inside of her room, not being communicative, not
being her regular bubbly, running-around kind ofself, and... waking
up at night and touching her mother to make sure that her mother
was there in bed with her, . . . having sleep disturbances and some
behavioral changes," was "consistent with child sexual abuse."
Finally, she testified as follows:
Q. Doctor, if you had those symptomsor some of those symptoms
and a report by a child of sexual abuse, are you comfortable forming
a diagnosis of child sexual abuse in such a case?
A. I would base that diagnosis on the child's statements about what
had happened to them.200
It is submitted that evidence of this character suffers from the very
same subjectivity and imprecision that condemned Dr. Carlson's testi
mony in Kumho Tre.m Adding to the problem is the fact that most
courts (asdiscussedin sectionB,below),in order to avoid the perception
that the expert isvouchingfor the credibilityofthe complainingwitness,
carefullylimit the behavioral expert to testimony about thegeneralnature
of the syndrome and preclude testimony about theparticular victim. But
at that level of generality, the testimony is singularly unhelpful in
resolving the fact issues in dispute.202 Again, a lookat a representative
sample of the testimony is instructive:
200. United States v. Velarde, 214 F.3d 1204, 1209 (10th Cir. 2000).
201. As stated in the opinion:
The court could reasonably have wondered about the reliability of a method of visual and
tactile inspection sufficientlyprecise to ascertain with some certainty the abuse-related
significance of minute shoulder/center relative tread wear differences, but insufficiently
precise to tell "with any certainty" from the tread wear whether a tire had traveled less than
10,000 or more than 50,000 miles. And these concerns might have been augmented by
Carlson's repeated relianceon the "subjectivefness]" of his mode ofanalysis in response to
questions seekingspecificinformation regarding how he could differentiate between a tire
that actually had been overdeflected and a tire that merely looked as though it had been.
Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 155; see also State v. Cressey, 628 A.2d 696, 701-02(N.H. 1993) (court troubled
by the interpretiveand subjective stepsinvolvedin psychological profile testimony).
202. "Expert testimony that does not add either precision or depth to the jury's ability to reach
conclusions about [a] subjectwhich is within their experiencedoes not meet the helpfulness test and the
trial court iswithinitsdiscretionto excludeit." Statev. Ritt, 599 N.W.2d 802, 811 (Minn. 1999) (internal
quotationsomitted)(experttestimonyon the coercive effects of certain interrogation procedures).
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Q. [To abuse expert] You mentioned that [she] appeared angry to
you.
A. Yes.
Q. Is anger a typical response in adolescents for someone who has
been subjected to sexual molestation?
A. Yes, it is. They carry their anger ontheir shoulder like a flag.203
Can it be seriously contended that anger in an adolescent is a forensic
"red flag" of anything other than adolescence?
Commenting on the usefulness of expert testimony with respect to
eyewitness identification evidence, the Nebraska Supreme Courtnoted
that
the knowledge of behavioral scientists, such as psychologists, is
probabilistic, couched in terms of averages, standard deviations,
curves, and differences between groups. A court, however, is not
concerned with the average eyewitness' reliability but with the reli
ability of the specific eyewitness before it, who may vary from the
average in probabilistic but ultimately unknown ways. It is not the
research behavioral social scientist who is in a position to assess a
specific witness' reliability; the jury, which views the witness as an
individual, is best able to collectively determine, on the basis of
common human experience as yet unsurpassed by laboratory
research, how toweigh what an individual witness has to say.204
203. State v. Moran, 728 P.2d 248, 253 n.5 (Ariz. 1986). The testimony was deemed properly
admitted togive thejuryan alternative explanation forthevictim's anger, which thedefense claimed was
prompted byparental discipline. The"good common sense ofjurors will discern thatwhich istrue from
that which is false," the court concluded. Id. at 384 (citationomitted). But whywasthat "good common
sense" notadequate toresolve thecredibility question without the"expertise" oftheprosecution's witness?
204. Statev. Trevino, 432 N.W.2d 503,520 (Neb.1988). In a similarvein, the court in State v. Coley,
32 S.W.3d 831 (Tenn. 2000), said:
[W]e find that expert testimony concerning eyewitness identification simply offers
generalities andisnotspecific to thewitness whose testimony isinquestion. Moreover, we
areoftheopinion that thesubject ofthereliability ofeyewitness identification iswithin the
common understanding of reasonable persons. Therefore, such expert testimony is
unnecessary. It maymislead and confuse, and it couldencourage thejury to abandonits
responsibility asfact-finder. Such responsibility isa task reserved forand ably performed
bythejury,aided byskillful cross-examination andthejuryinstruction promulgated inDyle
when appropriate. For these reasons, we find that general and unparticularized expert
testimony concerning the reliability of eyewitness testimony, which is not specific to the
witness whose testimony isin question, doesnot substantially assist the trieroffact. Thus,
weholdthatsuchtestimony isinadmissible underTenn.R.Evid.702and that thetrialcourt,
therefore, properly excludedJohnson's testimony.
Id. at 837-38; see also Saiav. Sears Roebuck & Co., 47 F. Supp. 2d 141, 150(D.Ma. 1999) (excluding
plaintiffs hedonic damages expert because his testimony was derived from broad generalizations andwas
"simply not sufficiently plaintiff-specific to make it helpful to thejury").
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These observations are equally applicable to syndrome evidence,
which at best (and without the empirical foundations of the eyewitness
identification experts205) describes patterns of behavior applicable to
some, but certainly not all or perhaps even most, victims of abuse. Dr.
LenoreWalker, who in 1979 originated the theory of battered woman
syndrome (BWS), concluded that only about half the victims studied
actually exhibited BWS.206 In her laterwritings she conceded that not
all relationships follow the pattern and that inconsistencies and varia
tions can be found.207 In fact, victim conduct defies characterization as
common or typical, and the considerable research that has been
conducted in thepastdecades has failed toprovide support "fora single
profile that captures the impact of abuse on a woman.5'208
The originator ofchild sexual abuse accommodation syndrome has
criticized its use by prosecutors in a similar vein:
Therehas been some tendency touse theCSAAS asan offer ofproof
thata child hasbeenabused. Achild maybesaid tobesuffering from
or displaying the CSAAS, as if it is a malady that proves the alleged
abuse. Or a child's conspicuous helplessness or silence might be said
to be consistent with the CSAAS, as if not complaining proves the
complaint. Some have contended that a child who retracts is a more
believable victim than one who has maintained a consistent com
plaint.209
Expert testimony must achieve a requisite level ofcertainty in order
to provide assistance to the factfinder. In the medical context this means
the physician must testify "to a reasonable degree of medical cer
tainty."210 Courts have similarly required scientific experts to be able to
testify "to a reasonable degree of scientific certainty."211 Syndrome
theory, however, defies such exactitude both because it operates at a
level ofmeaningless generality andmakes contradictory claims. By way
of example, indicia of abuse include such commonplace behavior as
205. See text accompanying notes 112-18.
206. See FAIGMAN ETAL., supra note 66, § 4-2.1.1, at 212.
207. See Lenore E.A.Walker, Psychology andLaw Symposium: Women and the Law, 20PEPP. L.REV 1170,
1184(1993); see also FAIGMAN ETAL., supra note 66, § 4-2.1.1,at 213-34.
208. See FAIGMAN ETAL., supra note 66, § 4-2.1.1, at 233.
209. Steward v.State, 652 N.E.2d 490, 493 (Ind. 1995) (emphasis omitted) (citation omitted).
210. See, e.g., Klein v. Vanek, 86 F. Supp. 2d 812, 818 (N.D.I11. 2000); Rotman v. Nat'l R.R.
Passenger Corp., 669 N.E.2d 1090, 1092 (Mass. App. Ct. 1996) (medical expert must testify thatcausation
isprobable, notmerely possible, conceivable, orreasonable); Resendes v.Boston Edison, Co.,648N.E.2d
757, 763 (Mass. App. Ct. 1995). See generallyJeffL,Lewin, The Genesis and Evolution ofLegal Uncertainty About
"Reasonable Medical Certainty", 57 MD. L.REV. 380 (1998).
211. See, e.g, Linnen v.A.H. Robins Co., Inc., 11 Mass. L. Rptr. 40, 47-48 (Super. Ct. 1999) (level
ofcertainty mustbe greaterthan merely "morelikely than not").
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biting lips, clenching fists, tapping fingers, biting nails,212 stomachaches
and nightmares,213 and "fatigue, poor sleep and headaches, emotional
changesincludinganxiety,irritability, depression and hopelessness, and
behavioral manifestations including aggression, cynicism,and substance
abuse, leading to poor job performance, [and] deterioration in
interpersonal relationships."214
If a child is calm during a genital examination, that may be taken as
evidence that she is used to being handled in that way; but a child who
resists during the exam mayalso be viewedashavingexperiencedsexual
212. See Gaffhey, supra note 75, at 285.
213. Commonwealth v. Hudson, 631 N.E.2d 50 (Mass. 1994).
214. See Levin& Greisberg, supra note 65, at 248. The following isa checklist for diagnosis of rape
trauma syndrome:
Subjective:










Nightmare and sleep disturbances
Change in relationships
Sexual dysfunction
[Changes in lifestyle (change in residence; seeking family support; seeking social
network support)]
Objective:
Physical trauma (e.g., bruising, tissueirritation)

















Gaffhey, supra note 75, at 290-91.
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trauma.215 Avictim's relating ofconflicting versions ofthe events iscon
sidered a sign ofabuse,216 butso is theconsistency ofthevictim's story over
time.217 Even courts that admit rape trauma syndrome concede that
"the behavior exhibited by a rape victim after the attack can vary.
While some womenwill express their fear, angerand anxiety openly, an
equal number ofwomen willappear controlled, calm, and subdued."218
Behavioral response checklists include such opposites as increased or
decreased eating or smoking,219 and preoccupation with or aversion to
sex.220
This contradictory221 nature of syndrome evidence distinguishes it
fromwell-recognized medicaldiagnostic techniquessuchas that usedto
determine whether a child's physical injuries are inconsistent with a
claim of accidental harm.222 Instead syndromes look more like drug
courierprofiles, which have a "chameleon-like wayof adapting to any
particular set of observations."223
215. Richardson et al., supra note 43, at 13.
216. Onejuristcomplains thatthereis"somethingfundamentally strange aboutsaying thatsince the
story is inconsistent, it mustbe true." Duckett v. State, 797 S.W.2d 906,924 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990)
(Teague, dissenting).
217. People v. Peterson, 537N.W.2d 857,872n.2 (Mich. 1995) (Cavanagh, dissenting).
218. People v. Taylor, 552N.E.2d 131 (N.Y. 1990). The courtcontinued, "Werealize that rape
traumasyndrome encompasses a broadrangeofsymptoms and variedpatternsofrecovery. Somewomen
arebetterabletocopewiththeaftermath ofsexual assault thanotherwomen. It isalso apparentthat there
isno single typical profile ofa rapevictim and that different victims express themselves and cometo terms
with theexperience ofrapein different ways." Id. Summarizing thenumerous studies ofrapevictims that
havebeen conductedover the years,one writerconcludes they:
failto establish anyspecific psychological sequelae forrapevictims. Instead,the studies find
that rape victimsexperiencepsychological reactions similar to victimsof other crimes,or
theyfind that RTS varies significantly fromindividual to individual, thus indicating that
there is no syndrome uniqueto rape. Theseproblems question the reliability of RTS as
circumstantial evidence that a rape occurred.
Lawrence, supra note 84, at 1673.
219. Gaffney, supra note 75, at 285.
220. Askowitz & Graham, supra note 68, at 2068-69.
221. JudgeTeague hascomplained that ChildSexual Abuse Syndrome "iswhatever the particular
expert wants it tobe,based uponelements hehimselfhascreated or manufactured, orhasplagiarized from
other's works." Duckett, 797 S.W.2dat 925 (Teague,J., dissenting).
222. In State v. Moran, 728 P.2d248(1986), the court contrasted syndrome evidence with "expert
testimony [like battered childsyndrome] asto theoccurrence ofan event when that testimony isbased on
physical findings rather than psychological evaluation" and "medical testimony that certain observable
physical facts indicate penetration." Id. at 251, 254n.6. A radiologist may, forexample, testify that the
victim's injuries were ofa type most likely inflicted deliberately ratherthanaccidentally, or that theinfant
victim died asa result ofsevere shaking. See Martha Coakley, ChildAbuse and the Law II: The Radiobgist in
Court, in DIAGNOSTIC IMAGING OF CHILD ABUSE 375(Paul K. Kleinman ed., 1998); see also Common
wealth v.Day, 569N.E.2d 397, 400(Mass. 1991); Steward v.State, 652 N.E.2d 490, 493-94 (Ind. 1995);
Commonwealth v. Dunkle, 602A.2d830,835-36(Pa. 1992).
223. United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 13 (Marshall and Brennan, JJ., dissenting) (citation
omitted). Thejustices cited cases inwhich opposite characteristics were considered suspicious, including
being thefirst passenger todeplane, thelast todeplane, anddeplaning inthemiddle ofthecrowd; holding
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Even assuming that behavioral evidence maysometimes aid thejury
in understanding conduct that may appear inconsistent with abuse,
especially where thedefense has pressed thelate reporting or retraction
to underminethewitness's credibility,224 suchtestimony remains proble
matic. First, expert opinions that "merely tell the jury what result to
reach" (like thatabuse occurred) are,for obvious reasons, neither "help
ful" nor appropriate.225 Second, where the expert's opinion is based
largely or solely on the alleged victim's statements and the testimony
therefore translates into a reassertion of the victim's story, the testimony
should not be admitted.226 Third, syndromeevidence may simply and,
ironically, substitute one set ofstereotypes (e.g., abused women are all
passive and helpless) for another (e.g., abused women do not stay with
their abusers).227
It has been recognized that "helpfulness is a matter of degree, and
expert evidence involves costs andrisks—too obvious toneed recounting
—that distinguish itfrom lay evidence about 'what happened here.'"228
One such risk is the topic of the next section: syndrome testimony's
tendency to infringe on the jury's exclusive role to assess credibility of
witnesses.
B. Vouchingfor Credibility and Invading the Province oftheJury
"[E]xpert testimony ... is not, as some current practice suggests, a
mechanism for having someone of elevated education or station
a round-trip ticket and holding a one-way ticket; traveling nonstop and changing planes; carrying no
luggage and carrying luggage; traveling alone and traveling with companions; acting too nervously and
acting toocalmly. See also Moriarty, supra note2, at 88-92.
224. See, e.g,Steward, 652 N.E.2dat 496 (citations omitted).
225. See FED. R. EVID. 704advisory committee's note; see also Statev.Alberico, 861 P.2d 192, 211
(N.M. 1993) (excluding testimony that alleged rape victims suffered from post-traumatic stress disorder
consistent with sexual abuse because "[w]hen theonly evidence consists ofthevictim's accusation andthe
defendant's denial, expert testimony onthequestion ofwho tobelieve isnothing more than advice tojurors
on how to decide the case.").
226. United Statesv. Whitted, 11 F.3d 782, 785-86 (8th Cir. 1993) (doctor could not basehis
diagnosis solely onvictim's allegations ofabuse); Viterbo v. Dow Chem. Co., 826 F.2d 420, 424 (5th Cir.
1987) (doctor's opinion based solely onpatient's oral history isnothing more than patient's testimony
"dressed upand sanctified"); Loudermill v. Dow Chem. Co., 863 F.2d 566, 570 (8th Cir. 1988) (expert
opinion lacking objective factual support cannot help jury and thus is inadmissible under Rule 702); State
v. Cressey, 628 A.2d 696, 699-700 (N.H. 1993) ("Expert psychological evidence can only be admissible in
a [prosecution for child abuse] ifitis atleast partly based on factors inaddition toand independent ofthe
victim's accounts. Otherwise, theexpert's conclusions areofnovalue to thejurybecause theypresent no
new evidence and aremerely vouching forthe credibility ofthechild victim witness.").
227. See USDOJ REPORT, supra note85; see also textaccompanying supra notes 66-75.
228. UnitedStates v. Brien, 59F.3d274, 277 (1st Cir. 1995) (upholding district court'sexclusion of
expert testimony on eyewitness identification, given the "risks ofconfronting thejury with battles ofexperts
on areas within the common-sense competence ofjurors").
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engage in a laying on of hands, placing an imprimatur, upon the
justice ofone'scause Experts are not, in theory, called to tell the
jurywho should win. They arecalled, instead, toprovide knowledge
to thejury topermit thejury rationallyto decidethe casebeforeit."229
It is axiomatic that assessing the credibility of witnesses is the sole
prerogative of thejury. Indeed, it hasbeensaid that the genius of the
jury trial system is to have twelve laypersons perform this task, each
bringing his or her common sense and experience to the table, rather
than relying on a single judge.
It is thus nearly universally recognized thatexpert testimony directly
vouching for or attacking the credibility of another witness at trial is
inappropriate.230 Courts vigilantly guard against invading the province
229. State v.Moran, 728 P.2d 248, 255 n.7(Ariz. 1986) (citation omitted).
230. United States v. Hall, 165 F.3d 1095, 1107 (7th Cir. 1999) (eyewitness identification expert);
United States v. Kime, 99 F.3d 870, 884 (8th Cir. 1996) (eyewitness identification testimony) ("It is the
exclusive province ofthe jury todetermine the believability ofawitness An expert is not permitted to
offer an opinion as tothe believabilityortruthfulness ofavictim's story."); United States v. Dorsey, 45 F.3d
809,815 (4th Cir. 1995) (excluding testimony oftwo defense witnesses infield offorensic anthropology who
were to have testified about their analyses ofbank surveillance photographs, concluding that "expert
testimony can be properly excluded ifit is introduced merely to cast doubt on the credibility ofother
eyewitnesses, since the evaluation ofa witness' credibility is a determination usually within the jury's
exclusive purview."); United States v.Azure, 801 F.2d 336, 339-40 (8th Cir. 1986) (pediatrician andchild
abuse expert's testimony that story ofvictim was believable and that expert could see no reason why victim
was not telling truth was not admissible); Commonwealth v. Dunkle, 602 A.2d 830, 836-37 (Pa. 1992)
(expert should not have been permitted to explain why sexually abused children might delay reporting or
omit details ofabuse because such testimony infringes onthe jury's right todetermine credibility). As one
federal judge put itinexcluding the testimony ofadefense psychiatrist tothe effect that the plaintiffsuffered
from a mixed personality disorder causing him toblame others when something goes wrong and to lie to
explain their failures, we cannot "allow trials to degenerate into swearing contests between opposing
psychiatrists claiming tohave insight into whether aparticular person istelling thetruth." Klein v. Vanek,
86 F. Supp. 2d 812,817 (N.D.IU. 2000). Seegenerally Michael W. Mullane, The Truthsayer and the Court: Expert
Testimony on Credibility, 43ME. L.REV. 53(1991); McCord, supra note 73, at 45-46.
FRE 608(a) allows evidence "in the form ofopinion or reputation" on the credibility ofa
witness, but is limited togeneral character for truthfulness oruntruthfulness, and the rule envisions lay, not
expert, testimony. FRE 608(a) does not allow opinion as towhether the witness spoke truthfully on a
specific occasion. See United States, v.Azure, 801 F.2d 336, 341 (8th Cir. 1986); State v.Kim, 645 P.2d
1330, 1339 n. 14 (Haw. 1982).
There areonly rare exceptions tothe prohibition against testimony oncredibility. Inthe1949
perjury prosecution ofAlger Hiss two defense psychiatrists were permitted torender anopinion (based on
his writings and courtroom demeanor) that Whittaker Chambers, the prosecution's chief witness, was a
psychopathic personality type disposed tomaking false accusations. United States v. Hiss, 88 F. Supp. 559
(S.D.N.Y. 1950), affd, 185 F.2d 822 (2d Cir. 1950); see ALISTAIR COOKE, A GENERATION ON TRIAL:
U.S.A. V. ALGER HISS 304-13 (1950); McCord, supra note 73, at46. In United States v. Shay, 57 F.3d 126
(1st Cir. 1995), thecourt permitted a defense psychiatrist to testify thatdefendant suffered from a mental
disorder (pseudologia fantastica) that had caused him to make grandiose but false statements implicating
himselfinabombplot. See also United States v. Hall, 93 F.3d 1337 (7th Cir. 1996) (district court erred in
excluding expert psychiatric testimony regarding defendant's personality disorder which made him
susceptible togiving false confession). Ontherelated issue ofvoluntariness ofaconfession, see Commonwealth
v. Crawford, 706 N.E.2d 289 (Mass. 1999) (defendant entided topresent expert testimony on battered
woman syndrome and PTSD tosupport claim she was incapable ofresisting police interrogation).
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of the jury on matters they are capable of resolving without the benefit
ofexpert opinion,231 and thecredibility ofwitnesses issuch a matter. An
expert, forexample,generallymay not testify to the damagingeffects on
perceptionand memorycausedbyprolongeduse ofdrugswhenoffered
to impeach the credibility ofa witness.232 Experts have beenprecluded
from testifying that children rarely lie about sexual abuse,233 or that
women rarely lieabout rape.234 An eminently qualified expertconver
sant with the extensive literature was not permitted to render an opinion
that a child witness is likely to falsely accuse a parent of sexual assault
when the child is the subject of a stressful custody dispute.235 And
virtually all jurisdictions prohibit behavioral experts from testifying to
the ultimate issue that a rape or assault occurred, whether based on
consistency with a syndrome or interviews with the alleged victim.236
231. &«,<?.£, Robertsonv.Norton Co., 148F.3d905,907 (8thCir. 1998) (ceramics experterroneous
lyallowed to testify that safety warnings were inadequate, when jurorscould readthemforthemselves).
232. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Perry,733N.E.2d83, 103(Mass. 2000). But see Commonwealth v.
Lord,702N.E.2d395(Mass. App.Ct. 1998) (suggesting that defense counsel mighthavebeenpermitted
to offer experttestimony to explainthe effects of Prozacon the memoryof the victim).
233. People v.Peterson, 537N.W.2d857,869(Mich. 1995) (testimony that children lieaboutsexual
abuseat a rate ofonly2%, and that their veracity rate is 85%,wasdeemedimpropervouching).
234. State v. Kinney, 762 A.2d 833 (Vt. 2000) (improper to permit expert to testify that false
reporting rate for rape was only 2%).
235. See Commonwealth v. Ianello, 702 N.E.2d 395 (Mass.App. Ct. 1987). The testimony had been
offered by the accused, who argued unsuccessfully that mental health professionals had been able to
document the phenomenon offalse allegations in thiscontextand that thissubject materwasbeyondthe
commonknowledge of the averagejury. The SupremeJudicial Court viewed the testimony as "no more
thantheexpert's over-all impression ofthetruthfulness ofmembers ofa class (children incustody disputes)
ofwhich the specific complainant wasa member," notingthat "[w]hile the proposed testimony fell short
of rendering an opinion on the credibility of the specific childbefore the court,wesee littledifference in
the final result. It would be unrealistic to allow this type of expert testimony and then expect the jurors to
ignore it when evaluating the credibility of the complaining child. Since we believe that Dr. Sacco's
opinion ultimately would have beenapplied to thechild alleging sexual abuse, werule that thejudgewas
correctin excluding theexperttestimony. Ifthe testimony haderroneously beenallowed, Dr. Sacco would
have impermissibly intruded uponthe vital function ofthejury." Id. at 1184; see also Commonwealth v.
Montanino,567 N.E.2d 1212 (Mass. 1991) (commanding officer ofpolicedepartmentsexual assault unit
shouldnot havebeenpermittedto testify that mostvictims reveal details ofthe assault onlygradually over
the course of several interviews: "[TJhere is little doubt that [the officer's ]comments relating to the
credibility of'most' sexual assault victims would betaken bythejuryas [his] endorsement of [thevictim's]
credibility."); Commonwealth v. Bougas, 795N.E.2d1230(Mass. App.Ct. 2003) (exclusion oftestimony
that children embroiled in familycontroversyoften fabricate allegationsof sexualabuse).
236. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Federico, 683N.E.2d1035, 1039(Mass 1997); Statev. Foret,628
So. 2d 1116(La. 1993); State v. Saldana, 324 N.W.3d 227, 230-31 (Minn. 1982); see also Pamela K.
Sutherland&DeliaJ. Henderson, Expert Psychiatrists and Comments on Witness Credibility, TRIAL, July 1998,
81,83.
The court in State v. Kim, 645 P.2d 1330(1982), a notable exception, permitted a child psychia
tristwhohad interviewed the thirteen-year-old complainingwitness, her mother, and the accusedto testify
in a statutory rapecase thatherconduct, account oftheincident, andemotional condition approximated
that of other child rape victims he had interviewed. Id. Dr. Mann testified as follows:
QBased upon your experience, Dr. Mann, haveyou had an opportunity to—inthe past
—to assess the credibility of reported rape casesby children involving familymembers?
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Even some of its strongest proponents concede that syndrome evi
dencepotentially runs afoul of the prohibitionagainst vouching for the
credibility ofanotherwitness.237 Sometimes it ispatendy obvious, asin
the following exchange:
Q. Doctor, ifyou had those symptoms or some of those symptoms
and a report by a childofsexual abuse, are you comfortable forming
a diagnosis of child sexual abuse in such a case?
A Yes.
Q,Approximatelyhow many times have you done this?
AI would say about 70 times, 70 cases.
QAnd, asaresult of yourinterviews andexaminations of these witnesses, haveyouarrived
atconclusions withrespect to the truthfulness of these reported rape cases involving family
members?
A Yes.
Q,Upon whatdo you base yourconclusions asto the credibility of suchclaims?
A There are several factors. One is the consistency of the account of the alleged sexual
abuse. There aresomecommon emotional reactions we frequently findin victims,which
consists of a fear of safety, fear of future sexual abuse, feelings of depression or anxiety,
embarrassment to have the alleged happenings known to peers or other people around
them,anegative viewofsex, some doubts thatoneparent mightbestrong enough to protect
further sexual abuse. It'salso important to see whether thementalstatus isbasically normal.
That means there is no disturbing thinking. That memory functions areintact, and that
there isa good sense of right orwrong or fairness andno excessive fantasizing.
Q Now, as a result of your experience and training in this area, did you come to the
conclusion asto the truthfulness of the rape case reported by [the complainant] regarding
the incident ofJuly 2nd or 3rd, 1979?
A Yes. I found her account to be believable.
Q,And was this a result of your interviewing not only [the complainant] but also the
defendant and Mrs. Kim in this case?
A Yes.
QNow, in arriving at that conclusion, what factors did you consider?
A Manyofthe factors I listed before. I found [the complainant's] account quiteconsistent.
Shewas verymuchpreoccupied witha fear of safety, which tookon some almost phobic
dimensions, telling me that she locked herself in her room and shut the windows when she
wasaloneoutof fear thatthe alleged mightcomebackandshemightbe re-abused. Shewas
quite depressed, showed a negative attitude to sex and seemed somewhat naive in sexual
matters, which made it very unlikely that shewould have fantasized acts in that specific
manner. Alsosense of fairness, I think,madeit unlikely thatshewouldmakeup astory just
to get back at somebody.
Id. at 1333-34. But the court renounced Kim eight years later when it reversed a conviction where the
clinical psychologist hadbeenpermitted to testify implicitly thatthe complainant was believable andhad
beenabused. State v. Batangan, 799P.2d 48,52(Haw. 1990) ("[C] onclusory opinions thatabuse didoccur
andthatthatchild victim's report of abuse istruthful andbelievable isof no assistance to thejury, and
therefore, should not be admitted.").
237. See, e.g., McCord, supra note73, at32-34. McCord, however, dismisses such concerns as "legal
bromides [that] have diverted thelegal system from acomplete andcorrect analysis oftheadmissibility of
[syndrome] evidence," referring specifically tothephrases "invades theprovince ofthejury" and "improper
commenton witness credibility." Id at 26. In lightof the centrality of thejuryin ourjudicial system and
our rules of evidence, this dismissal is perplexing.
For some empirical data suggesting thatthe risk of prejudicing thejurymaybemorepotential
than actual,seeVidmar & Schuller, supra note 11,at 174-76.
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A. I would base that diagnosis on the child's statements about what
had happenedto them.238
Many courts have recognized that syndrome and similar behavioral
science evidence is likely to be perceived by the jury as underwriting the
credibility of the witness in question even when not so transparendy
packaged. In fact, that is precisely the relevance of such testimony—
"[ujnless the evidence is probative ofcredibility, it is utterly immaterial
to any aspect of the case."239 A few courts exclude syndrome evidence
for the very reason that it may lead the jury to abdicate responsibility
and deferto the expert'sjudgment on whomto believe.240 Andpsycho
therapists, "who purport to know the workings of the human psyche,
pose an even greater risk than other experts ofjeopardizing the inde
pendent decision-making functions of the jury when they comment on
witness credibility."241 The concern, as the Vermont Supreme Court
stated, is "that the psychological expert [may] be perceived by the jury
as a 'truth detector'—someone who, by application ofscientificmethod,
determines whether the victim is telling the truth about whether the
abuse occurredand the abuser's identity."242
Nonetheless, we have seen that syndrome evidence is widely admitt
ed. Some jurisdictions accept it with the explicit purpose of influencing
238. United States v. Velarde, 214 F.3d 1204,1209(10thCir. 2000). In reversing, the Tenth Circuit
observed that an expert who bases her conclusion on the alleged victim's allegations is merely vouching for
the complainant's credibility,which is impermissible. Id. at 1210. A clinical psychologistwho had inter
viewed the child and her mother had also been allowed to testify that the child's nightmares, bed-wetting,
and angry outbursts were "consistent with" sexual abuse, and that she found no evidence that the child
"was subject to either lying or overexaggerated fantasizing in her life." Id. at 1211. The Tenth Circuit
reserved judgment on this testimony as it remanded it for a reliability determination.
239. Newkirk v. Commonwealth, 937 S.W.2d 690, 693 (Ky. 1996) (excluding CSAAS testimony).
240. See, e.g, State v. Ballard, 855 S.W.2d 557, 561 (Tenn. 1993).
241. Sutherland & Henderson, supra note 236, at 83. The writers continue that it "has not been
demonstrated that the art of psychiatry has yet developed into a scienceso exact as to warrant such a basic
intrusion into the jury process." Id. (citation omitted).
242. State v. Wetherbee, 594 A.2d 390, 393 (Vt. 1991). Sometimes the expert testimony operates
overtly as a lie detector. In State v. Pizzillo, No. 746, 2002 WL 75936 (Ohio Ct. App.Jan. 17, 2002), the
court reversed a conviction after a trial in which a social worker who had interviewed the alleged minor
victim was permitted to testify regarding the child's initial denial that any abuse had occurred:
[The witness] then went on to explain how she managed to divine that the victim had been
lying on June 16,2000:
"A. [The victim] was very difficult. She uh, her body language. She turned her back to me
most of the time. Uh she was silent on a lot of the questions that I asked. Uh she was
figidity. (sic) Shejust wanted me outa there, uh and eye contact wasjust awful. It wasdown.
Uh never wanted to look at me. Just very angry that I was there and I knew by that she
knew something, something washappening to her that she wanted to tell but she wanted me
outa there because I was pressing." (Tr. p. 184).
While her ten years as a social worker may have allowed [the witness] to develop many
skills, mind reading is not one of them.
Id. at *6.
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the credibility judgment, especially where the complaining witness has
recanted her testimony. The Supreme Court of Michigan has asserted
that "[to] a jury recognizing the awesome dilemma ofwhom to believe,
an expert will often represent the only seemingly objective source,
offering it a much sought-after hook on which to hang its hat."243
Similarly, California recently reaffirmed its rulings admitting on
credibility grounds the testimony ofpolice officersand domestic violence
counselors to the effect that victims usually tell the truth about their
abuse within 48 hours ofthe incident, but then often recant or minimize
it later on.244 In People v. Brown, the California Supreme Court even
allowed the witness, a manager of a domestic violence center, to quantify
for the jury the rate of recantation at between 80 and 85 percent. This
is in apparent contravention of its famous warning against "trial by
mathematics" in People v. Collins.245
Nearly all courts permit expert testimony about the common patterns
of victim behavior to serve a rehabilitative purpose when defendant
243. People v. Beckley,456 N.W.2d 391 (Mich. 1990). The characterization of a witness called by
the prosecution, or indeed any litigant, as "objective" appears somewhat disingenuous. And the court was
apparently untroubled (as another court was) that when "the only evidence consists of the victim's
accusation and the defendant's denial, expert testimony on the question of who to believe is nothing more
than advice to jurors on how to decide the case." State v. Moran, 728 P.2d 248, 253 (Ariz. 1986).
244. People v. Brown, 94 P.3d 574, 576 (Cal. 2004). There being no proofof any other incident of
abuse, the casewasnot decided under California's statute admitting evidenceofbattered woman syndrome,
Evidence Code § 1107,but rather its general rule on expert testimony. The trial court did givea limiting
instruction required by § 1107 that "This evidence is not going to be received and must not be considered
by you to prove the occurrence of the act or acts of abuse which form the basisof the crimes charged." Id.
at 576.
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals was equally candid in ruling that expert testimony con
cerning battered woman syndrome should be admitted in a sexualabuse trial because it bolstered the veracity
of the complaining witness:
A jury naturally would be puzzled at the complete about-face she made, and would have
great difficultyin determining which version of Brave Bird's testimony it should believe. If
there were some explanation for Brave Bird's changed statements, such explanation would
aid the jury in deciding which statements were credible.
Maicky's expert testimony regarding the battered woman syndrome provided that
explanation to the jury. As the witness told the jury, the syndrome is a psychological condi
tion, which leads a female victim of physical abuse to accept her beatings because she
believesthat she is responsiblefor them, and hopes that by accepting one more beating, the
pattern will stop. Maicky's testimony provided the jury with information that would help
it to determine which of Brave Bird's testimony to credit. If the jury concluded that Brave
Bird sufferedfrom battered woman syndrome, that would explain her change in testimony
—her unwillingness to say something damaging against her husband.
Arcoren v. United States, 929 F.2d 1235, 1240 (8th Cir. 1991).
245. 438 P.2d 33, 41 (Cal. 1968); see also Lawrence Tribe, Trial by Mathematics: Precision andRitual in
the Legal Process, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1329 (1971). Would a defense attorney in a suppression hearing be
permitted to offertestimonyofa criminologist quantifyingthe rate ofpolice"testi-lying" tojustifyunlawful
searches? See The Consequences ofPerjury and Related Crimes: Hearing Before the House Comm. onthejudiciary,\05th
Cong. (1998) (statementof Alan Dershowitz), available athttp://www.constitution.org/lrev/dershowitz_
test_981201.htm#N_9_.
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seeksto impeach the complainingwitness by showing delay in reporting,
recantation,and the like.246 Someallow testimony on the characteristics
of "typical" abusive relationships, including the statistical national
average for the number of times a woman goes back and forth before
ultimately leaving.247 Butnot alljurisdictions limitadmissibility to situa
tions where the defendant opens the door by way ofattempted impeach
ment, or to use for rehabilitative purposes only. Some will admit it as
substantive evidence during the prosecution's case-in-chief, if the trial
judge determines the victim's conduct may be misinterpreted, notwith
standingthe defendant's strategy.248
The Massachusetts courts' struggle to define the "narrow"249 line
between proper use of an expert and impermissible bolstering ofcredi
bility is representative. A qualified witness may testify to the general
behavioral characteristics and common clinical phenomena ofsexually
abusedchildren250 or other victims,251 but may not direcdyor indirecdy
refer to or compare the behavior of the specific complainant because
that intrudes on the jury's province of assessing credibility.252 The
decisional law emphasizes that:
246. See Mosteller, supra note 162, at 119-20, 130 (1989) (such evidence is universally admitted); see,
e.g, Chapman v. State, 18P.3dll64, 1172 (Wy. 2001); People v. Peterson, 537 N.W.2d 857, 868 (Mich.
1995); State v. Cressey, 628 A.2d 696, 702-703 (N.H. 1993); State v.Jensen, 432 N.W.2d 913, 918 (Wis.
1988). Butcf Newkirk v. Commonwealth, 937 S.W.2d 690, 693 (Ky. 1996) (expert testimony that it is
common for children to report sexual abuse and then retract such allegations was not admissible as rebuttal
evidence to respond to defendant's evidence that alleged ten-year-old victim had recanted accusations
against defendant).
247. See State v. Rodriquez, 636 N.W.2d 234, 245 (Iowa 2001). The witness, a supervisor in the
Sexual Assault and Domestic Violence Abuse Advocacy Program, told the jury that abused women try
seven times before finally leaving, and that statistically she is in the most danger when she tries to leave.
Id.
248. See, e.g., Mindombe v. United States, 795 A.2d 39, 44-48 (D.C. 2002); Peterson, 537 N.W.2d at
868; State v. Grecinger, 569 N.W.2d 189, 193 (Minn. 1997) (battered woman syndrome testimony can
come in during prosecution's case-in-chief). For civil cases see S.M.v.J.K.,262 F.3d 914, 920-22 (9th Cir.
2001),and/y^ v. Capuchin Province, 877 F. Supp. 1055 (E.D.Mich. 1995).
249. Commonwealth v. Rather, 638 N.E.2d 915, 919 (Mass. App. Ct. 1994).
250. See Commonwealth v. Dockham, 542 N.E.2d 591 (Mass. 1989).
251. See Terrio v. McDonough, 450 N.E.2d 190, 198 (Mass.App. Ct. 1983)(rape trauma syndrome
testimony that it would "not necessarily" be remarkable for a rape victim to return to the scene with her
attacker or to feel safe in his company after the event).
252. See Commonwealth v. Federico, 683 N.E.2d 1035, 1039 (Mass. 1997); Commonwealth v.
Rather, 638 N.E.2d 915, 918-20 (Mass.App. Ct. 1994); see also YiouXt v. Hoult, 57F.3d 1, 7 (1stCir. 1995)
("We think Dr. Brant's testimony may have crossedthe line in commenting upon the plaintiffs credibility.
Dr. Brant did not limit her testimony to psychological literature or experience or to a discussion of a class
ofvictimsgenerally. Rather, she came perilously close to testifyingthat this particular victim/witness could
be believed." (quoting United States v. Binder, 769 F.2d 595, 602 (9th Cir. 1985))); United States v.
Rosales, 19 F.3d 763, 766 (1st Cir. 1994) ("Dr. Slicner's testimony sent an implicit message to the jury that
the children had testified truthfully, and this might therefore have interfered with the jury's function as the
sole assessor of witness credibility.).
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It is one thing to educate the jury to understand that child abuse
victims may act in counter-intuitive ways, and that excessive weight
should not be given to factors such as failure to disclose when the
child victim's credibility is weighed. It is quite another to suggest to
the jury that the events and feelings expressed by the child witnesses
are the same as those experienced by other victims ofabuse. That this
has the effectof buttressing the witnesses' credibility seems impossible
to deny.253
The witness must not have actually examined or treated the child
because the risk ofimpermissible vouching isobviously highestthere.254
And when the expert is asked to respond to hypothetical questions, care
must be taken not to suggest that the expert has concluded that the
complainantis telling the truth.255
253. Commonwealth v. Deloney, 794 N.E.2d 613, 623 (Mass. 2003) (citations omitted).
254. In Commonwealth v. McCaffrey, 633 N.E.2d 1062 (Mass.App. Ct. 1994), the psychologist
first testified that she counseled sexually abused children and that such children exhibit
certain general behavioral characteristics. She then was permitted to testify, over
McCaffrey'sobjections, that Erin wascurrently her patient; that she had been treating Erin
for about a year; that at the beginning of the therapy Erin had revealed that she had been
sexuallyabused by her father; and that Erin had been placed in therapy groups for sexually
abused children. The expert further described Erin's conduct during the early course of
treatment in terms that the jury could not have failed to note resembled the behavior the
expert had earlier testified to as characteristic of sexually abused children ....
... Allowingthe psychologisthere to testifyas both behavioral expert and treating therapist
may well have approached too closely the forbidden issue of the victim's credibility. The
fact that she had accepted Erin as a patient to be treated as a sexually abused child could
easily give rise to the jury's inference that she had accepted Erin's allegations against her
father as true and was providing her professional servicesas a result, thereby endorsing
Erin's credibility as a victim of parental sexual molestation.
Id. at 1067-68; see also Commonwealth v. Rather, 638 N.E.2d 915, 919 (Mass. App. Ct. 1994). For a
similar approach in other jurisdictions, see Mxon v. United States, 728 A.2d 582, 592 (D.C. 1999). Some
courts have merely cautionedjudges to "carefully scrutinize the treating professional's ability to aid the trier
offact" giventhe inevitable"emotional inclination toward protecting the child victim." Peoplev. Beckley,
456 N.W.2d 391, 408 (Mich. 1990).
255. The followingquestions posed by the prosecution to its psychiatric expert were found to create
an unacceptable risk of vouching for the credibility of the complaining witness:
Q; "I would ask you to assume for purposes of this hypothetical, Doctor, that two sisters
livingwith their mother and stepfather had sexualrelationswith the stepfather on a regular
basis since the ages of twelve and nine. Further assume that neither sister disclosed those
relations for six years while it was ongoing. I would ask you further to assume that at age
fifteen the younger sister disclosed the sexual activity to her mother the following day on
which the stepfather had intercourse with her in the afternoon and in the evening scolded
her, yelled at her, and lectured her for failing to fold towels and finish dishes in the sink.
I wouldaskyou further to assumethat the morning after that incident, the fifteen-year-old
girlbecameupsetand told her mother the Defendant had been havingsexualrelationswith
her for years. Do you have an opinion, to a reasonable degree of medical certainty, as to
whether or not those assumedfactsare consistentwith the girlwho had been having sexual
relations with an adult since the age of approximately nine-and-a-half?"
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Some courts discount the danger of intruding on the jury's prime
function where the expert islimitedto testimony that the alleged victim
exhibited symptoms and behavior "consistent with" those of abused
children.256 Butothers see no meaningful difference between this and
testimony that, in the expert's opinion, the children were sexually
abused.257
Basedon that hypothetical question, Dr. Brant opined as follows:
"Well, I have described the circumstances in which the sexual relations can be maintained
as a secretfor a very long time. Then, comesthe question about what the circumstancesare
under which a child who has had ongoing sexual relations will tell someone about it.
Those circumstances can include, first of all, a child growing up and growing into
adolescence and having a changed awareness of what their situation is, that more and more
theymighthavewishes to haverelationships outsidethe family. To the extent that theyare
limited in doing that and having sexual relationships within the family, that can become
more and more bothersome to a child and create more conflict.
It is often in the context of a familyargument and anger that a child will,for the firsttime,
tell someone about what has happened. Also,I think that what you described in terms of
the child havingsexualrelationships at one point in time and then beingreprimandedfor
not folding clothes in the proper sort ofway,I think there can be a lot of strongfeelings, a
lot of conflict about, on the one hand, being treated in a more adult fashion; on the other
hand, beingreprimandedas a childor a servant,that can giveriseto anger. The anger in
some way can counteract the fears that have led a child to keep the sexual relations secret.
I think that by virtue of the argument, the anger, a child goinginto adolescence,that those
are the kindsofcircumstances in whichit isvery typicalthat a child might for the firsttime
disclosea secret that they have been keeping for many years."
Commonwealths Federico, 683N.E.2d 1035,1041-42(Mass. 1997). Similartestimonywasfoundto have
crossedthe line in Commonwealth v. Rather, 638 N.E.2d 915 (Mass. App. Ct. 1994):
Q. Ms.Tempesta [Therapistcalledbythe defense tocontradict thevictim'stestimonyabout
the specific allegedabuse. On cross-examination by the prosecutor:]
I wouldlikeyou for the following three questionsto makean assumption. Assume that you
have a child under the age of ten who has been sexuallyabused, physicallyabused, and
threatened with severebodilyharm if the child discloses that abuse. My firstquestion is,do
you have an opinion to a reasonable degree of psychological certainty as to whether it is
uncommon for such a child to fail to disclosethat abuse for a substantial period of time?
A. I think a child who has been sexuallyabused and who has been threatened with bodily
harm would have a very difficulttime disclosingthe abuse at all. And quite often children
who have experienced that type of abuse and those types of threats very often do not
disclose. When they do disclose they normally disclosein stages.
Id. at 916-18.
256. In State v. Jensen, 432 N.W.2d 913 (Wis. 1988), for example, the complainant's schoolguidance
counselor (whohappened to be the first person told of the alleged assault)was permitted to testify,as an
expert on sexually abused children, that the "acting out behavior" of the victim was "consistent with
children who are victims of sexual abuse" and a "red flag[ ]" or "indicatorf ]" of abuse. Id. at 916. See
cases collected atBachman v.Leapley, 953 F.2d 440, 441 (8th Cir. 1992), Statev. Chauvin, 846 So.2d 697, 704-
06 (La. 2003); Steward v.State, 652 N.E.2d 490, 495-498 (Ind. 1995). See also United States v. Alzanki, 54
F.3d 994, 1006 (1st Cir. 1995) ("victimologist" allowed to testify that alleged victim's behavior in not
seeking to escape was consistent with someone held in involuntary servitude).
257. State v. Cressey, 628 A.2d 696,699-700 (N.H. 1993); see also State v. Moran, 728 P.2d 248, 255
(Ariz. 1986)("the [impermissible] inference offered the jury is that because this victim's personality and
behavior are consistent with a molest having occurred, the crime must have been committed."); People
v. Peterson, 537 N.W.2d 857, 869 (Mich. 1995); State v. J.Q., 617 A.2d 1196 (N.J. 1993). The
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One court has apdy observed:
Where a jury is confrontedwith evidence of an allegedchild victim's
behaviors, paired withexpert testimony concerningsimilarsyndrome
behaviors, the invited inference—that the child was sexually abused
because he or she fits the syndrome profile—will be as potentially
misleading and equallyasunreliableasexpert testimonyapplyingthe
syndrome to the facts of the caseand statingoutright the conclusion
that a given child was abused.258
As another court summed it up:
An expert witness may not testify that a defendant isguilty. When, as
in this case, an expressionofopinion as to credibilityis the equivalent
ofan opinionas to guiltor innocence,it isof no consequence that the
testimony was presented in a general manner rather than as specific
to the case or on rebuttal rather than as evidence in chief.259
Syndrome and other behavioral science evidence clearly presents a
quandary. The more general the expert's testimony the less intrusive
into jury's traditional role, but also the less helpful in resolving disputed
facts. Conversely, the more specific the testimony the more helpful,but
Massachusettscourts have detected no meaningfuldistinction in a related context. See Commonwealth v.
Day, 569 N.E.2d 397, 400 (Mass. 1991) ("The fact that Dr. Newberger did not specifically state that the
defendantfit the profileisnot significant, sincea reasonable jury could have inferred; that the Common
wealthwasimplyingthat the defendantfit the 'child batteringprofile,'and, as a result,that the defendant
was responsible for the child's fatal injuries.").
In his dissent in People v. Peterson,Justice Cavanagh argued for use of the phrase that the child's
behavior was "not inconsistent with" sexual abuse instead ofthe familiar affirmative "consistent with" testi
mony:
"[Consistent with" testimonyis fundamentallydifferentfrom testimonythat a givensetof
behavioral reactions are not inconsistent with child sexual abuse. "Not inconsistent" is
rebuttal-type testimony; it merelystatesthat it could be true. "Consistent with" ispositive
testimony that it is true. "Not inconsistent" testimony can convey to the jury all the
information that it needs to assess the issues in the case.
To illustrate, suppose the facts of the case indicate that the child has withdrawn, is
exhibiting severedepression, initially reported the abuse to a school counselor, but has now
recanted her story in fear that her stepfather- abuser willbe taken awayfrom the family,and
her mother will be very sad. This information willbe placed before the jury by the child's
own testimony or through witnesseswith personal knowledgeof the child's behavior. If the
defense then focuseson the recantation and argues that her initial allegations were made in
retaliation or rebellion to house rules, an expert could testifythat child sexual abuse victims
have been known to withdraw, become depressed, and recant their allegations when they
realize that the family may be torn apart. If appropriate, the prosecutor could pose a
hypothetical question to the expert paralleling the facts of the case, and ask whether such
testimony is "inconsistent with" sexual abuse behavioral reactions. The expert could reply,
"No, it is not inconsistent." At that point, the jury has all of the information that it needs to
evaluate the child's credibility.
Peterson, 537 N.W.2d at 874-75.
258. Steward, 652 N.E.2d at 499.
259. Newkirk v. Commonwealth, 937 S.W.2d 690, 694 (Ky. 1996).
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the greater the risk the jury will defer to the expert's judgment. Resolv
ing this dilemma against the admission of such testimony, the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania concluded:
In the final analysis, the reason for the delay [in reporting by the
victim] must be ascertained by the jury and is based on the credibility
ofthe child and the attendant circumstance ofeach case. We believe
that the evidence presented through the fact witnesses, coupled with
an instruction to the jury that they should consider the reasons why
the child did not come forward, including the age and circumstances
of the child in the case, are sufficient to provide the jury with enough
guidance to make a determination of the importance of prompt
complaint in each case. Not only is there no need for testimony about
the reasons children may not come forward, but permitting it would
infringe upon the jury's right to determinecredibility.260
Various devices have been proposed over the years to determine the
truthfulness of a subject's account, ranging from "truth serum" to
polygraphs that measure blood pressure and pulse to counting the rate
of eye blinks.261 But even if we were satisfied with the scientific relia
bility of a particular method, it is inconceivable that we would permit its
use at trial to test the truthfulness of a witness' testimony. As Judge
Easterbrook explained in a case excluding expert testimony on eye
witness identification:
Jurors may believe that witnesses who hesitate, perspire, or fidget
during cross-examination are hiding the truth. This is the view that
underlies polygraph examinations, but without the precision of
measurement. Is it true? Calm and collected liars deceive polygraph
examiners (and thus jurors too); other witnesses grow restless or testy
although they have nothing to hide. Suppose one of the litigants
offers an expert in physiology to explain to jurors the (weak) correla
tion between lying and the appearance ofdiscomfort on the stand. Or
an expert in group dynamics to explain to a potential dissenter on the
jury how to resist the pressure ofthe majority to go along—or for that
matter how to see through lawyers' rhetorical tricks. Because trials
rest on so many contestable empirical propositions, including those
about eyewitness recollection, it always would be possible to offer
expert evidence along these and related lines.
Yet a trial about the process of trials not only would divert atten
tion from the main question (did Hall kill Jessica Roach?) and
substantially lengthen the process but also would not do much to
260. Commonwealth v. Dunkle, 602 A.2d 830, 837 (Pa. 1992) (footnotes omitted).
261. See Sarah Van Boven, In the Blink ofanEye, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 21, 1996, at 6 (reporting on the
work of Boston College ProfessorJoseph Tecce). A summary of Professor Tecce's conclusions can be found
in McGraw-Hill Yearbook of Science & Technology 375-77 (6th ed. 1992).
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improve the accuracy of the outcome. Social science evidence is
difficult to absorb; the idea of hypothesis formulation and testing is
alien to most persons. That's one reason why the training of social
scientists is so extended. Delivering a graduate level statistical-
methods course to jurors is impractical, yet without it a barrage of
expert testimony may leave the jurors more befuddled than enligh
tened. Many lawyers think that experts neutralize each other, leaving
the jurors where they were before the process began. Many lawyers
think that the best (= most persuasive) experts are those who have
taken acting lessonsand have deep voices, rather than those who have
done the best research. Perhaps that is too pessimistic a view; but
then the effectof experts is itselfa question open to empirical inquiry,
which might be added to the agendafor trial.262
Easterbrook's astute observations should give equal pause regarding
the admission of syndrome evidence.
C Probative Value and Prejudicial Harm: The FRE 403 Calculus
"The teaching of the evidence doctrine is that unreliable scientific
testimony creates a serious and unjustifiable risk of an erroneous
verdict, and that the adversary process at its best does not remove this
risk."263
The potential risks of expert testimony have been widely acknow
ledged. The Daubert Court noted:
Rule 403 permits the exclusion of relevant evidence "if its probative
value is substantially outweighed by he danger of unfair prejudice,
confusion ofthe issues, or misleading the jury " Judge Weinstein
has explained: "Expert evidence can be both powerful and quite
misleading because of the difficulty in evaluating it. Because of this
risk, the judge in weighing possible prejudice against probative force
under Rule 403 of the present rules exercises more control over
experts than over lay witnesses."264
As discussed above, the probative value of behavioral science evi
dence, especially syndrome testimony, is often questionable, and a few
courts have even excluded it on grounds of relevancy "for failure to
make the existence of any fact of consequence more probable or less
262. United States v. Hall, 165 F.3d 1095, 1119-20 (7th Cir. 1999) (Easterbrook,J., concurring).
263. Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 931 n. 10 (1983) (BlackmunJ., dissenting).
264. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm. Co., 509 U.S. 579,595 (1993) (citation omitted); see also Usher
v. Lakewood Eng'g & Mfg. Co., 158 F.R.D. 411, 413-14 (N.D. 111. 1994) (federal courts have enhanced
authority under Daubert to exclude expert opinion under 403).
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probable thanitwould have beenwithout theevidence."265 Ifthesymp
toms associated with a particular syndrome also appear with frequency
in the population generally, the testimony adds litde to the resolution of
the dispute.266 Moreover, since the diagnosis of post traumatic stress
disorder, battered woman syndrome, and child sexual abuse accom
modation syndrome is based in part on the victim's version of events,
there is a troubling circularity to the logic of this evidence.267 It
sometimes sounds like: The witness recanted, therefore she must have
been abused. But asJustice Brown of the California Supreme Court
recendy observed, "[rjecantation is not a predicate of abuse but the
otherwayaround."268 Someone oncewarnedthat "lowprobative worth
can often be concealed in thejargon of some expert."269
On the other side of the FRE 403 balance, the risk of jury over
valuation (which the common law handled clumsily by operation of the
nowdiscredited "ultimateissue" rule)270 pervades the evidentiary rules
controlling opinion testimony. The concern is particularly acute for
testimony carrying a scientific aura,271 but hasbeenidentified aswell in
the case of non-scientific clinically-based testimony.272 Moreover the
very terminologies used by the witness such as rape trauma syndrome or
battered woman syndrome may itself unfairly prejudice the defendant's
273
case.
265. See, e.g., Newkirk v. Commonwealth, 937 S.W.2d 690, 693 (Ky. 1996).
266. Id.
267. Thornton, supra note 74, at 1751-52. Battered women syndrome, for example, is a "history-
driven diagnosis,"depending on the accuracy ofperception ofthe veryperson who wasabused. See Welner,
supra note 82, at 205; see also Peoplev. Brown,94 P.3d 574, 583-84 (Cal. 2004). Similarlythe behavioral
characteristics of CSAAS "assume abuse rather than provide evidence of it." Askowitz& Graham, supra
note 68, at 2039-40.
268. People v. Brown, 94 P.3d 574, 585 (Cal. 2004) (Brown,J., dissenting).
269. Charles A. Wright & Kenneth W. GrahamJr., Federal Practice and Procedure
§5217, at 295 (1978).
270. See FED.R. EVID. 704 advisory committee's notes.
271. "[A]certain patina attaches to an expert's testimony unlike any other witness; this is 'science,'
a professional's judgment, the jury may think, and give more credence to the testimony than it may
deserve." United States v. Hines, 55 F. Supp. 2d 62, 64 (D. Mass. 1999); see also United States v. Fosher,
590 F.2d 381, 382 (1st Cir. 1979) (excluding proffered expert testimony on eyewitness identification
because, inter alia, it would "raise a substantial danger of unfair prejudice given the aura of reliability that
surrounds scientific evidence").
272. See Krauss & Sales,supra note 36, at 87. Justice Blackmun referred to "the inevitable untouch-
abilityofa medicalspecialist's words" in the eyesof an impressionable jury. Barefootv. Estelle, 463 U.S.
880, 916 (1982) (BlackmunJ., dissenting). He continued: "Indeed, unreliable scientificevidence iswidely
acknowledged to be prejudicial. The reasonsfor thisare manifest. The major danger ofscientific evidence
isitspotentialto misleadthejury; an aura ofscientific infallibility may shroud the evidence and thus lead
the jury to accept it without critical scrutiny. Where the public holds an exaggerated opinion of the
accuracyofscientific testimony, the prejudiceislikelyto be indelible." Id at 926-27(citations and internal
quotations omitted) (Blackmun,J., dissenting).
273. Vidmar & Schuller, supra note 11, at 143.
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In excluding expert testimony concerning eyewitness identification
despite its impressive scientific foundation,274 courts have worried that
the "minimal probative value of the proffered expert testimony is out
weighed by the danger ofjuror confusion."275 Such testimony has the
potential to confuse and mislead the jury and create "prolonged trials by
batdes ofexperts."276 Several courts have similarly concluded regarding
syndrome testimony:
Permitting a person in the role ofan expert to suggestthat because the
complainant exhibits some of the symptoms of rape trauma syn
drome, the complainant was therefore raped, unfairly prejudices the
[defendant] by creating an aura of special reliability and trustworthi
ness. Sincejurors of ordinary abilities are competent to consider the
evidence and determine whether the alleged crime occurred, the
danger of unfair prejudice outweighs any probative value. To allow
such testimony would inevitably lead to a batde of experts that would
invade the jury's province of fact-finding and add confusion rather
than clarity.277
The concern is that the expert's credentials will displace the jury's
own common sense and intuition about the way people behave in
certain circumstances.278
274. See text accompanying supra notes 112-18.
275. See United States v. Kime, 99 F.3d 870, 884 (8th Cir. 1996).
276. United States v. Brien, 59 F.3d 274, 277 (1st Cir. 1995).
277. State v. Saldana, 324 N.W.2d 227, 230 (Minn. 1982); see also State v. Ballard, 855 S.W.2d 557,
561-62 (Tenn. 1993) ("This 'specialaura' of expert scientific testimony, especially testimonyconcerning
personalityprofilesofsexuallyabusedchildren,maylead ajury to abandon itsresponsibility asa fact finder
and adopt the judgment of the expert."); State v. Cressey, 628 A.2d 696, 698 (N.H. 1993):
The reliability ofevidenceisofspecialconcernwhen offeredthrough expert testimonybe
causesuch testimonyinvolvesthe potential risksthat ajury may disproportionately defer to
the statementsofan expert if the subjectarea isbeyond the common knowledgeof the aver
age person, and that a jury may attach extra importance to an expert's opinion simply be
causeit isgivenwith the air ofauthority that commonly accompanies an expert's testimony.
State v. Grecinger, 569 N.W.2d 189, 198 (Minn. 1997)(Stringer,J, concurring):
The admissionofthe expert testimonyon battered womansyndromecouldhavea profound
influence on the jury in its determination as to whom to believe on the basic issue of whether
the battering occurred at all—even though the court prohibited the expert witness from
testifying as to whether the complainant was in fact a battered woman. The right to a
presumption of innocence would soon be an empty epithet unless the trial court exercises
extraordinary vigilance in applying Rule 403 under circumstances such as we have here,
where guilt or innocence turns solely on which of two accounts to believe, and expert
testimony, that arguably implies that the criminal conduct charged actually did occur, is
offeredto explaininconsistent conduct by the complainant. Carefulinquirymustbe made
under Rule 403 as to all aspects of the need for, and value of, the expert testimony as
rehabilitative ofthe witness'credibilityand itshelpfulnessto the jury, and these factorsmust
be balanced against the clear potential for unfair prejudice to the defendant.
278. See Vidmar &Schuller,supra note 11,at 142. Socialframework evidenceis alsolikelyto have
some "spillover effects" on all the other evidence heard by the jury, causing jurors to credit the com
plainant's credibilityand moral character. Id. at 148, 160; see also Lawrence,supra note 84, at 1700-02.
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The danger of jury overvaluation is particularly acute where the
expert presents his or her testimony with great confidence and assur
ance. In the notorious trial ofjohn Hendrickson, convicted ofmurder
ing his wife Maria in Albany, New York in 1853, the crucial evidence
of guilt came from three young doctors who testified they had devised
a method ofidentifying the presence ofa poison previously undetectable
by medical science. The evidence was ultimately discredited by practi
tioners, but unfortunately for Hendrickson not until after he was
convicted and hanged.279 Aprominentpathologist observed at the time
that the "confident and positive" demeanor ofthe prosecution witnesses
carried more weight with the jury than the more considered and scienti
fically reliable testimony of the defense experts: "foolhardy confidence
seemed to triumph overprofessional caution."280
It has been argued that the risk of overestimation of psychological
testimony has been exaggerated, particularly since human behavior
(unlike the opaque box of DNA science) is not a subject foreign to
jurors.281 And certainly some of the risk can be addressed in obvious
ways, as for example by not referring to witness as an "expert" in front
of the jury.282 Nonetheless, asJustice Blackmun noted in his dissent in
279. James C Mohr, Doctors and the Law: MedicalJurisprudence in Nineteenth-
Century America 122-39 (1993).
280. Id.at 134 (citation omitted). Mock jurors have similarly been found more willing to convict on
basis of confident eyewitnessesthan fingerprint evidence. See Elizabeth Loftus, PsychologicalAspects ofCourtroom
Testimony, 347 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. SCI. 27, 32-33 (1980).
281. Neil Vidmar & Shari Seidman Diamond conclude that" [e]mpirical data do not support a view
that juries are passive, too-credulous, incompetent, and overawed by the mystique of the expert." SeeJuries
andExpert Evidence, 66 BROOK. L. REV.1121,1180 (2001). They reviewed the research on the various forms
of social framework evidence and found that jurors used it "by incorporating the information into their
decision-making processes. However, the jurors were not seduced by it. They critically evaluated the
information and did not accord it an unwarranted aura of trustworthiness and reliability or allow the
expert's opinion to substitute for their own judgment. In addition, the accumulated data from the studies
showed only a very modest spillover effect on the way the jurors evaluated other evidence in the case,
including judgments about the credibility or character of other witnesses." Id. at 1166; see also Vidmar &
Schuller, supra note 11, at 166-76 (reviewing studies of the impact of expert testimony on jurors, several
concluding they do not generally suspend judgment in deference to expert testimony); Askowitz &
Graham, supra note 68, at 2095-96. Seegenerally Edward Imwinkelreid, The StandardforAdmitting Scientific
Evidence: A Critiquefrom the Perspective ofJuror Psychology, 28 VlLL.L. REV.554,566-68 (1983)(reviewof studies
showingjurors are not overly influenced by scientificproof); Scott Sundby, TheJury as Critic: AnEmpirical
Look at How CapitalJuries Perceive Expert and Lay Testimony, 83 Va. L. REV. 1109 (1997); AMERICAN BAR
ASSOCIATION REPORTOFASPECIAL COMMITTEE ONjURYCOMPREHENSION OFTHEABALITIGATION
Section:Jury Comprehension in Complex Cases 40-43 (1989)(notingexampleswherejuries rejected
expert testimony as hired gun evidence). For a briefsurveyof the empirical studieson juror comprehension
of expert proof, see Edward Imwinkelreid & David Schleuter, Evidentiary Tactics: Selecting the 'Best' Evidence
toSimplify the Case, 19 CRIM.JUST., Summer 2004, at 24-25.
282. See Charles R Richey, Proposals toEliminate the Prejudicial Effect ofthe Use ofthe Word "Expert" Under
the Federal Rules ofEvidence in Civil andCriminalJuryTrials, 154 F.R.D. 537 (1994).
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Barefootv. Estelle/83 thereisconsiderable evidence that suggests thatjuries
"are not effective at assessing the validity of scientific evidence."284
Boilerplate instructions to the jury regarding the assessment of expert
testimony couldverywell exacerbate the problem.285
Moreover, the adversary system cannot be counted on to reveal the
defects in behavioral testimony because it rests on "psychiatric
categories and intuitive clinical judgments not susceptible to cross-
examination and rebuttal."286 Evenskilled opposing counsel mayhave
difficulty exposing the flaws because as the Supreme Court of New
Hampshire recognized, the methodology used in psychological evalua
tions often puts the evidence "effectively beyond reproach."287 The
conclusions of the expert
do not rest on one particular indicator or symptom, but rather on
[the] interpretation ofall the factors and information before her. So
even though the defendant may be able to discredit several of the
indicators, symptoms, or test results, the expert's overall opinion is
likely to emerge unscathed. An expert using this methodology may
candidly acknowledge any inconsistencies or potential shortcomings
in the individual pieces ofevidence she presents, but can easilydismiss
the critique by saying that her evaluation relies on no one symptom
or indicator and that her conclusions still hold true in light of all the
other available factors and her expertise in the field. In such a case,
the expert's conclusions are as impenetrable as they are unverifi-
able.288
Chiefjustice Warren Burger observed forty years ago:
The very nature of the adversary system . . . complicates the use of
scientificopinion evidence, particularly in the fieldofpsychiatry. This
system ofpartisan contention, ofattack and counterattack, at its best
is not ideally suited to developing an accurate portrait or profile of the
human personality, especially in the area of abnormal behavior.
Although under ideal conditions the adversary systemcan develop for
283. See text accompanying supra notes 99-105.
284. Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 929 (1982)(BlackmunJ., dissenting)(citation omitted).
285. By way of example:
Your powerwith regard to an expert witness is exacdy the same as it iswith regard to a lay
witness. You may accept what an expert witness says, you may accept the opinion of an
expert witness,you may reject the opinion of an expert witness,you may accept it in part
and reject it in part. It'sentirely uptoyou todeal with that evidence asyou are persuaded todeal with
it. Butit is offered because, in the general run of things, you would not beexpected tohave the special
knowledge thatthe expert has.
Commonwealth v. Rather, 638 N.E.2d 915, 918 (Mass. App. Ct. 1994)(emphasisadded).
286. Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 932 (BlackmunJ., dissenting).
287. State v. Cressey, 628 A.2d 696, 701-02 (N.H. 1993).
288. Id.
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a jury most of the necessaryfact material for an adequate decision,
such conditions are rarely achieved in the courtrooms in this country.
These ideal conditions would include a highly skilledand experienced
trial judge and highly skilled lawyers on both sides of the case, all of
whom in addition to being well-trained in the law and in the techni
ques of advocacy would be sophisticated in matters of medicine,
psychiatry, and psychology. It is far too rare that all three of the legal
actors in the cast meet these standards.289
In certain trials expert testimonyisobviouslyessentialin order for the
factfinder to reach a rational decision on the issues in dispute. Neither
a layjury nor judge untrained in medicine could determine whether a
highly sophisticated surgical procedure had been performed compe-
tendy or negligently, or whether a nurse had killed her patients deliber
ately by injections that sent their hearts into "accelerated ideo-ventri-
cular rhythm."290 Butin many trials in which social science evidence is
offered it serves a collateral role, such as explaining the behavior of a
witness, who (it is feared) may otherwise be misinterpreted by the jury.
Given this more tangential function there is serious question about
whether its probative value outweighs the downside risks, including
distraction from the actual issues in dispute to a focus on the expert's
pedigree, poise, and presentation.
AsJustice Cavanagh concluded:
The marginal probative value of allowing the [behavioral] expert to
further testify with respect to the particular complainant is substan
tially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice that the jury will
misuse the testimony. It invades the province of the jury to assess
289. Warren Burger, Psychiatrists, Lawyers, and the Courts, 28 FED. PROBATION,June 1964,at 3, 6; see
also StephenJ. Morse, Crazy Behavior, Morals, and Science: An Analysis ofMental Health Law, 51S.CAL. L.REV.
527, 626 (1978) ("Many of the cases are not truly adversarial; too few attorneys are skilled at cross-
examining psychiatrists, laypersons overweigh the testimony ofexperts, and, in anycase, unrestricted use
ofexperts promotes the incorrect view that the questions are primarily scientific").
290. See Hon. MichaelA. Ponsor, life, Death, and Uncertainty to the Judge in Charge, the Murder Trial of
Kristin Gilbert, BOSTON SUNDAY GLOBE,July 8, 2001,at D2, available at2001WL 3941573. Asthe Seventh
Circuit has explained:
Suppose, forexample, it wererelevant forajury to decidewhethera person'suseoffoulor
abusive language wasintendedto harm another person. Mostof the time, thejury would
be able to assessthe circumstances without the need for expert testimony, since foul langu
ageisan unfortunate part ofeveryday life. In some cases, however, theindividual mightbe
suffering from Gilles de la Tourette's syndrome, which is a rare disorder manifested by
grimaces, grunts, and in about halfof all cases, episodes of the use of foul language. A
defendantwishing to explainhis behavior by showing that he had Tourette's syndrome
wouldneed expert testimony both on the conditionitselfand hisownaffliction. In other
cases, the question whethera personhasvoluntarilyjoinedcertainactivity maybe central.
Ifa possible explanation is that the person issuffering from post-traumatic stress disorder,
thejury wouldneedexperttestimony to allow it to takethispossibility into account.
United States v. Hall, 93 F.3d 1337, 1343 (7th Cir. 1996) (citations omitted).
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credibility. It invites the jury to giveundue weight to testimonythat
is foundationally and fundamentally unreliable merely because it is
cloaked with the expertise of an expert. It also invites the jury to
believe that the expert knows more than he is telling, by letting the
jurors infer that the expert, who workswith sexuallyabused children
every day, must believe this child's story or else the expert would not
be testifying.291
Since abuse casesoften come down to a credibility contest between
the accusedand the allegedvictim, it isacknowledged that expert beha
vioral testimonypresented by the prosecution may very well be deter
minative,292 andits impact has been empirically documented as produc
ing significandy more guilty verdicts, particularly where the testimony
refers specifically to the victim in the case, and where no opposing
defense expertispresented.293 Butadmitting social science evidence of
dubious reliability on the untested assumption that it is necessary to
counteract jurors' false beliefs about victims may, ultimately, result in
the substitution ofanother setoffalse beliefs, thistimecomingfromthe
"expert."294
Where the defendant has initiated a significant attack on the credi
bility of the complaining witness by emphasizing behaviorlike delayed
291. People v. Peterson, 537N.W.2d 857,875-76 (Mich. 1995) (Cavanagh, J., dissenting); see also
United Statesv. Kime, 99 F.3d 870, 884 (8th Cir. 1996).
292. See Askowitz & Graham, supra note 68, at 2028; MARY ANN DUTTON, UNITED STATES
Department ofJustice, The Validity and Use of Evidence Concerning Battering and Its
Effects in Criminal Trials: Impact of Evidence Concerning Battering and Its Effects in
Criminal Trials Involving Battered Women(1994), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/ocpa/
94Guides/Trials/Impact/; JANET PARRISH, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OFjUSTICE, THE VALIDITY
and Use of Evidence Concerning Battering and its Effects in Criminal Trials: Trend
Analysis: Expert Testimony on Battering and its Effects in Criminal Cases (1994), available
athttp://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/ocpa/94Guides/Trials/Valid/.
In ruling that the admission of expert testimony from two prosecution witnesses was not
harmless error, one circuitrecognized that wherethere is littleevidence beyondthan that of the victim's
allegations,such testimony is likelyto have a substantial effecton the trial's outcome. See United States v.
Velarde, 214F.3d1204, 1212 (10th Cir.2000). Along similar lines, thecourtinMukhtar v. California State
University, Hayward, 299F.3d1053 (9th Cir.2002), amended 319F.3d1073 (9th Cir. 2003), observed, "Dr.
Wellman drew theinference ofdiscrimination forthejuryin a case otherwise based entirely onless-than-
convincing circumstantial evidence. Thus, it ishard forus to see howDr. Wellman's testimony, which
addressed thecentral issue ofElsayed's case, was harmless; ratherit 'moreprobably thannotwas thecause
of the result reached.'" Id. at 1068(citationomitted).
293. See MargaretBullKovera,et al., Expert Testimony inChildAbuse Cases, 18 LAW &HUM. BEHAV.
653(1994); Vidmar &Schuller, supra note 11, at 158-60 (rape traumasyndrome); Mosteller, supra note
162, at91; see also Regina A. Schuller, The Impact ofBattered Woman Syndrome Evidence onJury Decision Processes,
16 LAW &HUM. BEHAV. 597 (1992) (defense offer of such evidence in support of self-defense leads to
moderate increasein favorabledefendant's verdicts).
294. See Mosteller, supra note 162, at 92.
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reporting or recantation,295 the balance may shift in favor of allowing
testimony explaining in general terms why such behavior is not
necessarily inconsistent with abuse. Even in this situation, however, the
testimony should meet minimal Daubert and Kumho Tire standards, and
great care must be taken to avoid expert pronouncements about the
particular victim.296 Given that FRE 403 onlyprotects a litigant from
evidence that is unfairly prejudicial, reliable rebuttal evidence from a
qualified expert restricted to educating the jury regarding the behavior
of abuse victims would not appear to fall into that category.297 In all
other contexts, FRE 403 generally should screen out syndrome testi
mony.
IV. Costs and Benefits of Admitting Behavioral
Science Evidence
One might ask: Even if there are troubling issues regarding the use
of social science in the courtroom, what is the harm in admitting it for
whatever value it has to the factfinder?
In this regard, it is instructive to note that the FederalJudicial Center
survey ofjudgesand attorneys298 foundthat theproblemmostfrequendy
cited by both groups regarding expert testimony was that "experts
abandon objectivity and become advocates for the side that hired
them," followed closely by the "excessive expense" of expert wit
nesses.299 Other recurrent observations were that the conflictamong the
experts at trial often "defies reasoned assessment," and that there is a
295. In Mxon v. United States, 728 A.2d 582 (DC 1999), for example, defense counsel persistentiy
argued that the complainant's testimony was not credible because for a long period she failed to report, and
even denied, the alleged abuse, and that this conduct belied her allegations. Id. He pursued this line during
his opening, cross of the complainant, and closing. Id. at 590.
But as onejudge has aptly warned, "simple cross-examination willdisclosesome inconsistencies
in the child's testimony. This leaves the defendant the dubious decision of either not cross examining the
child witness or cross examining the child witness, thereby allowing the State to pull its 'expert' out of the
hat to testifythat each inconsistency the child gave is typical of a sexuallyabused child." Duckett v. State,
797 S.W.2d 906, 923-24 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990) (Teague, J., dissenting).
296. "Once the jury has learned the victim's behavior from the evidence and has heard experts
explain why sexualabuse may cause delayed reporting, inconsistency,or recantation, wedo not believethe
jury needs an expert to explain that the victim's behavior isconsistent or inconsistent with the crime having
occurred." State v. Moran, 728 P.2d 248, 255 (Ariz. 1986).
297. As one court put it, "[syndrome] evidence may harm defendant's interests, but we cannot say
it is unfairly prejudicial; it merely informs jurors that commonly held assumptions are not necessarily
accurate and allows them to fairlyjudge credibility." Moran, 728 P.2d at 252; see also Steward v. State, 652
N.E.2d 490, 499 (Ind. 1995). Butcf Statev. Petrich, 683 P.2d 173, 180 (Wash.1984)(marginal benefit of
child abuse expert testimony is insufficient to outweigh substantial prejudice to defendant).
298. JOHNSONETAL.,supra note 158, at 6.
299. Id.
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"disparity in level of competence of opposing experts."300 All of these
concerns should inform our assessment ofsocial science evidence in the
courtroom.
Illustrative of the cost-benefit issues are several employment dis
crimination cases in which social science evidence was utilized.301 In
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins™2 Ann Hopkins asserted that her accounting
firm employer had denied her partnership because of gender. Her evi
dence established what the Court characterized as "clear signs" of
gender bias—to wit, comments from the partners' evaluations that de
scribed Hopkins as "macho," as "a lady using foul language," as some
one who needed to take "a course at charm school" and who had
"matured from a tough-talking somewhat masculine hard-nosed [mana
ger] to an authoritative, formidable, but much more appealing lady
[partner] candidate."303 An influential partner had advised Hopkins
that she could improve her chances for promotion if she would "walk
more femininely, talk more femininely, dress more femininely, wear
make-up, haveher hair styled, and wearjewelry."304 Together withthe
statistical picture—662 partners at the firm, only 7 of whom were
women; of the 88 persons proposed for partnership that year, only the
plaintiffwas female—and Hopkin's very impressiverecord of success at
the firm, this made for a compelling case of discrimination.
Yet the centerpiece ofHopkin's case was the testimony of Dr. Susan
Fiske, a social psychologist, who had reviewed the partners' comments
and opined that the promotion process at Price Waterhouse was
influenced by sex stereotyping.305 Fiske explained that since Hopkins
was the only woman in the pool of candidates, even gender-neutral
remarks—she is "consistently annoying and irritating"—were probably
the product of gender bias, although Fiske admitted she could not
identify which of these particular comments were sexist.306 Dr. Fiske
testified that although she had not met any ofthe people involved in the
decisionmaking process, it was commonly accepted practice for social
psychologists to base their opinions on a review of documented com
ments in this kind of employment context.307
300. Id.
301. See generally Jane Goodman & Robert T. Groyle, Social Framework Testimony inEmployment Dis
crimination Cases, 7 BEHAV. SCI.& L. 227 (1989).





307. Id. at 235-36. Dr. Fiskealsoprovided keytestimony in a highly-publicizedsexharassment case,
RobinsonV.Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc. 760F. Supp. 1486(M.D.Fla. 1991), allegingthat the prominent
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Price Waterhouse surprisingly did not object to Fiske's testimonyat
trial,308 relieving the courts from having to rule on its admissibility.
Justice Brennan's opinion in her favor nonetheless discounts the evi
dence as "merely icing on Hopkin's cake." He wrote:
It takesno specialtraining to discern sexstereotypingin a description
of an aggressive female employee as requiring "a course at charm
school." Nor, turning to Thomas Beyer's memorable advice to
Hopkins, does it require expertise in psychology to know that, if an
employee's flawed "interpersonal skills" can be corrected by a soft-
hued suit or a new shade of lipstick, perhaps it is the employee's sex
and not her interpersonal skills that has drawn the criticism.309
The dissenters—Justices Kennedy, Rehnquist, and Scalia—ques
tioned how Fiske could discern stereotyping in comments that were
gender neutral, like "overbearing" and "abrasive," without "any know
ledge of the comments' basis in reality and without having met the
speaker or subject."310 And there is of course the question of the
reliabilityofFiske'smethodology, although the decision predatesDaubert
and Kumho Tire. But more to the point, did her testimony meet the
"helpfulness" and "fit" standards of FRE 702? Was the factfinder311
really in need of specialized assistance to determine the import of the
"walk more femininely"-type comments before them in evidence? And
could a social psychologist who has merely read the comments herself
provide them meaningful assistance?312
Addressing this very question in an age discrimination case, the
district court in Flavel v. Svedala Industries, Inc.313 answered in the affirma
tive. It refused to bar the testimony of plaintiff's industrial psychologist
concerning age stereotypes allegedly contained in company documents.
Defendant argued that the proposed testimony would "not be helpful to
the jury, which is capable of identifying age discrimination without
display of pictures of nude women at a shipyard created a hostile work environment for the few female
employees. See Shestowsky, supra note 173, at 370-71.
308. Id. at 255; see also Goodman & Groyle, supra note 301, at 235.
309. Id. at 256.
310. Id.at 293 n.5. They added that the "plaintiffwho engages the services of Dr. Susan Fiskeshould
have no trouble showing that sex discrimination played a part in any decision." Id (emphasis added).
311. The Hopkins case was tried to the district judge without a jury, pre-dating the 1991 amendments
to Title VII providing for jury trials in actions filed under that statute (now codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(c)
(2000)).
312. Dr. Fiske's evidence must be contrasted with the kind of statistical evidence routinely admitted
to prove discriminatory patterns and practices, based on the established devices of binomial distribution,
standard deviation, and multiple regression. See MlCHAELj. ZlMMER ETAL.,CASES AND MATERIALS ON
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 210-51 (6th ed. 2003); Jansonius & Gould, supra note 2, at 282-86.
313. 875 F. Supp. 550, 557-58 (E.D. Wis. 1994).
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expert opinion."314 Disagreeing, thecourtruledthat" [ejxperttestimony
on age stereotyping would make the jurors aware of [the fact that age
discrimination may arise from an unconscious application of stereotyped
notions of ability rather than from a deliberate desire to remove older
employees from the workforce] in evaluating the evidence. Moreover,
in a pattern and practice case, evidence of discriminatory conduct is
often widely-dispersed and difficult to evaluate; expert testimony as to
age stereotyping mayagain aidjurors in assessing liability."315
Where the issue in another trial was whether the plaintiff had been
discriminated against when denied tenure, the district court in Mukhtar
v. California State University, Hayward*16 admitted the testimony ofa socio
logist who haddeveloped eight criteria for"decoding"317 white behavior
towards minorities.318 Based on the presence of all eight, the expert
testified that race was a factor in the plaintiffs tenure denial. Reversing
on the ground that the district judge failed to make a reliability deter
mination with respect to the testimony, the Ninth Circuit also raised the
question of whether it was "helpful" in assisting the jury in matters
beyond theircommon knowledge.319 Indeed, the expert's"criteria"are
litde more than just common sense clues to evaluating whether any
personnel decision is based on covert illegitimate factors,320 and have
314. Id.
315. Id.
316. 299 F.3d 1053 (9th Cir. 2002), amended 319 F.3d 1073 (9th Cir. 2003). For an insightful
treatment of this case see Deborah Dyson, Comment, Expert Testimony and "Subtle Discrimination" in the
Workplace: Do We NowNeed a Weatherman toKnow Which Way the Wind Blows, 34 GOLDEN GATEU. L. REV.
37 (2004). '
317. Mukhtar, 299 F.3d at 1062. Police officers have similarly been permitted to present expert
testimony purporting to translate narcotics jargon and code for the jury. See, e.g., United States v. Plunk,
153 F.3d 1011 (9th Cir. 1998).
318. The criteria include: "a. The University's justification for denying tenure lacked 'credence;'
b. Tenure criteria were applied inconsistently; c. Inconsistent tenure criteria advantaged whites and
disadvantaged blacks; d. Tenure criteria shifted when challenged; e. Statistical evidence showed disparate
treatment; f. Procedural violations occurred in the tenure process; g. University officials trivialized and
dismissed [plaintifFs] qualifications and accomplishments; and h. University officials failed to follow
procedures for reducing racial inequality." Mukhtar, 299 F.3d at 1062.
319. Id. at 1065 n.9. The trial judge also recognized the risk that the experts would be "substituting
their judgment for what the jury ultimately has to find, which is whether, in fact, this decision was based
on race discrimination or based on legitimate academic concerns. ... I don't want to hear them each go
through all the evidence and say 'this means this and that means that,' and 'I read this testimony and that
testimony.' That will take too long and it really will invade the province of the jury." Id. at 1064-65.
320. Compare the expert testimony offered in Tyus v. Urban Search Management, 102 F.3d 256 (7th Cir.
1997), a Fair Housing Act suit alleging racially discriminatory advertising. Dr. Tarini, a psychologist,
statistician, and chair of the department ofmarketing communication at a university, wasprepared to testify
to how advertising sends a message to its target market and how an all-White advertising campaign affects
African-Americans. Id. at 263-64. Tarini relied upon peer-reviewed articles and a focus group metho
dology. Id.
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been incorporated into the structure for circumstantial proof of indivi
dual disparate treatment cases sinceMcDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green.321
Although it might appear that plaintiffs in civil rights cases would
benefit from increased receptivity of courts to social science evidence,322
in the long run it may very well work to their disadvantage. For one
thing, it raises expectations so that a plaintiff who does not have the
wherewithal to develop and present such evidence may be at a disad
vantage in the eyesofjudge and jury, as has occurred in the prosecution
of criminal cases lacking DNA or other forensic evidence.323 Such
testimony, and the employer's response to it, may also distract jurors
from the more compellingfactual and statistical foundation ofplaintiffs
case. And defendant employers will usually have more resources to
expend on their own social science experts.
Indeed, it did not take defense attorneys long to get into the expert
witness game. In EEOCv. Sears, Roebuck & Co.324 theEqualEmployment
Opportunity Commission presentedcompellingstatistical proof that the
defendant retailer had engaged in systemic nationwide discrimination
againstwomen, specifically the concentration offemaleemployeesin the
lower-level salesjobs paid hourly, while male employeesdominated the
higher-payingcommissions positions. Searsfocused itsresponsein large
part on several social science experts who made out a "lack ofinterest"
defense: American society has socialized women with a set of values
that distinguishes them from men in the workplace: they are lesscom
petitive, less aggressive, and less willing to accept risk; consequendy
women generally are not attracted to rough-and-tumble commissions
sales positions. Sears asserted, and both the district and circuit courts
accepted, that "lack of interest" and not discrimination was the real
321. 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Seegenerally Dyson, supra note 316, at 45-49; Mark S. Brodin, The Demise
ofCircumstantial ProofinEmployment Discrimination Litigation: St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, Pretext, and the
'Personality Excuse', 18BERKELEYJ.EMP.&LAB.L. 183(1997). Thejury willusuallybe instructedregarding
this structure of proof.
For more on the use(andrejection)ofexperts in employment discrimination cases,seeJansonius
& Gould, supra note 2, at 297-309.
322. One writer goes so far as to suggest that "[ejxpert testimony is so useful for correcting the
substantial misperceptions and biases of the jurors or judges—the lay people—who decide sexual
harassment cases that this testimony should be regarded as necessary for the just adjudication of sexual
harassment claims." Shestowsky, supra note 173, at 359.
323. See Richard Willing,"CSIEffect" HasJuries Wanting More Evidence, USATODAY, Aug. 5, 2004, at
Al; Jonathan Saltzman &John Ellement,Jurors Seen asReluctant toConvict, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 12, 2004,
atBl.
324. 628F.Supp. 1264 (N.D.IU. 1986),^839 F.2d 302 (7th Cir. 1988). Seegenerally Vicki Schultz,
Telling Stories About Women and Work: Judicial Interpretation ofSex Segregation in the Workplace in Title VII Cases
Raising the Lack ofInterestArgument, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1749(1990); ZlMMERETAL.,M/>ra note 312, at 278-
80.
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reason women were underrepresented in the betterjobs.325 The em
ployer's experts included two noted feminist scholars326 who might have
been expected to be on the opposite side of the litigation.
EEOCv. Sears, Roebuck & Co. was reportedly the longest trial in the
history of the Seventh Circuit, generating more than 20,000 transcript
pages of testimony.327 "Each side called numerous expert witnesses,
some ofwhom contributed book-length reports to the trial record."328
And in the processSears "had created, and prevailed with, a potent new
defense foremployers in TitleVII cases."329
For years it was gospelamong most liberals and progressives that an
activist Supreme Court was a good thing. But as the Warren Court
gave way to the Burger Court and then the Rehnquist Court, views
changed dramatically. The weapon of the social science expert could
be, and has now certainly been, turned against civil rights plaintiffs.330
"Hired guns" can be pointed in any direction.
The fair and proper useof socialscienceevidencewould require that
bothlitigants have relatively equal access to such experts,331 to related
resources, and to skilled counsel. This is not always, or even often, the
case. Particularly in criminal cases, and certainly where defendant is
indigent, it is not likely the defensewillbe able to retain either a testify
ing expert or one who may be consulted for purposes of challenging the
testimony of the government's expert.332 Not surprisingly, the most
dramatic increase in guiltyverdictshas been documented where the pro
secution expert isnot countered bya defense expert.333
325. See Sears, 628 F. Supp. at 1323-24; Sears, 839 F.2d at 330-31. In his separate opinionJudge
Cudahy complained: "Perhaps the most questionableaspectof the majorityopinion is its acceptanceof
women's allegedlow interest and qualifications for commission sellingas a complete explanation for the
huge statistical disparities favoring men." Sears, 839 F.2d at 360-61 (concurringin part and dissenting in
part).
326. Dr. Rosalind Rosenberg, an associateprofessor of history at Barnard College specializingin
American Women's history, andJuliet Brudney, a consultant and writer on employment issuesinvolving
women. Sears, 628 F. Supp. at 1307-08.
327. ZlMMERETAL.,supra note 312, at 278.
328. Id. (quoting Thomas Haskell & Sanford Levinson, Academic Freedom and Expert Witnessing:
HistoriansandtheSears Case, 66 TEX. L. REV. 1629, 1636-37 (1988)).
329. Id. at 278.
330. Along similar lines, one writer has argued that if rape trauma syndrome evidence is admitted
when offered by the prosecution to establish guilt, defendants must be permitted to offer evidence that an
allegedvictimdid not exhibit indicia of the syndrome to establishinnocence (whichmight necessitatea com
pulsory psychiatric examination of the victim). Lawrence, supra note 84, at 1702. At least one court has
agreed. See Henson v. State, 535 N.E.2d 1189 (Ind. 1989).
331. ProfessorMargaret Berger has argued that judges should consider " [w]hether both sidesto the
controversy have reasonably comparable access to scientific authorities" in deciding to admit expert
testimony. Symposium on Science andthe Rules ofEvidence, 99 F.R.D. 187, 231 (1983).
332. See United States v. Crisp, 324 F.3d 261, 273 (4th Cir. 2003) (Michael, C.J., dissenting).
333. Neil J. Vidmar & Regina A. Schuller, Juries andExpert Evidence: Social Framework Testimony, 52
LAW& CONTEMP.PROBS. 133, 159 (1989).
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In sum, asthe First Circuitput it in a case involving experteyewitness
identification testimony, there is good reason to avoid imposing upon
the parties "the time and expense involved in a battle of experts."334
This is particularly so given alternative ways to educate jurors and
improve the accuracyof decisionmaking. Perhaps the most obvious is
through use of specialized jury instructions. Judge Easterbrook has
suggested that judges in identification cases
inform jurors of the rapid decrease of accurate recollection, and the
problem ofsuggestibility, without encountering the delay and pitfalls
ofexperttestimony. Jurors are morelikely to acceptthat information
coming from ajudge than from a scholar, whose skills do not lie in the
ability to persuade layjurors (and whose fidgeting on the stand, an
unusual place for a genuine scholar, is apt to be misunderstood).
Altogetherit is much better forjudges to incorporate scientific know
ledgeabout the trial processinto that process,rather than to make the
subjecta debatable issue in everycase.335
Obviously the matters of what instruction to give, under what
circumstances it is to be given, and howit is to be phrased are not incon
sequential and must be resolved. But jury instructions on eyewitness
334. United States v. Fosher, 590 F.2d 381, 384 (1stCir. 1979). As another court cautioned,
The result [ofadmittingpsychological evidence offered by defendant] mustnecessarily be
a "battle of experts" concerning the validityof the expert evidence. This would consume
substantial court time and cost both parties much time and expense. Much of the trial
wouldfocus on the tangential issueof the reliability of the expert evidencerather than the
central issueofwhat the defendantsdid or did not do. The inevitability of a "battle of the
experts" in this typeof caseis clear. In so subjective a field as psychiatry, the experts are
bound to differ. The partieswill spenduntold time and moneylocatingexpertsand pre
paring to cross-examine opposing experts. Court time will then be spentpresenting the
experts. With so much attention paid to the expert testimony,it is likelythat the attention
of the jury will be similarly diverted.
Statev. Cavallo,443 A.2d 1020,1025(N.J. 1982). Such batdesalsoengendercynicism about the courts,
leading observers to wonder
whether or not one or more of these expertshave been compromised by the people who
hired them to testify, since it's hard to look at one set of facts and see such divergent
opinions and determinations drawn from the opposing sides from those facts. This is
particularly true when applying the same theoretical criteria to those facts and where the
only apparent difference is the desired outcome each side was able to find an expert to
support. . . . Such expert presentations, in a very real way, do not facilitate but rather,
complicate the cognitive skills ofthe fact-finder that are absolutely essential whensearching
for truth.
Ronald B. Aldrine, Forensic Testimony: What Judges Want, 24 PACE L. REV. 215, 218-19 (2003). The
perceptionof the courtroom expert as a "hired gun" has becomequite prevalent. The DistrictAttorney
characterin BarryReed'spopular novel The Indictment, for example,cynically defines an expertwitness as
"a guy who's fiftymiles from home with slides." BARRY REED, THE INDICTMENT 31 (1994).
335. United Statesv. Hall, 165 F.3d 1095, 1119-20 (7th Cir. 1999) (Easterbrook, J., concurring)
(emphasis omitted).
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identification have worked quite well insomejurisdictions,336 andsimilar
336. For a compelling argument in favor ofjudicial instructions overexperttestimony, seeWalker
&Monahan,supra note 11,at 592-98. For several empirical studies of the effect ofsuchinstructions, see
Vidmar & Schuller, supra note 11, at 164-66.
Cautionary instructions on eyewitness identification go backat leastto United States v. Telfaire,
469 F.2d 552 (D.C. Cir. 1972). In Massachusetts, a defendantwho fairly raises the issue of mistaken
identification is entitled to an instruction on the factors relevant to reliability. Seegenerally LlACOS ETAL.
.yw/>ra note 66, § 10.3.3,at 698-701. It is crafted as follows:
"One of the mostimportant issues in this caseis the identification of the defendantas the
perpetrator of the crime. The Government has the burdenofproving identity, beyond a
reasonable doubt. It is not essential that the witness himself be free from doubt as to the
correctnessof hisstatement. However,you, thejury, must be satisfied beyond a reasonable
doubt of the accuracyof the identification of the defendantbeforeyou may convicthim.
Ifyouarenot convinced beyonda reasonable doubtthat thedefendant wasthepersonwho
committed the crime, you must find the defendant not guilty.
"Identification testimonyis an expression of beliefor impressionby the witness. Its value
depends on theopportunity thewitness had to observe the offender at the timeoftheoffense
and to make a reliable identification later.
"In appraising the identification testimony ofa witness, youshouldconsiderthe following:
"Are you convinced that the witness had the capacity and an adequate opportunity to
observe the offender?
"Whether the witness had an adequate opportunity to observethe offenderat the time of
the offense willbe affectedby such matters as how long or short a time wasavailable,how
faror closethewitness was,howgoodwerelightingconditions,whether the witness had had
occasion to see or know the person in the past.
"In general,a witness basesany identification he makeson hisperception through the use
of his senses. Usuallythe witness identifies an offenderby the senseof sightbut this is not
necessarily so, and he may use other senses.
"Areyou satisfied that the identification madeby the witness subsequentto the offense was
the product of his own recollection? You may take into account both the strengthof the
identification, and the circumstances under which the identification was made.
"If the identificationby the witness may have been influencedby the circumstancesunder
which the defendant was presented to him for identification, you should scrutinize the
identification withgreatcare. Youmayalsoconsiderthe lengthoftime that lapsedbetween
the occurrence of the crime and the next opportunity of the witness to see the defendant,
as a factor bearing on the reliability of the identification.
"You may also take into account that an identification made by pickingthe defendant out
ofa group of similarindividuals is generallymore reliablethan one which resultsfrom the
presentation of the defendant alone to the witness.
"You may take into account any occasions in which the witness failed to make an
identification of defendant, or made an identification that was inconsistent with his
identification at trial.
"Finally,you must consider the credibilityof each identificationwitnessin the same way as
anyother witness, considerwhetherhe istruthful, and considerwhether he had the capacity
and opportunity to make a reliable observation on the matter covered in his testimony.
"I againemphasizethat the burden ofproof on the prosecutorextendsto everyelementof
the crime charged, and this specifically includesthe burden ofproving beyond a reasonable
doubt the identity of the defendant as the perpetrator of the crime with which he stands
charged. If after examining the testimony, you have a reasonable doubt as to the accuracy
of the identification, you must find the defendant not guilty."
Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 391 N.E.2d 889, 897-98 (Mass. 1979). Specific instructions may also be
provided regardingthe decreasedreliabilityof so-calledcross-racial identifications. See Commonwealthv.
Hyatt, 647 N.E.2d 1168, 1171 (Mass. 1995); State v. Cromedy, 727 A.2d 457 (N.J. 1999) (mandating
instruction).
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instructions, drafted with the assistance of social scientists,337 could be
devised, for example, to assist jurors in understanding the way a victim
of abuse might respond in particular circumstances.
V. Conclusion
"It isa fundamental principle ofour systemofcriminal justice that we
do not convict people ofcrimes on the basis ofstatistics or models; it
appears equally that we do not attempt to determine whether some
one has been a victim of crime on the same basis."338
"In the final analysis, the more that courts permit experts to advise the
jury based on probability, classifications, syndromes and traits, the
more we remove from the jury its historic function of assessing
credibility. While a criminal may be facile with his denials and
explanations and a child may be timid and halting, we entrust to the
wisdom of the twelve men and women who comprise the jury the
responsibility to sort between the conflicting versions of events and
arrive at a proper verdict."339
Undeniably, social scientists have made important contributions to
our understanding of human behavior, and mental health professionals
perform an invaluable service to patients. But a courtroom is not a
sociology class,and a trial is not a therapy session. The task of litigation
is dispute resolution, determining guilt in criminal cases and liability in
civilmatters. The players—judge, jury, lawyers,witnesses—are assign
ed narrowly defined roles, and the data employed in the process must
pass through evidentiary filters designed to minimize distortion and
maximize the accuracy of the fact-finding. The goal of the entire
enterprise is to ascertain the truth while at the same time avoiding
"unjustifiable expense and delay."340
Because the factfinders—the jurors—are amateurs, they will some
times need help from specialists. But before such a person testifies it
must be demonstrated that the jurors truly need assistance on the matter,
that the witness is qualified to assist them, and that the theories and
methodologies employed by the witness are valid and reliable. Where
the "assistance" amounts to litde more than telling the jurors which
witness to believe, the expert has intruded into the very area where the
337. Judge Easterbrook noted that the pattern instructions of both the Federal Judicial Center and
the Seventh Circuit were formulated with such assistance. Hall, 165 F.3d at 1119-20 (Easterbrook, J.,
concurring).
338. Commonwealth v. Deloney, 794 N.E.2d 613, 622 (Mass. App. Ct. 2003).
339. Newkirk v. Commonwealth, 937 S.W.2d 690, 696 (Ky. 1997).
340. Fed. R. Evid. 102.
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laypersonsreign supreme. And where the jurors willlikelybe confused,
distracted from the main issues, or unduly impressed by and focused
upon the expert's pedigree or confidence level, such testimony should
be avoided. All of this argues against the admission of behavioral
evidence, particularly of the syndrome variety.
There can be no denying the prevalence of horrific crimes in our
society, particularly against children. A casual perusal of the morning
newspaper provides chilling confirmation of the magnitude of the
problem. There is equally no denying the great difficulties prosecutors
face when attempting to prove abuse:
Often these cases pit the word of a traumatized child against that
of an adult. Child sexual abuse typically occurs in private, when the
abuser is confident that there will be no witnesses. Therefore, the
child victim is usually the only eyewitness. The prosecution's case is
severelyhampered if the court finds the child to be too young to be a
witnessor incompetent to testify. Even if the child does testify,several
factors often limit the effectiveness of this testimony. The child's
cognitive and verbal abilities may not enable her to give consistent,
spontaneous, and detailed reports ofher sexual abuse. A child who
must testify against a trusted adult, such as a parent or relative, may
experience feelings offear and ambivalence, and may retract her story
because of family pressures or insensitivities in the legal process.
Prosecutors face another dilemma when offering the child victim
as a witness if the child has delayed reporting the abuse. Jurors may
interpret delayed disclosure as evidence of fabrication, especially if
defense counsel suggests this conclusion during cross-examination of
the child. Further, jurors may hold misconceptions that the child has
memory deficits, is suggestible, cannot distinguish between fact and
fantasy, or is likely to fabricate sexual experiences with adults. These
problems are compounded by the lack of corroborative physical or
mentalevidence in manychildsexual abuse cases.341
Yet the daunting challenge in these and other prosecutions, notably
rape and domestic violence, can only explain the temptation for prosecu
tors to offer, and courts to admit, evidence ofdubious reliability, helpful
ness, and probative value. It certainly cannotjustify the admission of
behavioral science testimony carrying a misleading "scientific" cache
that mayundercutthe accused's presumption ofinnocence342 and result
341. Lisa R. Askowitz, Comment, Restricting the Admissibility of Expert Testimony in Child Sexual Abuse
Prosecutions: Pennsylvania Takes it tothe Extreme, 47 U. MIAMIL. REV. 201, 201-03 (1992) (citations omitted).
342. It has been observed, for example, that" [m]ore and more, the biggestconsumers of the battered
woman syndrome over the lastseveralyearsare prosecutors who are usingit to elude the character evidence
rules in their prosecutions of alleged batterers." Faigman, supra note 27, at 674; see alsoNewkirk, 937 S.W.2d
at 695-96; Steward v. State, 652 N.E.2d 490,494 (Ind. 1995); Commonwealth v. Dunkle, 602 A.2d 830,
838 (Pa. 1992).
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in a wrongful conviction, and sometimes the consequent exoneration of
the actually guilty party. It is not onlyDaubert but fundamental prin
ciples ofevidence doctrine that demand considerably more skepticism
than has been shown toward this mode of proof.
